University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1997

The logic of contingent existence.
Daniel M. Kervick
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Kervick, Daniel M., "The logic of contingent existence." (1997). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 2308.
https://doi.org/10.7275/c9yg-0685 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2308

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THE LOGIC OF CONTINGENT EXISTENCE

A Dissertation Presented

by
DANIEL M. KERVICK

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1997

Philosophy

© Copyright by Daniel Michael Kervick 1997
All Rights Reserved

THE LOGIC OF CONTINGENT EXISTENCE

A Dissertation Presented

by

DANIEL M. KERVICK

Approved as to style and content by:

'i/Sd
Fred Feldman, Member

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis began as a paper written for a seminar on

Actualism taught by Professor Edmund Gettier at the
University of Massachusetts in the Spring of 1984. The work
was accomplished at intermittent intervals, and an

inordinate amount of time has elapsed between its inception
and its completion.

Thus it is impossible to personally

recognize all of the people who have assisted me along the

way
My greatest philosophical debts are to my teachers and
to my fellow graduate students in the Philosophy Department

at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Foremost among

these is Professor Gettier, my dissertation director.
have,

of course,

I

benefitted from many specific comments and

criticisms during the course of the writing.

Ed provided me

with a very full set of comments on the earliest drafts of
Chapters

3,

4,

and

5,

and helped me to extract an

interesting thesis from those more vague early ideas.
But, beyond this, my progress has been aided

immeasurably by the example of clarity and exactness that Ed
always displayed in his classes and seminars at UMass, and
in all of his philosophical work.
me,

That example has inspired

throughout the writing, as an ideal to which

tried to measure up.

IV

I

have

but complementary, example was provided by

my teacher Fred Feldman.

Fred often stated that the truth

must be simple, and seemed to have a way of doing full
justice to the issues, without making things more complex
than they had to be.

And,

he helped me to recognize a

personal tendency to take a dilatory route in addressing

philosophical issues, when a more direct one was available.
I

have tried to improve myself in this area, but, given the

amount of time

taken in completing this thesis,

I

I

fear

I

have not been quite as successful in emulating this ideal.

My development as a philosopher has been greatly aided
by my many discussions with my friends Mark Aronszajn and
Paul McNamara.

I

shared an office with Mark during my years

of course work at UMass,

and he helped me learn the value of

slowing down and getting things right.
of unpretentiousness,

that

I

Paul set a standard

intellectual honesty and diligence

have tried, not always successfully, to match.

A number of other people have assisted me in various
ways.

Tom Blackson read an early draft of a now-defunct

chapter, and helped me to identify the most important

claims.

Portions of the thesis were presented to the

Philosophy department at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University, and an earlier draft of Chapter

3

was

presented to a gathering of UMass grad students and
professors.

Philip Bricker, Gary Matthews, Ned Markosian

and Ted Sider made particularly valuable comments.
v

I

would like to thank the employees at the computer

centers at St. Anselm College and Plymouth State College for

much needed technical assistance.

I

would also like to

thank the staff at Blake's Ice Cream in Manchester, New
Hampshire, where the bulk of the final draft of the thesis

was written.

They provided a cheerful atmosphere and ample

free refills of iced coffee

discovered,
And,

I

-

an essential nutrient,

I

have

for thesis-writing.

would like to thank my parents Daniel

J.

Kervick

and Claire Kervick, for providing a home environment in

which philosophical questioning was valued and appreciated.
I

have often realized that my thinking on some philosophical

topic had its origin in kitchen- table discussions of such

things as God,

free will and morality.

Children who are

left to confront life without this kind of encouragement
are,

I

think,

truly impoverished.

My debts to my wife, Lourdes Jimenez and my son, Ian
Kervick- Jimenez are in this, as in all things, inestimable.

vi

ABSTRACT
THE LOGIC OF CONTINGENT EXISTENCE

SEPTEMBER 1997

DANIEL M. KERVICK, B.A., TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Ph D
.

.

,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Edmund Gettier III

Among modal claims, claims that involve the notions of

broadly logical possibility and necessity, one that seems
almost trivial is this: that if some proposition is
possible,

then it is possibly true.

However,

there is an

argument, due in its essentials to the medieval philosopher

and logician Jean Buridan, to the effect that this seemingly
trivial claim is, in fact, untrue.

Briefly put, the argument is this.

proposition that Quine does not exist.

Let Q be the

Since Quine's

existence is contingent, Q is possible.

But,

propositions

are ontologically dependent upon their constituents, and

Quine is a constituent of

Q.

So,

necessarily, were Quine

not to exist, neither would Q exist.

And,

a necessary

condition of a proposition's being true is that it exist.
Hence,

there are propositions, such as

but not possibly true.

I

Q,

that are possible,

call this conclusion,

with certain other similar claims,

together

'Buridanism'

My main topic is the evaluation of the argument for
Buridanism, and the exploration of the consequences of
Vll

Buridanism for modalist theories of possible worlds and for
modal logic.

I

begin by examining the two crucial premises

in the argument for Buridanism

N-dependency, according to

:

which propositions expressed by sentences containing proper
names are singular propositions that depend ontologically

upon the referents of those names, and Buridan's Thesis,

according to which a proposition can be neither necessary,
nor possible, nor true, unless it exists.

Robert Adams has argued that accepting Buridanism
forces us to revise the modalist conception of possible

worlds as maximal and consistent propositions or sets of
propositions.

I

show that this is not the case, and provide

an analysis of a proposition's being true relative to a

world that allows us to maintain the modalist account while
embracing Buridanism.
Standard systems of quantified modal logic are prone to
several related problems that

contingency.

I

refer to as the problems of

These systems often include as theorems

formulas that seem to presuppose that everything that
exists,
logic,

exists necessarily.
BML

,

I

develop a system of modal

based upon Buridanism, that is able to overcome

these difficulties.

viii
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

What follows is an examination of metaphysical, logical
and semantical issues concerning broadly logical modality
and the interpretation of modal discourse.

The inquiry

focuses on a particular question:

Actualism

+

Singular Propositions

and a particular answer to the question that
'

Buridanism

=

I

?

call

'

Actualism is the thesis that there is nothing that does
not actually exist, or equivalently, that there is nothing

save what exists in the actual world.

Singular

propositions, as described in the work of David Kaplan, are
the semantic contents of sentences containing a directly

referential singular term.

With regard to the individuals

that they are about, they may be said to involve those

individuals directly rather than by way of some individual
concept.

It is the individual itself and not some

corresponding property or concept that is the relevant

propositional component.

Buridanism is a family of related, and somewhat
unorthodox, modal claims.

One of these claims is that there

1

are propositions that are possible but not possibly
true;

and another is that there are propositions that are
necessary, but not necessarily true.

Buridanism includes

some other important results: that there are propositions
that are possible, but not necessarily possible; that there

are propositions that are necessary, but not necessarily

necessary; and that there are propositions that are true,
but not necessarily possible.

Readers acquainted with the

standard systems of modal logic will recognize that these
last three claims amount to a denial of the validity of the

characteristic axioms of the familiar modal systems
and B.

S5

S4

:

:

B:

S5,

S4

Those axioms are:

OP d OOP

DP
P 3

=>

COP

OOP

It must be admitted at the outset that many

philosophers, and probably most philosophers, would find

Buridanism to be a highly counterintuitive doctrine.

So

perhaps, before proceeding, something of an apology is

required.

Why is Buridanism worthy of an extended

examination?
The foremost reason is that, with all due respect to

initial intuitions, there is an interesting argument for

2

Buridanism.

And, while

acknowledge that some may not find

I

the argument entirely compelling, when taken as a whole,

I

believe that each premise of the argument, taken
individually,

is at least as reasonable as its negation.

The present study

then,

,

should not be viewed as a defense

of the argument for Buridanism, but rather as a sympathetic

examination of the argument.

I

hope to convince the reader

only that Buridanism is at least a live option in the

philosophy of modality
This is important.

-

that it might be true.
If Buridanism is true,

the

consequences for modal logic and the philosophy of modality
are significant.

I

have already indicated that Buridanism

impugns the correctness of each of S5, S4 or B as the logic
of modality.

It will be shown that even the minimal system

T is defeated on Buridanian principles.

characteristic axiom of

T:

DP

While the

T,

^ P

is upheld,

there is a failure of the metatheoretic principle

of necessitation

Nec

:

i-$

-

i-Do

N is common to all normal systems of modal logic
T.

1
,

including

Of course, not every instance of necessitation will

3

but one crucial instance that does fail is the one in

fail,

which

is replaced by the familiar duality principle:

'O'

OP

D:

=

nQ-nP.

While D will still turn out to be a theorem of propositional
modal logic, its necessitation will not.

An important

consequence of this failure is that, unlike the case with
standard modal logics, in Buridanian modal logic the
following formulas are not equivalent, respectively, to the
axioms S5,

CS5

:

CS4

:

CB:

S4 and B:

ODP

o

DP

OOP

=>

OP

ODP

3 p.

In the course of this study,

will develop a modal

called 'Buridanian Modal Logic', or

logic

-

D,

CS5,

T,

I

'

BML

'

-

CS4 and CB are theorems, but in which S5,

in which
S4,

B

and the rule of necessitation fail.

A second reason for examining Buridanism is that it
provides an exceptionally good point of entry for the study
of many issues of fundamental importance in metaphysics and

philosophical logic.

As will be seen,

the evaluation of the

argument for Buridanism requires at least some discussion of
a number of related issues

-

Actualism and Possibilism, the

4

nature of propositions and possible worlds, de re and
de
dicto modality, and the semantics of singular reference to
name just a few of these issues.

In addition,

attention

must be paid to certain more technical issues in modal and
intensional logic and in possible worlds semantics.

Because

consideration of the argument for Buridanism requires the
consideration of so many important related issues,

I

believe

that the examination that follows is valuable, no matter how
the case for Buridanism itself ultimately turns out.

This thesis may be seen in part as offering what Harry
Deutsch,

following Arthur Prior, has called a logic for

contingent beings

2
.

Such a logic is required in order to

avoid commitment to the claim that if something exists, it

necessarily exists.
claim,

Despite the obvious invalidity of this

it is one that certain classical systems of modal

logic do not manage to avoid.

There are some additional,

and related, problems with classical modal logics
that

I

-

problems

refer to collectively as the problems of contingency.

The manner in which BML solves the problems of contingency

will be contrasted with the solutions put forward by Arthur
Prior,

Saul Kripke, Chris Menzel and Deutsch himself.

Finally, a third reason for examining Buridanism is

that Buridanism and related issues have already generated a

sizeable amount of discussion in contemporary philosophy,

5

although so far as
used before

.

I

know the term 'Buridanism' has not been

In addition to the philosophers mentioned in

the previous paragraph, Buridanism has been discussed

directly or tangentially by
Plantinga

,

G.

E.

Moore, Arthur Prior, Alvin

Robert Adams, John Pollock, Graeme Forbes, Alan

McMichael and Nathan Salmon among others. 3

Much of this

discussion has been penetrating, but much more needs to be
done to clarify just what is at stake, to compare
alternatives, and to decide who might be right.
I

wish to emphasize that Actualism will be presupposed

in this thesis and not defended.

Chapter Two will be

devoted to an explication of Actualism and to a
clarification of just what it does and does not entail, but
no defense will be ventured.

While

I

do strongly incline

toward Actualism, the absence of an argument for Actualism
is not meant to suggest that

take it to be obviously true,

I

or to disparage alternative possibilist views.

Indeed, much

of the most important contemporary work on the philosophy of

modality takes a possibilist approach.

It is only the

necessity of setting manageable bounds to the inquiry that
is responsible for the lack of a more ambitious defense.

1

.

1

Overview

The remainder of Chapter One is concerned with general

philosophical background and technical preliminaries.
6

The

key doctrines of Buridanism are introduced informally,
and

compared with the earliest form of Buridanism, as found
in
the work of the medieval philosopher and logician Jean

Buridan,

from whom the thesis takes its name.

The language

of first order modal logic is presented along with an

explanation of some of the techniques of possible worlds
semantics.

A technique is presented for passing from a

particular possible worlds semantics to a corresponding
extensional world theory by sifting out metalinguistic
elements.

A brief sketch of a modalized version of ramified

type theory will be presented in outline.

Finally,

some

preliminary points are raised concerning the relationship
between modal discourse and different kinds of talk of
possible worlds.
Chapter Two is devoted to a presentation and

explanation of Actualism and its contradictory, Possibilism.

Actualism is defined, and shown to be incompatible with two
interesting, but distinct, varieties of possibilism:

Meinongian Possibilism, which takes possibilia to be certain
kinds of nonexistent things, and Lewisean Possibilism, which
takes possibilia to be existing things inhabiting other

concrete universes

-

universes that are causally and

spatiotemporally isolated from ours.

In the last section of

the chapter, a question is raised about the compatibility of

7

extensional world theories and Actualism.

I

argue that

there is a serious problem here, and that the Actualist

should be skeptical of standard possible worlds analyses of

modal discourse.
In Chapter Three,
is introduced.

the notion of a singular proposition

Singular propositions are initially

identified as the contents of sentences containing directly
referential singular terms.
of David Kaplan,

reference'

reference.

An examination of the writings

to whom my use of the term 'direct

is due,

reveals two different notions of direct

One of these, which

I

call

'prior reference',

is

selected as the basis for the ensuing discussion of singular
propositions.

The chapter concludes with a proposal for

identifying singular propositions, and the constituents of
those propositions, in a way that is language- independent

but which does not presuppose that they are structured

entities
In Chapter Four,

one main question is addressed:

whether sentences containing proper names express
propositions that are ontologically dependent on the
referent of that name.

This question prompts two subsidiary

questions: whether sentences containing proper names express

singular propositions in which the referent of the name is a
constituent, and whether singular propositions depend

8

onto logically on their constituents.

question

is,

I

The first subsidiary

believe, more tractable, and the bulk of the

chapter is devoted to the arguments for treating names as
devices of direct reference.

The second question raises

issues about the ultimate nature of propositions,

issues

that can not all be addressed within the scope of the

present study; but, it will be argued that intuitive
considerations about the way propositions represent the

world suggest that singular propositions are structured
entities, and that it is plausible,

then,

that they are

ontologically dependent on their constituents.
Chapter Five deals with the crucial premise in the

argument for Buridanism

-

that for any proposition it is

necessary that if that proposition is necessary, or
possible, or true, then it exists.

I

call this premise

-

which is really a conjunction of three distinguishable
premises

-

'Buridan's Thesis'.

I

first discuss what

I

take

to be the metaphysical consequences of accepting Buridan's

Thesis,

that is,

'Buridanism'

.

I

the cluster of views that

I

call

then turn to issues having to do with the

relationship between Buridanism and modalist accounts of

possible worlds.

I

argue that there is a very simple and

straightforward account of possible worlds that is
compatible with Buridanism, and

9

I

show that modalists need

not adopt a more complicated account, due
to Robert M.
Adams.

Finally,

Thesis.

I

turn to the evaluation of Buridan's

The most popular way of defending the thesis
is via

a doctrine that Alvin Plantinga has called

Actualism

1

-

'Serious

for any property P and individual x,

necessary that if x has

P,

then x exists.

major problems with this approach.

it is

There are two

First,

the problem of

formulating Serious Actualism in a way that is not subject
to counterexample.

Second,

the problem of showing that

Buridan's Thesis, or one of the three components of
Buridan's Thesis, is an instance of such a formulation.

I

conclude the chapter with a consideration of these problems.
If Buridanism is false,

a defense of S5 as the modal

logic of broadly logical possibility and necessity can be

given by appealing to the idea that propositions have their

modality essentially.
more interesting.
logic

-

If Buridanism is true,

things are

Chapter Six outlines a system of modal

Buridanian Modal Logic, or BML

.

I

describe certain

problem sentences for standard modal logics that
collectively the "problems of contingency", and
BML is able to avoid these problems.

I
I

call

show how

Finally, BML is

contrasted with four other logical approaches to the
problems of contingency: the free logical approach, Arthur
Prior's system

Q,

Harry Deutsch's Logic for Contingent

10

Beings and Chris Menzel

'

s

True Modal Logic,

In each case,

I

argue that the solution offered by BML is superior.
In an Appendix,

BML is developed formally.

An

axiomatization is produced for propositional BML.

Also,

a

modified possible worlds style semantics is given, and
soundness and completeness relative to the semantics are
proven.
only.

The semantics is held to be of instrumental value
I

believe that BML should be generated as a sub-

theory within a more comprehensive intensional logic, and
that an adequate account of its real semantics will depend
on whatever the best semantics of intensional logic turns

out to be

1

.

2

Buridanism

-

Historical Background

Buridanism is named after the medieval philosopher and
logician Jean Buridan.

It is a modern counterpart of views

that Buridan presented in his Sophismata as a solution to a

certain sophism or logical puzzle 4

,

describing some aspects of Buridan’

so
s

I

Buridan’

s

discussion

and serves as an

contemporary version of

excellent introduction to the

Buridanism that

will begin by

presentation of the

puzzle, and of his attempted solution.
is both interesting and ingenious,

I

will introduce in the next section.

In chapter eight of Buridan’

s

Sophismata,

the chapter

on insolubles, Buridan considers the following sophism.
11

1.1)

Every proposition is affirmative, so none is
negative.

The question is whether or not the above is a valid

consequence
sophism,

.

To understand the problem posed by the

it is necessary to appreciate some characteristic

features of medieval logic 5

.

According to most medieval logicians, propositions come
in three varieties.

A propositions is either a thought, or

a visible or audible expression of a thought.

Another way

of putting this is that every proposition is either mental,

spoken or written.

The medievals did not regard a written

proposition as a type of sentence that could be inscribed on
separate occasions, but as the inscription itself: what we

would call a sentence token.
localized,

It is an individual that has a

temporary existence.

Similarly,

spoken

propositions were taken to be particular token events with
definite temporal boundaries.

A mental proposition was a

also an event token, a temporary "modification of the
intellect".

It was thought to involve the coming into

existence of a token in the language of thought.

All

propositions then are ontologically individual temporal
entities.

They are individuals that first come into

existence and, afterward, cease to exist.

12

The doctrine that propositions are individual
events or

inscriptions raises a number of difficulties, both

philosophical and interpretive, for Buridan's discussion.
How much change in the physical character of an inscription
is required to destroy its identity?

the ascription of belief or desire?

What is involved in
Just what does it mean

when Buridan asks whether "this sophism" or "the following
sophism" is a valid consequence?

It seems that the question

being asked here will be different for each different copy
of Buridan's text.

It is not my aim to address theoretical

issues in medieval logic, but only to illustrate Buridan's

thinking in an intuitive way.

Still,

in order to discuss

this thinking with some degree of precision,

let us assume

that the subject of Buridan's inquiry is some particular

written inscription
sentence (1.1)

S of a

(Latin)

sentence that translates

.

A consequence is a proposition that asserts that one

proposition follows validly from another.
such as

S

A sentence token

was regarded as making such an assertion, not as a

mere material conditional.

A proposition is a valid

consequence if the consequent of that proposition follows

validly from its antecedent.

Since part of the problem

raised by the sophism is just what one proposition's

13

following validly from another consists in,

I

will postpone

discussion of this issue for now.
Buridan holds

to be valid,

S

and he begins his

discussion with a presentation of some simple arguments

designed to show this.

The first argument is this:

"It is proved, first, by the argument from
contraries, for just as it follows that if every
man is ill, then no man is healthy, because it is
impossible for the same person to be healthy and
ill, so it follows in the proposed [case] that it
is impossible for the same proposition to be both
affirmative and negative at once."
6

Traditionally, two terms G and H are said to be contrary
just in case it is impossible that something fall under both
G and H.

Buridan'

terms G and

1.2)

H,

and additional term

Every F is

is valid,

point is simply that,

s

the consequence

so no F is H

G,

and that

F,

for any contrary

S

is just such a consequence.

Buridan appears clearly right about

S.

Indeed,

It does seem to be

valid
After presenting two more arguments purporting to

establish the validity of the consequence, Buridan then goes
on to point out certain difficulties with the view that the

consequence is valid.

One of the difficulties is set out in

this passage:

14

"The opposite is argued, because from a
possible
proposition there does not follow an impossible.
And yet the first proposition is possible, namely,
"Every proposition is affirmative"
For God could
destroy all negatives, leaving the affirmatives.
Thus, every proposition would be affirmative.
But, the other is impossible, namely, "No
proposition is negative", for in no case could it
be true.
For whenever it is not, it is neither
true nor false, and whenever it is, then some
[proposition] is negative, namely it.
Hence, it
is false to say that none is negative." 7
.

Let's use

E

to designate the antecedent of S and 'N'

designate the consequent of

Remember that E and N are

S.

themselves particular sentence tokens, just as is

Reorganizing just a bit then,
call it 'argument A',

to

I

S.

think that the following,

is a fair rendering of Buridan's

argument

la)

E is possible.

2a)

Necessarily,

3a)

Necessarily, If N some negative exists, then N is not
true

4a)

Necessarily,
and 3a)

5a)

Necessarily, if N does not exist, N is not true,

6a)

Necessarily, N is not true.

7a)

It is impossible that N is true.

8a)

For any proposition P, if P is possible then it is
possible that P be true,

9a)

N is impossible,

if N exists,

if N exists,

then some negative exists,

N is not true.

(from 4a and 5a)

(immediately,

(from 7a and 8a)
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(from 2a

from 6a)

10a)

No impossible proposition follows validly from
a
possible,

11a)

N does not follow validly from

E.

(from la,

9a,

10a)

Buridan then describes a second problem with the assertion
that

S

is a valid consequence:

"Likewise, a consequence is not valid, if the
antecedent could be true without the truth of the
consequent.
But so it is in the proposed case
since from the fact that the antecedent could be
true and the consequent could be not true, it is
apparent that the antecedent could be true without
the truth of the consequent.
And this is clear
also because this is true:
"Every proposition is
affirmative", granting that God should destroy
negatives. And then that consequent would not be
true, because it would not be.
Hence, it is
manifest that the antecedent could be true without
the consequent.
So the consequence is not
valid. 8

The argument is quite straightforward.

We can spell it out

as follows:

lb)

It is possible that E be true,

2b)

Necessarily,

if E is true,

3b)

Necessarily,

if N does not exist,

4b)

Necessarily, if E is true, then N is not true,

then N does not exist,
it is not true,
(2b and

3b)
5b)

It is possible that E be true and N not true,
4b)
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(lb and

6b)

If an inference is valid, it is not possible
that the
premises be true while the conclusion is not true.

7b)

N does not follow validly from

Call this 'argument

(5b and 6b)

E.

B'

In the course of providing a solution to the sophism,

Buridan considers three competing accounts of validity.

He

finds the first two accounts wanting, and presents

counterexamples to show this.

He then goes on to affirm a

number of modal theses, in the context of which his own
solution emerges.
Before discussing the rejected accounts of validity,

will jump ahead to Buridan'

s

own solution.

I

The

presentatation of the solution is preceded by a preliminary
section containing a list of "conclusions" 9

.

There are five

conclusions in this section, each a part of Buridan 's own

position
Buridan 's first conclusion is that there are valid

consequences in which it is possible that the antecedent is
true while the consequent is not true.

There are also valid

consequences in which the antecedent could be true while the
consequent does not exist.

In fact,

it is the truth of the

latter claim that makes room for the truth of the former,

because Buridan holds that, for any proposition

necessary that

P is

true only if P exists.
17

P,

it is

This is one of

the components of the view that

Thesis".

I

have called "Buridan's

The supporting example Buridan gives in this

context involves (tokens of) the sentence
1.3)

A man runs, so an animal runs.

He says that this is a valid consequence even though the

antecedent could be true while the consequent
same time, destroyed.

Buridan can reject

is,

at the

The upshot of this conclusion is that

(6b)

in the second argument while

accepting all of the remaining premises.
The second conclusion is a strengthening of the first.

Not only is it possible, according to Buridan, that there
are valid consequences in which it is possible that the

antecedent be true while the consequent is not true, there
are also valid consequences in which it is possible that the

antecedent be true, and it is not possible that the
consequent ever be true.
The antecedent of

S

This is the case, he says, with

is possible,

but the consequent,

N,

S.

is

not possibly true, since to be true a proposition must exist
(Buridan's Thesis), and whenever N exists there is at least
one negative proposition,

so N is not then true.

Additionally, N itself is possible according to
Buridan.

God could destroy all negative propositions.

So,

there is some proposition that is itself both possible and
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not possibly true.

This is Buridan's third conclusion, and

it mandates the rejection of

(8a)

in the first argument.

Buridan accepts all of the remaining independent
premises in
that argument
Note,

once again, premise (6b)

in the second argument.

It states a purported necessary condition for validity.

fact,

In

it seems to be one half of a standard modal account of

validity

Df i

:

A consequence C is valid if and only if it is not
possible for the antecedent of C to be true while the
consequent of C is not true.

In rejecting this premise,

must be proposed.

a revised account of validity

According to the first revised account of

validity considered by Buridan a valid consequence is valid
because the antecedent

"

.

.

could not be true without the

truth of the consequent formed at the same time as [the
antecedent]

.

"

Relying on the particularized notion of a

proposition described earlier, we can say that two
propositions are "formed at the same time" just in case they

both exist at that time.
this

So,

we can put the proposal like

:

Df 2

:

A consequence C is valid if and only if it is not
possible that: (i) both the antecedent and the
consequent of C exist, (ii) the antecedent of C is
true and (iii) the consequent of C is not true.
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Buridan finds this proposal unacceptable.

Its

inadequacy is a consequence of the conclusions we
have

already discussed.

1.4)

Consider some token C of the following:

No proposition is affirmative,
corner

so a stick is in the

There seems to be no reason at all to say that C is a valid
consequence.

Yet Df 2

,

the result that it is.

together with the conclusions, yields
Necessarily,

if both the antecedent

and consequent of C exist, then there is at least one

affirmative proposition, namely the consequent of
is impossible that

C exist,

and (ii)

(i)

C.

So,

it

both the antecedent and consequent of

the antecedent of C is true.

But,

by the

familiar rule of modal inference:

1.5)

-i

OP

=>

-iO(P & Q)

it then follows that it is impossible that

(i)

antecedent and consequent of C exist,

the antecedent of

C is true,

(ii)

both the

and (iii) the consequent of C is not true.

Df 2 is satisfied,

Thus,

to its discredit.

The problem for Buridan, then, is to provide an

acceptable account of validity.

I

will not discuss his

proposal here, because it involves issues that do not have
counterparts in the contemporary version of Buridanism which

20

is my main topic.

I

would like, now, to turn to that

contempory version.

1

•

3

Burid anism

-

The Contemporary Clasp

Buridan's views, while interesting in their own right,

may seem to depend in an essential way on the particularized
notion of the proposition found in medieval logical theory.
In contemporary logic,

it is customary to distinguish

between sentences, their tokens, and abstract propositions

which are expressed by those sentences on occasions of
utterance.

Propositions are often seen as abstract objects

par excellence and as such exempt from the vicissitudes of
contingent temporal existence.
Things are not quite so neat, though.

Under the

influence of David Kaplan, Saul Kripke and others, many

philosophers now take seriously the idea of a singular

proposition

-

a proposition in which ordinary mortal

individuals are somehow involved as constituents,
in the proposition" in Kaplan's phrase 10

.

And,

"trapped

if some

constituent of a proposition is a contingent being, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the proposition is itself a
contingent being.
This highly impressionistic picture needs to be

sharpened.

Such will be the aim of Chapters Three and Four.

For now, though,

I

would like to offer a preliminary account
21

of singular propositions and

tins

way in which their

existence may lead to a contemporary version of Buridanism.
What follows here is not an attempt at a rigorous account of
the nature of singular propositions, nor a defense of their

claim to existence.

It is just an initial sketch.

Kaplan has argued 11 that names and indexical pronouns
function semantically as devices of direct reference.

A

directly referential singular term is perhaps best

understood as a term
referent.

whose semantic value is simply its

Directly referential singular terms may be

contrasted with other singular terms, such as definite
descriptions like "the current Attorney General", whose
semantic value seems to be more closely akin to a property.
If we regard the semantic value of a term as the

semantic input provided by that term, on a given occasion of
its use in a sentence,

proposition,

toward the determination of a

then we may picture the difference between

singular propositions and other propositions by appealing to
a structural model.

The proposition expressed by "Reno is

smiling" may be represented by the ordered pair:

<S

,

r>
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where r is Janet Reno, the woman herself and not
a

representation of her.
How the proposition expressed by "The current Attorney
General is smiling" is to be represented depends on the
correct semantic analysis of definite descriptions.
one currently popular account.
'many',

'few',

'all',

'some'

Words like 'the',

etc.

Here is

'an',

are determiners.

Their

semantic values are functions from properties to functions
from properties to propositions.

So,

the definite

description in the given sentence may be thought of as
determining a complex:

<3,

F>

in which F is the property of being the current Attorney

General, and S is a function, of the kind described above,

and that is the semantic value of 'the'
sentence,

«$,

F>,

then,

The whole

expresses a proposition with the structure

S>.

In this proposition,

the components are all properties or

fuctions of some kind.

No individual plays any role.

Singular propositions seem to be required, not just for
the semantic analysis of sentences containing names and

indexical pronouns, but also for the analysis of sentences
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involving quantification over variables within
the scope of
modal operators and other operators.

We often have need to

distinguish claims like the first de re claim below from
those like the second de dicto assertion:
1.6)

The current Attorney General could have failed to be an
Attorney General

1.7) It could have been that the current Attorney General
was not
an Attorney General.

On a strict reading,

the first says of the person who in

fact is Attorney General, Janet Reno,

failed to be Attorney General.

that she could have

Many philosophers, myself

included, would accept this claim.

The second sentence

attributes possibility to a circumstance that is logically
impossible, and the sentence is thus false.
The difference between these two can be represented

structurally as the difference between

1.8)

<<$,

1.9)

<0,

F>

,

«S,

G>,

and

F>

H»

,

where G is the property of possibly not being an Attorney
General, and H is the property of not being Attorney

General.

Now,

between G and

it seems as though there is some relationship
H.

If we take possibility to be a property of

propositions and extend the structural metaphor to cover not
24

just propositions, but properties as well,
then we might

represent G as the structure
<0,

<H,

x>>

in which <H, x> is a structure that determines a
singular

proposition when the placeholder x is replaced with an
individual.

Then the proposition (1.8) above may then be

said to be true partly in virtue of the fact that the

singular proposition <0, <H, r>> is true.

Consider now a proposition such as the proposition that
Quine does not exist (this particular proposition will be

prominently featured in what is to come)

If the above

.

story of singular propositions is roughly correct than this

proposition is a singular proposition representable as
something like:

<N0T

,

< EXISTS

,

Quine>>

where the second term of the ordered pair that is the second
term of the main pair is Quine himself.
as contingent as you or

that were the case,
pair,

exist.
not?.

I,

Now surely Quine is

and so could fail to exist.

If

it seems plain that the embedded ordered

and thus the whole ordered pair, would also fail to
(How could the embedded pair exist,

if Quine did

Would it be an ordered pair with a different second
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element?

That seems counterintuitive.

ordered pair with no second element?

contradictory notion.

-

Would it be an
Surely a

Would it be an ordered pair with a

second element that does not exist?

-

Not an actualistic

notion)

Since Quine is contingent, though, this proposition is
one that is possible.

But,

if we assume that a proposition

cannot be true if it does not exist then it seems that this

proposition could not be true.
Quine did not exist.

But,

It would be true only if

if Quine did not exist,

not exist, and so would not be true.

it would

We can use these ideas

to generate an argument against a modernized version of

in Section II,

(8a)

that is, an argument that shows that there

are propositions that are possible, but not possibly such
that they are true:

Argumen t C
(lc)

That Quine does not exist is possible,

(2c)

Necessarily, if Quine does not exist, then that Quine
does not exist does not exist,

(3c)

Necessarily, if that Quine does not exist does not
exist, then that Quine does not exist is not true,

(4c)

Necessarily, if Quine does not exist then that Quine
(from 2c and 3c)
does not exist is not true,

(5c)

Necessarily, if Quine exists, then that Quine does not
exist is not true,
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(6c)

Necessarily, that Quine does not exist is not
true,
(from 4c and 5c)

(7c)

It is not possible that that Quine does not
exist is
true, (from 6c)

(8c)

That Quine does not exist is possible, and it is not
possible that that Quine does not exist is true,
(from lc and 7c)

(9c)

There is a proposition P such that P is possible and it
is not possible that P is true. (From 8c, by EG)

Very similar arguments can be given for the conclusions
that there are propositions P such that P is possible, but
it is not necessary that P is possible,

propositions

P

necessary that

and that there are

such that P is necessary, but it is not
P is necessary.

At this point,

I

will leave

the detailed construction of these arguments to the reader,

although they will be presented less formally in Chapter
Five;

they involve modified versions of premise

(3c)

making

reference to possibility and necessity rather than truth.
What are the controversial independent premises in the

above argument?

I

believe that only premises

are seriously open to doubt.
one component of what

I

Premise (3c)

(2c)

and

(3c)

is an instance of

have called 'Buridan's Thesis’

.

The

three components are as follows:

BT X

BT

2

:

:

Necessarily, for any proposition
is necessary, then P exists,

P,

necessarily,

if P

Necessarily, for any proposition
is possible, then P exists,

P,

necessarily,

if P
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BT

3

Necessarily, for any proposition
is true, then P exists,

:

P,

necessarily

if p

These claims will be the main topic of Chapter Five.
other controversial premise,

The

may be viewed as a

(2c),

consequence of two distinct claims:
Q.

DEP

:

That Quine does not exist is a singular proposition
with Quine as a constituent.

Necessarily,
constituent

for any singular proposition P with
necessarily, if p exists then c exists.

c,

The latter claim, which

I

call the Dependency Thesis, may be

taken as saying that singular propositions are ontologically

dependent on their constituents.

The former claim,

Q,

follows from the thesis:

DRN

:

And,

Necessarily, for any sentence S containing a use of
some proper name N, the proposition expressed by S,
in a context of use in which N refers to some thing
is a singular proposition with x as a constituent.

DRN and DEP have a further consequence which

I

x,

will

refer
to as N-dependency

N-DEP

:

Necessarily, for any sentence S containing a use of
some proper name N, the proposition expressed by S,
in a context of use in which N refers to some thing
x, is ontologically dependent on x.

These claims will be the focus of Chapters Three and Four.
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Technical Preliminaries

Much of the following discussion will make reference to
the formal language of first order quantified modal logic,
ML,

and the standard semantics for that language, usually

referred to as possible worlds semantics

Actually,

possible worlds semantics is not a single interpretive
technique, but a family of closely related techniques. Here,
I

will adopt a method essentially due to Kripke 12

,

but

I

also will use the Kripke-style semantics as a basis for

comparison with other semantic frameworks.

I

will then go

on to show how to generate a sort of object language

representation of possible worlds semantics by translation
of the sentences of ML into the classical first order

language of ext ensional world theory.

1.4.1 The Language of ML

Syntax
The vocabulary of ML consists of:
a)

proposition letters

b)

truth functional connectives
>

c)

/

&

,

V,

o.

predicate letters
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d)

terms
i)

constants
a,

ii)

,

bx

,

c lt

a2

,

^1

x2

,

b2

,

c 2/

...

'

y*

^i'

y

i

/

,

y 2;

z 2/

.

.

3

modal operators
,

g)

ax

quantifiers
V,

f)

c,

variables
^

e)

b,

0

parentheses
(,

)

An expression of ML is any finite sequence of symbols drawn
from the vocabulary of ML.

An expression E of ML is a

formula of ML if and only if E is an element of the smallest
set F such that:

1)

every proposition letter is an element of

2)

for every predicate letter
any terms t lf t 2
..., t ±/

^

with superscript
t2

,

F,

...

t ±] is an

i, and
element of

F,
3)

if A is an element of F,

4)

if A and B are elements of F, then [(A &
=>
B)] and [(A = B)] are elements of F,
f (A

5)

if A is an element of F,
of F

6)

if A is an element of F, and v is a variable,
and [VvA] are elements of F.

then

[->A]

is an element of F,

then [Da] and
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B)~|,

[~0 a]

["(A

V

B)~|,

are elements

then

|~3

vA]

An expression of the form

phrase (or just

[3v]

a quantifier,

or [Vv] is called a quantifier

for short),

and v is called

the variable of that phrase.

If A is a formula,

any occurrence of the formula

[3vA~\

or [VvA],

then for

the occurrence

of A within that occurrence of the formula is
called the

scope of the corresponding occurrence of quantifiers
and

[Vv],

respectively.

[3v]

An occurrence of a variable v is

bound if and only if it is either the variable of an
occurrence of a quantifier, or it lies within the scope of
an occurrence of a quantifier and v is the variable of that

quantifier occurrence.

An occurrence of a variable that is

not bound is said to be free.

A sentence is a formula that

contains no free occurrences of any variable.

Semantics
In what follows,

let F be the set of formulas of ML, C

the set of constants of ML,
of ML and

terms,

Z

P the set of

the set of variables of ML.

is then C u Z.

We set A

predicate letters
T,

= F u C u P,

Let an ML-model be a sequence <W,

a,

R,

the set of

and r

=

D,

V> such

d,

that W and D are non-empty sets, a is a member of

subset of W X

W,

W,

A u Z.

R is a

d is a function that assigns a subset of D

to each element of W,

and V is a function such that:
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(a)

the

domain of V is A X

and

w,

(b)

V satisfies the following

further conditions:

i)

ii)

For every formula A of ML and every w in
W
1 or V (A, w) = 0.

,

V(A
y

^

For every predicate letter
and w in W, V(Jri
a subset of D
and for all w' in W, V(Jri w) =
V(J^, w'
1

w
w,

-

)

,

is

w)

,

,

)

iii

,

For every constant c, and w in W, V(c, w) is a
member
of D, and for all w' in W, V(c, w) = V(c, w').

Define a V - completion to be a function v such that
the domain of v is r X W,
A and

v(z,

(c)

w)

V

(y,

w)

v'

for every y

v(5,

w)

= V(5,

for all

w)

5

e

are z-variant if and only if v(y, w)

=

e D,

completions v and

(b)

(a)

e

for each variable z in

r save

Z

Two V-

.

perhaps the variable

V-

z.

completions are required to meet the following requirements
iv)

For every predicate letter ^rL terms tj,....,^, and
world w, v{\^ t^.-.ti], w) = 1 if and only if
<v(t 1( w
v t i w) > e v
w)
,

)

v)

.

.

(

,

(

&

,

For all formulas A and B of ML and every w in W:
v([->A], w) = 1 if and only if v(A, w) = 0,
v([A&B~|, w) = 1 if and only if v(A, w) = 1 and
v(B, w)
v([aVb],
= 1
=

1

=

1,

w)

=

1

if and only if v(A,

w)

=

1

or v(B, w)

w)

=

1

if and only if v(A,

w)

=

0

or v(B, w)

w)

=

1

if and only if v(A,

w)

=

v(B,

,

v([A=>B~|,
,

v([~A=B],

vi)

.

w)

,

For every formula A in ML and every w in W,
(a) v([Da], w) = 1 if and only if for every w' in W
such that <w, w’> e R, v(A, w') =1, and
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v([OA],

(b)

w)

such that <w
vii)

,

=

1

w'>

if and only if for some w'
R, v(A, u) = 1,

in W

6

For every formula A and variable z,
v([3zAl, w) = 1 if
and only if there is a V-completion v* such
that v and
v' are z-variant, and v' (z, w) e d(w)
and v (A, w)
1

1

viii

/

For every formula A and variable z, v([VzA~], w) =
1 if
and only if for every V-completion v' such that v
and
v' are z-variant and v'(z, w) e d(w), v
(A, w) = 1.
1

Finally, we incorporate one last requirement, relating
the

valuation function V to its V-completions

ix)

For every formula A and world w, V(A, w) =
if, for each V-completion v, v(A, w) =1.

1

if and only

We now define the following terms: For any ML-model M

with value assignment V and actual world
true in

M

if and only if V(A,

a)

=

1.

a,

a sentence A is

A sentence A of ML is

valid if and only if it is true in every ML-model M.

Very often, presentations of possible worlds semantics
are accompanied by a remark such as:

"The set W is to be

regarded intuitively as the set of possible worlds".

Yet,

it is important to notice that any non-empty set may be the

first term in a model.
To add identity to our language, we introduce the

symbol

'='

to our stock of two-place predicates,
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to be

written between two terms.

We add to the semantics the

following interpretation rule:
x)

V(=, w) = the set of ordered pairs
X and y are in D and x = y.

(x,

y)

such that

1.4.2 World Theory
I

will be addressing questions concerning the adequacy

of possible worlds semantics in providing a truth-functional

semantics for modal discourse.

In arriving at a clear and

precise formulation of these questions, it will often be
helpful to have an alternative method for representing

possible worlds semantics, the method provided by
extensional world theory (EWT)

.

Rather than giving truth

conditions for ML in a metalanguage, it is possible to give
translations of ML sentences into a first order language.
We arrive at essentially the same account, purified of

extraneous metalinguistic elements.
The language of Extensional World Theory, L EWT

,

is a

classical first order language with a distinguished one-

place predicates
'R'.

'I'

In addition,

and a distinguished two-place predicate

there is a one-to-one correspondence

between the n-place predicate letters of ML and the n+1place predicate letters of Le^.

It is assumed that the

proposition letters of ML are 0-place predicate letters.
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Finally,

there are two sorts of variables: a set of

i n(^i v idual

variables V, and a set of world variables W

Translation from ML into Lg^ is accomplished by use of
the following rewrite rules.

ML sentences are first mapped

to intermediate forms containing superscripts.

Successive

applications of the rewrite rules results in all
superscripts eventually being purged.

A

-|

(

A)

w

a

A)

-»

w

- A)
(

(A & B)

w

(A V B)

w

(A ^ B)

w

(A = B)

w

(3vA)

w

VvA

w

(

(

-

(

A)

(

(

-

-

w

(OA)

A)

w

(

&

(B) w

w

V

(B)

w

A)

w

o

(B)

w

A)

w

=

(B)

w

-

3v Ivw &

(A) w )

-

Vv(Ivw ^

(

(

-

Vw' (Rww'

w

A)

)

o

A)

w

(

&

A)

w

(

)

where w

is a new world

)

where

is a new world

variable
(0A)

W

-

3w’ (Rww

1

w’

variable
(

(

Ft x
A)

w

,

...

tn

/

-»

w
)

Aw,

-

tn

(Ft,,

,

w)

for atomic A.

It is easy to see what the intended interpretations of the

language of extensional world theory are supposed to be.

Every ML-model M generates a corresponding interpretation
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I

M

for world theory.

The range of the individual variables
V

is the domain of the model M.

The range of the world

vaiables W is the set of possible worlds of

The

M.

interpretation of a constant of L,^ is just that element
of
D in M that is the interpretation of the corresponding

constant in ML.

The interpretation of

°f all ordered pairs in R in M.

'

R'

in EWT is the set

The interpretation of

'I'

in EMT will be the set of all ordered pairs <x, w> such that

w

E

W in M and x

e d(w)

in M.

Finally,

since for any

predicate letter F n+1 in EWT there is a corresponding

predicate letter

in ML,

the set of n+1 tuples <x lr
w)

the interpretation of F n+1 will be
...

xn

,

w> such that <x x

,

.

.

.

xn > e

in M.

We can then say that a sentence of ML is true in an ML-

model M if and only if its L EWT translation is true on the

corresponding first order interpretation

IM

.

An ML sentence

will be valid if and only if its L EWT translation is true on

every interpretation

IM

corresponding to a ML-model M.

1.4.3 Intensional Logic

At certain points,

I

will need to provide

formalizations in a higher order intensional language.
fact,

In

the ability to distinguish between a mistaken first

order claim and a similar but correct higher order claim

36

will turn out to be philosophically crucial.

it matters

little for the purpose of this thesis which higher
order

intensional language is used.

Current studies of

intensional logic, predication theory and property theory
have yielded a number of interesting candidates.

I

will

employ a version of ramified type theory developed by

Richmond Thomason 13

:

The vocabulary of the theory begins with ML, but adds a
set of predicate variables and a set of proposition

variables.

In addition, we add the symbol

square brackets

1

[

'

and

]
'
'

'X'

and the

We extend the formation rules

in the following way:

7)

if A is a formula of MLRT, and X is any variable at all,
either individual variable, predicate variable, or
proposition variable, then [3XA] and [VXA] are
formulas of MLRT,

8)

if A is a formula of MLRT, and X is any variable at all,
either individual variable, predicate variable, or
proposition variable, then |”(AX) [A]] is a formula of
MLRT.

Throughout this study, type distinctions will be suppressed,
so long as this leads to no confusion.

The semantics for

the theory is briefly described in the Appendix.

1

.

5

Theories of Possible Worlds

Contemporary philosophical discussion of modality is
interwoven with commentary, speculation and theories about
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possible worlds.

It often seems to be regarded as
an

uncontroversial matter that there are possible
worlds of
some kind, and that, without really settling
the question as
to what they are, modal talk can be traded in

unproblematically for possible worlds talk.

It is also

sometimes taken for granted that, whatever possible worlds
turn out to be,

they will satisfy one version or another of

EWT
That the existence of possible is problematic will

emerge later.

For now,

I

would like to raise the issue of

what is minimally assumed by the usual talk of possible
worlds.

Among those who believe in possible worlds, there

is a small core of agreement about their relation to

modality.

MWl

)

The most important elements of this core are:

For every proposition P, P is possible if and only if
P is true relative to some world w.

MW2)

For every proposition P, P is necessary if and only if
P is true relative to every world w.

MW3

For every proposition P, P is true if and only if P is
true relative to every/ the actual world.

)

These three theses give the desired results that every

necessary proposition is true, and every true proposition is
possible.

They fail to capture a good number of fundamental

modal principles, though.

For instance, we know that if a

necessary proposition strictly implies some other
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proposition, then that other proposition is
necessary as
well.

This principle corresponds to the axiom K
from normal

systems of modal logic
K:

D(A

^ B)

3

(Da 3 QB)

.

We can account for this modal fact by adding the following

closure condition to the account of possible worlds:
MW4)

For all propositions P and Q, if p strictly implies
Q,
then P is true relative to a world w only if
Q is true
relative to w.

Condition (MW4), along with the first three conditions,
requires that possible worlds be consistent: that no

possible world is such that some proposition and its
negation are both true relative to it.
that,

for some proposition A, both A and

relative to some world w.
-|

A)

)

To see this,

is necessary,

->A

The proposition

and so by (MW2),

are true

A 3

(-iA

3

(a &

it is true relative to

w.

Then, by two applications of

(MW4

-'A)

is true relative to w.

(A &

But,

suppose

)

,

the proposition (A &

~^A)

is not possible

and so, by (MW1), it is not true relative to any world.

Contradiction
Condition (MW4) also gives us one half of each of the
two duality theses

(Dl)

and (D2):
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(Dl.l)

For every proposition
not necessary.

P,

if P i s possible,

(D2.1)

For every proposition
is not possible.

P,

if p is necessary,

To prove (Dl.l),

->A

is not true relative to w.

relative to every world, and by (MW2)
The proof of

then ip

suppose some proposition A is possible.

Then by (MW1) A is true relative to some world

consistency

then -p is

(D2.1)

->A

,

w,

and by

So vA is not true
is not necessary.

is similar and is left to the reader.

The four conditions already specified will not yield us
the converses of

(Dl.l)

and (D2.1):

(D1.2)

For every proposition
P is possible.

P,

if

-.p

is not necessary,

(D2.2)

For every proposition
P is necessary.

P,

if

-.p

is not possible,

then

then

The simplest and most natural additional constraint to add
is the maximality condition:

For every proposition P and world
true relative to w.

(MW5)

Consider, now,

(D1.2)

proposition such that
for some world w,
(MW5),

->A

->A

.

w,

either P or

Let A be an arbitrary

is not necessary.

Then by (MW2),

is not true relative to w.

A is true relative w and so A is possible.

the proof of the converse of

-ip

(D2.1)
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is similar.

But,

by

Again,

is

It may escape notice that we do not
need the maximality

condition to generate the full duality principles.

We can

get by with these weaker conditions:
(MW6)

For every proposition P, if, for every world w,
P is
not true relative to w, then, for every world w, -ip
is
true relative to w.

(MW7)

For every proposition P, if, for some world w, P is
not true relative to w, then for some world w
-ip is
true relative to w
'

,

'

Here is one way to see that (MW6) and (MW7), while jointly

weaker than (MW5), are strong enough to generate the full

duality principles:

Let a world be any proposition that is

possible, and say that a given proposition is true relative
to such a world just in case the world strictly implies that

proposition.
hold, but

Then (MW1) through (MW4),

(MW5)

does not.

Still,

(MW6

)

and (MW7)

the full duality

principles follow.

Although (MW6) and (MW7) are together weaker than
(MW5),

they are less natural.

And, virtually all

metaphysicians who have defended the existence of possible
worlds have accepted the stronger condition (MW5

)

.

Hence,

will include it in my grouping of the most fundamental

principles about possible worlds.
I

also will include one further assumption that is

widely accepted: the principles (MW1) through

41

(MW5)

are not

I

just true but necessarily true.

In fact

I

slightly stronger version of this claim.
including the claim that (MW1)

,

will adopt a

Rather than simply

for example,

is necessary,

I

will adopt:

(MW1

'

)

Necessarily, for every proposition P, necessarily
P is possible if and only if p is true relative to
some possible world w.

and similar reformulations of (MW2) and MW3

)

.

To state

these revised versions of (MW1) through (MW5), it will be

useful to employ some symbolizations.
w,

w'

,

w'

'

to range over worlds,

etc.

We use the variables
the expression 'Aw'

indicate that w is actual, the expression 'TMP)

'

to

indicate that P is true, and 'T(P,w)' to indicate that
true relative to w.

(MWl

'

(MW2

'

(MW3

'

(MW4

'

(MW5

'

DVPCKOP

=

3 wT P

)

VPD(DP

=

VwT P w

)

DVpDCTMP)

)

VPVQ{D

)

nVPVw(T(P,w) V T

I

call the conjunction of (MWl

(

P

(

(

=)

P is

Then we have:

)

s

to

,

w

,

T(P,
Q)

)

(

)

)

)

(

lw) Aw)

)

Vw(T(P,w)

o
(

~>P

,

w)

3 T(Q,w))}

)

1

)

through (MW5

minimal theory of possible worlds (MWT)

.

)

the

We can compare the

minimal theory with a family of theories that go
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1

significantly beyond

the extensional world theories of

it,

the previous section.

Consider the sentence
It is possible that it is possible that 2+2 = 4.

1.10)

We may symbolize this sentence as
1.10s)

OOP.

From (1.10s), we get by an application of
(MWl

)

3wT( [OP]

1.11)

By (MW2

'

w)

,

OA is strictly equivalent to

)

3w'T(P, w'

1.12)

)

We obtain from (MW4
a world,

that some proposition is true relative

'

if and only if any strictly equivalent proposition

is also true relative to that world.

So,

(1.11)

and (1.12)

yield
(1.13s)

And,

3wT

(

[

3w T P w
'

(

,

'

)

]

,

w

going back to English (1.13s) says

(1.13)

There is a world w such that it is true relative to w
that: there is a world w' such that P is true
relative to w'
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Standard extensional world theories provide
for a
further expansion of (1.13) and other formulas
by specifying
a set of rules for translating the predicate

'T'.

One such

set of rules is described in the previous subsection,
let

'

T

be interpreted as the expansion

w)

(A,

(A) w

if we

.

Applying these rules to (1.10s) we get:
(1.14)

and,

3w Raw & 3w' (Rww' & Pw)
(

since the language of WT is just a classical first

order language,

(1.15)

3w3w

'

(

(1.14)

Raw

&

(

Rww

is equivalent to

'

& Pw

'

)

)

which implies

(1.15)

and,

'

(1.15)

(1.16)

So,

3w Pw

'

is the EWT rendering of:

3w'T(P, w)

'

by using the EWT to expand MWT

,

(1.16)

turns out to be a

consequence of (1.13s)
We can see how strong extensional world theories are in

comparison to the minimal theory by considering one kind of

modalist interpretation of the two-place predicate
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'

T'

of

MWT.

The sort of modalist account

worlds themselves

have in mind takes

I

to be propositions,

and interprets the

relation of a proposition being true relative
to a world as
an entailment relation.

More specifically, let a world be a

proposition Q with these features:
every proposition

P,

-

and (ii)

P,

'

it is not the case that,

T A, w)
(

for

it is

for some proposition

Q strictly implies both P and its negation.

interpret

-

either Q strictly implies P or Q

P,

strictly implies the negation of
consistent

it is maximal

(i)

as

'

1

(W 3 A)

'

Finally, we

.

This version of Modalism seems to satisfy the minimal

conception of possible worlds, if we assume the existence of
maximal propositions.

But,

it does not by itself produce an

extensional world theory.

Modalism gives the following as

its translation of

and thus,

(1.17)

But,

3WD(W

=>

3W

(

1

(W

'

11

.

'

),

3 P)

)

(

1

.

10 s):

.

in no plausible higher order modal logic would it be a

consequence of (1.17) that

(1.18)

So,

3W'D(W

o p)

)

.

there is no basis in MWT alone for the claim that (1.16)

is a consequence of

(1.13s). That there are possible worlds

of any kind is a problematic ontological claim.
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But,

the

lesson here is that the positing of the
kinds of possible

worlds assumed to exist by standard extensional
world
theories must be regarded as even more problematic.
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CHAPTER

2

ACTUAL ISM

In recent philosophical discussions of
modality,

encounters a variety of theses called "Actualism"

.

one

And,

/

each version of Actualism stands opposed to a contrary
thesis called
^

"

Possibilism"

.

The ways in which the

fsnent versions of Actualism and Possibilism are

louicQ-lly related are not always immediately evident.

Still,

it is my contention that all of the many varieties of

Actualism are like branches of a single tree; each a logical
consequence, a natural extent ion or an alternative

formulation of a fairly small core of doctrine.
This chapter is concerned primarily with formulation

and clarification.

The aim is simply to state the core

doctrine as directly as possible, and to clarify its
intended content by showing what it does and does not
entail.

Actualism itself will be carefully distinguished

from some specific variants of Actualism, and compared with
its main possibilist alternatives.

Some simple criticisms

of Actualism will be examined and rejected.

Finally,

I

formulate a problem concerning the relationship between

Actualism and extensional world theories.
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will

2

.

What Actual sm Ts

1

i

The core doctrine is what

I

will call Simple Actualism

ACT: Everything there is actually exists.

According to Simple Actualism, there are no things that do
not actually exist.

It is an immediate consequence of ACT

that there are no possibilia

-

individuals that do not

actually exist but which could exist.
impossiblia

-

individuals that do not actually exist and

which could not exist.

It is of course true in one sense

that there could have existed things
-

Nor are there any

that do not actually exist.

But,

-

like golden mountains

according to ACT, this

does not imply that there are certain things that possibly
exist, but which do not actually exist.

Now, while

I

suppose that it is logically consistent to believe in
impossiblia, but not in possibilia, no philosopher that

aware of in fact holds this view.
discussion,

possibilia.

:

am

In the remainder of this

the focus will be on whether or not there are

The denial of ACT in conjunction with the view

that there are possibilia

POS

I

I

will call "Simple Possibilism"

There are things that possibly exist, but which do not
actually exist.

I

will adopt the familiar technique of treating the

modal adverbs "possibly" and "actually" as sentence
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operators.

To say,

for example,

that x is possibly F is

just to say that it is possible that
x is

possibly the case that x is

F.

or it is

F,

So ACT says that everything

there is such that it is actually the
case that it exists;
and POS says that there are things such
that

possible that those things exist but

(b)

(a)

it is

it is not actually

the case that those things exist.

ACT is a logical consequence of two related
doctrines:
ACTa: Everything there is exists

ACTb

:

Everything that exists actually exists.

If one is to deny ACT,

and ACTb.

one must reject at least one of ACTa

Possibilists who deny ACTa are Meinongian

Possibilists

,

Possibilists

.

1

and those who deny ACTb are Lewisean
The motivation for this terminology will be

made clear shortly.
ACT is sometimes expressed by saying that there are no
things that are not actual.

This is fine as long as one

attends to a possible source of confusion.

Many actualists

say that there are propositions or states of affairs or

circumstances or situations that are not actual.

They do

not mean that there are propositions etc. that do not

actually exist.

Rather,

they mean that there are

propositions that are not actually true, or states of
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affairs that do not actually obtain.

"Actual" is being used

here to express a property of propositions
or states of
affairs.
In philosophical discussions of modality,
though,
one more commonly finds "actual" used as a
predicate of

individuals, so that to say that x is actual is
to say that
x actually exists.

In this sense,

of course,

the actualist

believes that all entities are actual.
Some otherwise actualistic philosophers hold a view
that one might call "mitigated platonism"

certain "abstract" entities

-

They hold that

.

such as properties, sets,

propositions and states of affairs
there nevertheless are such things

2
.

do not exist, but that

These philosophers

differ on the one hand from Meinongian Possibilists in that
they do not believe in merely possible or impossible

individuals
is true:

.

They would say that a modified version of ACT

one that replaces the quantifier phrase

"everything" with "every individual".

It is arguable that

such views are closer in spirit to contemporary Actualism
than to the usual forms of anti-Actualism
simple,

I

will ignore this complication.

actualist philosophers that

I

To keep things

.

Most of the

will consider,

if they

countenance these abstract entities at all, regard them as
existing.

But this issue of the status of abstract entities

cuts across the dispute about Actualism vs. Possibilism.
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If we accept the principle that some
individual x is

actually F if and only if x is F in the actual world,
then

ACT has an important additional consequence, which

will

I

call "Simple World Actualism"

ACTw

:

Everything there is exists in the actual world
Now,

3
.

it would seem that ACT is an important

metaphysical thesis, and that, if it is true, it is not just
a contingent fact about this world.

must also be true.

But,

So its necessitation

a strange thing happens when we

formulate this necessitation:

ACT:

Necessarily, everything there is actually exists.

As already indicated,

this claim may plausibly be

interpreted as false, for it is certainly the case that
there could have existed things that don't actually exist.
I

could have had more children than

I

been more planets than there are, etc.

do,

there could have

Now,

the actualist

is going to want to construe actualism as an important

metaphysical thesis, and hence as a necessary truth.

So

this involves distinguishing (at least) two senses of

"actually".

Let's use "actually!" for the sense on which

the actualist thinks QACT is true, and "actually 2 " for the

sense in which it is not.
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There have been several different proposals for

formulating this distinction.

Probably the most popular

actualistic treatment construes the first operator,
"actually!

<£"

,

as meaning something like "that

"that $ obtains" and "actually 2 0" as meaning
a" where

denoting,

'a'

<D

"3>

is true" or
is true in

is a directly referential indexical term

in any possible context of use,

happens to be actual world.

the world that

The actualist will regard ACT

as true no matter which sense is employed for "actually"

but will regard QACT as true only in the first sense.
We have a similar problem with the necessitation of

ACTw

,

which will be denoted QACTw.

The correct treatment

of QACTw depends in part on the specific version of

actualism under consideration.

This issue will be taken up

presently as part of the examination of Plantinga's modal
metaphysics
The various different logical and metaphysical views

regarding modality have tended to cluster around three main
alternatives.

Two of these, Actualism and Lewisean

Possibilism, are associated with definite individuals

Alvin Plantinga and David Lewis.

-

Other versions of

Actualism and Lewisean Possibilism have tended to be
variations on the central themes of their accounts.
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(Recall

that

I

am using the label "Lewisean Possibilism"
to cover

all versions of possibilism that deny ACTb, and
not just for
the views of David Lewis himself)

on the other hand,

doctrine.

.

Meinongian Possibilism,

is a more varied and imprecisely defined

In the next few sections,

I

will outline the

views of Plantinga and Lewis, and then discuss what

I

take

to be the two most natural versions of Meinongian

Possibilism

2

.

2

Plantinga on the Nature of Necessity

Alvin Plantinga’

s

book The Nature of Necessity* must be

regarded as the first major effort, following the renewed
interest in modal logic in the second half of this century,
to produce a comprehensive philosophical account of

modality.

Plantinga'

features.

First, he accepts a "platonic" realist ontology

s

account is marked by two important

one that posits properties, abstract propositions and

abstract states of affairs in addition to individuals and
sets of individuals.

Second, he is a modalist; he regards

modal notions as somehow fundamental and not in need of
further analysis.

I

will discuss each of these features,

beginning with the former.
Plantinga has never presented his ontological views in

anything like a formal system, but he has given some fairly

comprehensive informal accounts in a number of places.
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5

-

There would appear to be five
fundamental categories:
individuals, properties (including
relations), propositions,
states of affairs, and sets.
States of affairs are the
sorts of thing that either obtain or do
not obtain.

if a

state of affairs obtains, then it may be
said to be actual.
Some actual states of affairs are necessary,
and all actual

states of affairs are possible, but, among those
states of

affairs that do not obtain, some are possible while
some are
not.

All states of affairs exist, whether they obtain
or

not

Every state of affairs

S

has a complement S*

:

the state

of affairs that is necessarily such that it obtains
just in

case

S

does not obtain.

impossible;

S

S

is necessary just in case S* is

is possible just in case S* is not necessary.

Propositions are "the things that are true or false,
believed, asserted, denied, entertained and the like".

Plantinga expresses some hesitancy as to whether or not

propositions and states of affairs are just the same thing,
so that being true and obtaining are just two names for the

same property.

He says that he inclines toward the view

that they are different

6
.

In what follows one may, without

affecting the underlying ideas, interpret the phrase "that
O"

indifferently as referring to either a state of affairs

or a proposition.

The term "actual" in phrases such as
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"that 0 is actual" may correspondingly
be interpreted as

attributing either the property of obtaining
to states of
affairs,

or the property of being true to
propositions.

Many would consider Plantinga to be a sort
of archactualist. And,

actualist.

indeed,

However,

Plantinga calls himself an

Plantinga uses "Actualism" to refer

only to the necessitation of what

I

have called "ACTa"

he says some things that, on their face,

inconsistent with Simple Actualism.

,

and

appear to be

Specifically, he says

that not everything is actual, which is about as
apparently

inconsistent as you can get.

So,

is Plantinga an actualist

in name only?

Plantinga is an actualist.

As we have already seen,

when Plantinga says that there are things that are not
actual, he means that there are states of affairs that do

not obtain, or propositions that are not true.
at least in an informal way

and "actually 2

"

that

understand Plantinga'

I

s

-

He accepts

the definitions of "actually ^

outlined in the previous section.

-

1

To

interpretation of the second

definition, we need to say something about Plantinga'

notions of a (possible) world, of existing in a world and of

having a property in a world.
Plantinga does not offer any analyses of the
fundamental modal concepts of broadly logical possibility
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and necessity.

Most important, he does not take
these

concepts to be properly analyzable in
terms of the concept
of a possible world.
Nor does he offer world- theoretic

reductions of properties, propositions or
states of affairs
in terms of the basic notions of an
extensional world

theory.

world,

Rather, he thinks that the notion of a possible

and the other notions of extensional world theory,

should be understood in terms of his basic ontological
and these fundamental modal notions

A possible world,
a ^^ a ^ rs

*

maximal.

-'-

for Plantinga is a kind of state of

a state of affairs that is both possible and

s

A state of affairs

S

for every state of affairs S*,

precludes S*

possible that

S

is maximal if and only if,
S

either includes S* or

includes S* if and only if it is not

S

.

7
.

be actual and S* fail to be actual

S

.

precludes S* if and only if it is not possible that both
and S* be actual.

By elementary modal reasoning, if

S

precludes S*, then it includes the complement of S*; so
maximal if and only

if,

S

for every state of affairs S*

,

S is
S

includes either S* or the complement of S*

Plantinga also gives an account of what it is for

something to have a property in a world: x has a property
in W if and only if, necessarily,

would have

P.

if W were actual,

P

then x

To say that an object x exists in W is to say
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that necessarily,

if w were actual then x would
exist.

if

existence is a property, then to say that
x exists in W is
the same as saying that x has the property
of existence in
W.

In section III of this chapter, we will
consider some

difficulties that arise for the actualist who wishes
to
avail himself of the resources of extensional
world
theories, or wishes to use standard possible worlds

semantics to generate truth conditions for modal discourse.
One of these issues is raised by Plantinga.

The actualist

accept that there could have been things that do not

actually exist.

This claim will be rendered in EWT (with

accessibility) as:

3w(Awa

&

3x Ixw &
(

^Exa)

which entails

3x-iExa

This sentence is understood by Plantinga as saying
3x->D(@

=>

Ex)

where @ is a propositional constant designating the actual
worldstate or world-proposition.
actual

But @ includes everything
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something exists in
OO

<3

if and only if it exists

tout court.

we get

3x->Ex

.

Thus EWT,

together with Plantinga's account of the nature of

possible worlds, seems committed to entities that do not
exist

Plantinga is able to provide an interpretation of L
EWT
that circumvents this problem by appealing to individual

essences

A property F is an individual essence just in

.

case it is possible that there is an x such that

(a)

necessarily,

if x exists it exemplifies F and

necessarily,

if F is exemplified it is exemplified by x

alone.

An individual essence of me,

property that

(b)

for instance,

is a

have essentially, and that could not

I

possibly be had by anything else.

Plantinga thinks

I

have

many such essences: one is the property of being identical
to Kervick

properties

There are also the a- transforms of any

.

I

happen to uniquely exemplify.

to be some such properties)
F is the

world.

.

The a-transform of a property

property of being F in

a,

where a is the actual

Plantinga holds that, although

accidentally,

world in which

(There are bound

I

may have F only

have the property of being F in a in every

I
I

exist.
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Whether these properties are indeed individual
essences
is a deep and intricate question.

But,

if they are

individual essences, then Plantinga can give an

interpretation of EWT consistent with actualism.

For,

while

there are no individuals that do not actually exist,
there
are many individual essences that are not actually

exemplified.

So,

instead of saying that some non-actual

individual exists in W but not

a,

we can say that a

corresponding individual essence is exemplified in W but not

And instead of saying that some non-actual individual

a.

has F in W, we can say that a corresponding individual

essence is co-exemplified with F in W.
The adequacy of Plantinga'

s

scheme will be taken up

again in Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

But, we may now

turn to a comparison of these views with the possibilist

alternatives

2

.

3

Lewis on the Plurality of Worlds

David Lewis regards it as a virtue of his account 8 that
there are no primitive modal notions.
for an intensional logic.

Nor is there any need

We can recast everything modal

that we want say in a classical first order language, and
the basic primitive predicates of that language can be

explicated in terms of parthood, spatiotemporal relatedness
and overall similarity.
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Lewis's views on modality differ
dramatically from
those of Plantinga.

But,

in one important respect Lewis
and

Plantinga agree: both hold that there are
no nonexistent
objects.

The failure to recognize that Lewis's
modal

cosmology includes only existing things has
lead some
philosophers (such as William Lycan 9

)

to a serious

misunderstanding of his views, and they have produced
criticisms of Lewis's views that simply miss the
point.
Sometimes, however,

this misunderstanding leads to a failure

to appreciate just how extraordinary Lewis's views
are.

In order to understand Lewis's account of modality,
is best to begin with the actual world:

The world you and I inhabit is a very inclusive
thing.
Every stick and every stone you have ever
seen is part of it.
So, are you and I.
And so
are the planet Earth, the solar system, the Milky
Way, the remote galaxies we see through
telescopes, and (if there are such things) all the
bits of empty space between the stars and
galaxies.
There is nothing so far away from us as
not to be part of our world. Anything at any
distance at all is to be included. Likewise the
world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient
Romans, no long-gone pterodactyls, no long-gone
primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the
past, nor are the dead dark stars too far in the
future, to be part of this same world.
Maybe, as
I think, the world is a big physical object; or
maybe some parts of it are entelechies or spirits
or auras or deities or other things unknown to
physics.
But nothing is so alien in kind as not
to be part of our world, provided only that it
does exist at some distance and direction from
here, or at some time before or after or

simultaneous with now ." 10
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it

We can begin with a primitive notion
of spatiotemporal
connectedness: x and y are spatiotemporally
connected just
in case x is some distance from
y,

that is earlier,

or x exists at a time

later or simultaneous with the time at

which y exists, or x exists at

a spacetime location that is

remote from the spacetime location of y by some definite

spacetime interval.

We assume that this relation is an

equivalence relation.
The actual world consists of me and you, and everything
that is spatiotemporally connected to us

.

A world in

general is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally

connected entities: something

(a)

spatiotemporally connected, and

all of whose parts are

(b)

that has as a part

anything that is spatiotemporally connected to any other of
its parts.

The most provocative feature of Lewis's account

is his claim that the actual world is not the only world

that there is

worlds.

-

it is one of an uncountable plurality of

Real worlds, as concrete and tangible as the

universe we inhabit 11

,

not abstract world propositions,

world properties, maximal states of affairs, consistent sets
of sentences in some ideal language,

etc.

For any way that

any world could possibly be, he says, there is some world
that is that way.

And it is a consequence of the definition

of a world that the worlds are mutually isolated
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-

no part

of one is spatiotemporally connected
to any part of any

other world.

It is around this teeming collection
of

isolated worlds that Lewis builds his modal
metaphysics.
Lewis

'

s

original presentation employs the machinery
of

extensional world theory, minus the accessibility
predicate,
and with the addition of a two-place predicate 'Cxy',
to be

read
Ax

x is a counterpart of y"

,

to be read "x is actual".

and a one-place predicate
The term

@

is treated not as

a name or as a directly referential indexical,

but as an

eliminable singular term abbreviating:
ixVy(Iyx

in English.
as parts

=

Ay)

the thing that has all and only actual things

"

The predicate 'Ax', however,

treatment.

is given an indexical

To say of something that it is actual is to say

that it is in this world.

"This" is used here as a

demonstrative expression, so that what "this world" refers
to depends on the context in which it is being used,

and

ultimately on which world that context is part of.
A possible individual is,
world.

for Lewis,

any part of any

Any possible individual is in the world of which it

is a part.

It is a consequence of his notion of a world

that no possible individual is in more than one world, since
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if any possible individual x is
part of two worlds w and w'

then for any part y of

w,

and any part

spa tio temporally connected to

x,

z

of w'

So,

w and w

'

y and

z

are

and since spatiotemporal

connection is an equivalence relation,
y and
the same world.

,

are identical.

are parts of

z

There are some

individuals that overlap more than one world.

These are

mereological sums of possible individuals from different
worlds.

But these entities are not in any world,

since they

themselves have spatiotemporally disconnected parts.
Since possible individuals are confined to a single
world,

there is no literal transworld identity.

cannot understand a sentence such as "Fa

& OGa"

So,

we

as saying

that the thing a is in the actual world and has F there and
that very same thing is in some other world and has G there.

This is where the notion of a counterpart comes in.

Intuitively,

for any possible individual x, a possible

individual y is a counterpart of x in w just in case y is in

w and resembles x more closely than any other individual in
w.

Additionally, y must also "sufficiently" resemble x.

The counterpart relation is not 1-1: x may have more than
one counterpart in some worlds and no counterparts in
others.

It is not transitive: y in w 2 may be a counterpart

of x in w 1(

and

z

in w 3 may be a counterpart of y, while

is not a counterpart of x.

z

And it is not symmetric: y in w 2
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may sufficiently resemble x in w
x

and resemble it more

,

closely than does anything else in w
2
individual
x.

z

,

while there is some

in w x that resembles y more closely
than does

So y is a counterpart of x, but x is not
a counterpart

of y
/

In Lewis's original presentation in "Counterpart
Theory

and Quantified Modal Logic" 12

he provides a translation

,

scheme very similar to the one for standard extensional

world theory (without accessibility)
in one important respect.

but differing from it

,

In standard EWT

,

there is one

translation rule for atomic formulae, and separate rules for
sentences in which the main connective is a

or a ’O'

Lewis treats these in a combined fashion, with one rule for
all open formulas governed by a

formulas governed by a

'O'

.

I

and one for all open
will simplify the statement

of these rules by dealing only with monadic formulas.

($a) w

-

VvV3(I£v

w

-

3v33(l3v & C3a

(00a)

Sc

C3a)

3

(o) v (3

&

(4>)

v

3)

.

Since this thesis presupposes Actualism, and is not

concerned with arguing for Actualism and against
Possibilism, there is no need for any extended criticism of

Lewis's views.

with Actualism.

It is enough to understand their connection
But,

I

would like to make a few comments.
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Actualists have criticized Lewis's views
in many
different ways.
Some criticisms deal with inadequacies
in
the proposed translation schemas 13 some
deal with
set-

,

theoretic problems connected with the size of
Lewis's

universe 14

Some deal with epistemological problems

.

relating to whether or not Lewis's account allows
for the
fact that we have modal knowledge.

fundamental criticism is simple.
a number of people,

Inwagen 15

But,

believe the most

I

It has been put forward by

but most forcefully by Peter Van

What follows is my own formulation of that

.

criticism
There are no (earthly) 300-story buildings, but there

could have been.

It is possible that there exist an x such

that x is a 300-story building.

assertion

-

call it "claim 1"

-

On Lewis's account, this
is in some sense equivalent

to the claim that, while there is no 300-story in the actual

world,

there is a real,

in some other world

-

fully physical, 300-story building

in some other real,

fully physical,

universe that happens not to be spatiotemporally connected
to ours.

Call this second claim "claim 2".

In what sense are these two claims equivalent?

Lewis

would not say that they are equivalent just because his
translation schemae manage to generate translations with the
same truth values as the originals.
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The suggestion seems to

be that the second is the reason why the first
is true
Now,

there are many ways in which things could have
been

different from the way they are.
these ways,

But,

for at least most of

it still would have been the case that it is

possible for there to be a 300-story building.
Lewis,

claim

2

And for

would still be the reason why this is true.

Claim

2

is the reason why claim

claim

2

would be true whenever claim

The criticism,

then,

1

is true in part because
is true.

1

is just this:

it seems to me that,

whether or not there is more than one world

-

more than one

maximal spatiotemporally connected sum of things

-

it is

possible for there to be only one such world, one in which
there is no 300-story building.
instance.

A world like ours for

But even if that were the only world,

it would

still be possible for there to be a 300-story building.

claim

2

cannot be the reason why claim

1

is true.

Lewis and his defenders would not be convinced.

would say that
quantifiers 16

.

I

So,

He

am confused about the scope of my

"Possibly",

functions both as a

says he,

quantifier over worlds, and to restrict the range of
quantifiers in its scope.
is only one such world"

,

So,

when

then what

I
I

say "possibly,

mean is that there is a

world in which there is only one such world.
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there

All

I

can claim in response to this is that,
whether or

not my criticism is correct,

am using.

I

do know which quantifiers

am using "there is" unrestrictedly.

I

when

I

that it is possible that there is only one such world,

I

understand myself to be asserting that the proposition

I

I

say

express by "there is only one such world", is metaphysically
possible.

To allow "possibly" to restrict the quantifier

would not be to assert the possibility of the same
proposition

I

express with the unrestricted quantifier in

"there is only one such world", so
the possibility that

I

I

don't allow it.

And

am asserting is not the trivial one

that means something like: if a certain kind of concrete

universe were actual, there would only be one such universe
that is part of that universe; instead it means: if a

certain kind of concrete universe were actual, there would
(unrestrictedly) be only one such universe.

There is a certain tendency in philosophy to approach

suggested analyses as follows.

A proposal is made that the

sentences of one body of discourse L x are to be analyzed by

translating them into sentences of another body of discourse
L2

The logical properties and relations holding among the

sentences of L x are more or less agreed upon, as are the
logical relations holding among the sentences in L 2

.

The

theory is then evaluated on the basis of whether or not
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these logical properties are preserved under
the

translation.

But, we also have intuitions about the
truth

conditions of the individual sentences themselves,
and
sometimes the main thing wrong with the analysis is that
the

translations of the analyzed sentences just are not true
under the same conditions as the analyzed sentences
themselves
Before going on to Meinongian possibilism, it may be

useful to introduce a piece of terminology.
Inwagen,

Following Van

let us call worlds of the sort that Lewis upholds

"C-worlds "

('C'

.

is for

'concrete').

And let us call worlds

that are more or less like the ones Plantinga employs

-

maximal states of affairs or propositions or situations or

properties

2

.

4

-

"A-worlds".

('A'

is for

'abstract').

Meinonaian Possibilism
We now consider those versions of possibilism that deny

ACTa,

that hold there really are things that do not exist.

These views come in many varieties.

Many Meinongian

possibilists do not come near to accepting the whole

Meinongian ontology.

But, Meinong is the most famous

defender of non-existent objects.

Hence the name seems

appropriate

Meinong held an extremely liberal ontology of
individuals.

The motivating idea (which must ultimately be
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modified to get

a

consistent theory) is that for any

collection of properties, there is an object
that has all of
the properties in the collection.
Call this
'Meinong's

Principle'.

Assume that for every property

least one property

F,

there is at

which is complementary to F

F'

-

it is a

property such that it is not possible for something
x to
exist and to have both F and

Meinong

s

principle,

F'

.

As a consequence of

there are objects that have both F and

some complement of F (although none of them exist)

entities are impossible

.

If an object does not have both

some property and some complement of that property,

possible.

Such

it is

As a further consequence of Meinong's Principle,

there are objects x such that,
some complement

F'

of F,

objects are incomplete
is complete

for some property F and for

x has neither F nor F'.

These

If an object is not incomplete it

Only objects that are possible and complete

have the privilege of existing, but there are also some non-

existent objects that are possible and complete.

Meinongianism has been beset with logical problems.
There have been various efforts to deal with these problems.
One of the most famous, due to Russell 17

round squares.
property,

If Meinong is right,

,

concerns existent

and if existence is a

then there are many such objects.

Since they are

round squares, they are impossibles, so they don't exist.
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But,

if they don't exist,

in what sense can they be said
to

have the property of existing?

One approach would be to

deny that existence is a property.

Terry Parsons 18

,

Another, developed by

is to restrict the application of
Meinong's

principle to only certain properties, of which
existence is
/

not one.

A third approach, defended by Ed Zalta 19

,

distinguishes between exemplifying a property and encoding
a
property.

We may then say that the existent round square

encodes but does not exemplify existence.
Now, Meinongian possibilists may avoid some of these

problems by holding a restricted Meinongianism.

They may

hold only that there are only complete and possible nonexistents.

There are, then, different options that might be

taken in formulating a modal metaphysics.
The simplest strategy might be to say that there is

only one existent C-world

-

the actual world

-

and that

everything that exists exists in the actual world.

But,

one

might then go on to hold that there are many non-existent

possibilia that exist in many non-existent C-worlds

.

To

exist in a world would then be, as for Lewis to be part of a
world.

A second strategy more in the spirit of Plantinga,

would be to regard worlds as A-worlds, and to treat
existence in a world by saying that x exists in a world if
and only if the world includes the state of affairs that x
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exists.

The Meinongian may hold that there are
non-

existent possibilia that are constituents of certain

possible states of affairs, and that therefore exist
in some
of these worlds.

Whether or not the technical problems with

Meinongianism can be solved,

think it is fair to say that

I

the reason most philosophers reject Meinongianism is that

they just don't believe that in addition,
the computer

I

am writing on,

for example,

to

there really are a thousand

other computers which currently occupy the same space but

which don't exist.

2

.

5

Actualism and Possible Worlds
Talk of possible worlds, in connection with possible

worlds semantics for modal discourse, seems on its face to
involve commitment to possibilia.

It seems to imply that

there are things that do not exist in the actual world, and
so there are things do not actually exist.

Many actualists,

justifiably attached to these semantic techniques on account
of their usefulness for a variety of purposes, have resisted

the conclusion that this prima facia commitment is,
end,

unavoidable.

in the

They have sought to provide an

interpretation of possible worlds talk that would allow one
to reap the benefits of possible worlds semantics without

investing in an ontology of possibilia. 20
71

I

believe that there is a serious problem, for
the

actualist, with possible worlds semantics.

There are

reasons for thinking that if actualism is true,
possible

worlds semantics cannot provide an adequate truth
conditional semantics for modal discourse.
•3^1®

I

will not be

to make the full case for this claim here.

But,

I

would like to describe the apparent problem and say
something about the options open to the actualist.
2.5.1 Two Jobs for Semantics

Semantics is about meaning.

Whatever else it does, a

semantic theory for a natural language, or for some fragment
of that language,

ought to say something about what the

sentences in that fragment mean.

It is often held that the

first task is not complete unless the theory yields certain

consequences about the truth conditions of the sentences in
the fragment, at least for those sentences in the fragment

that have truth conditions 21

.

What does it mean to say that the theory entails

consequences about the truth conditions of the sentences?

And how much must it entail?
this:

One minimal constraint is

for every sentence S that is either true or false,

theory should entail a true sentence of the form

S

is true if and only if
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the

where the blank is filled in by some
sentence of the
language in which the theory is stated.
This is a very minimal condition.

Assuming that "if

and only if" expresses only a material
biconditional, a

theory could meet this condition by entailing
such things as
"Snow is white" is true if and only if 2+2

=

4.

A theory that entails a T-sentence for each sentence
in the
object language is a truth-conditional semantics

and a

truth conditional semantics that entails only true T-

sentences is materially adequate

.

So one thing we might ask

of semantic theory is that it be a materially adequate

truth-conditional semantics.

Another aspect of meaning is manifested in the logical

properties and relations of the sentences in the language.
An adequate semantic theory should entail things about
logical consistency and inconsistency, logical consequence,
logical truth etc.

Since these logical properties are

generally taken to be interdef inable
one of them.

Suppose,

then,

,

we need only consider

that for every set r of

sentences of the object language, and single sentence

theory entails either that
or that

S

S

S,

the

is a logical consequence of r

is not a logical consequence of r.

And suppose

that all of these entailments of the theory are correct.
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such a theory is formally adequate.

So another thing „e

might ask of a semantic theory is
that it be formally

adequate
One popular approach to semantics,
model- theoretic
semantics, seeks to encompass these two
tasks within one

technique.

For a given language we first specify a
class of

entities called models, and a set of functions
called

interpretations that associate the sentences of
structures drawn from an arbitrary model.

S

with

We use these to

define a certain relation: S is true in model M on

interpretation
r

We then say

I.

if and only if,

is a logical consequence of

S

for every model M and interpretation

I,

S

is true in M on I whenever all of the elements of
r are true

in M on

1

22

The hope,

then,

is that by selecting the appropriate

interpretation, or set of interpretations, we can turn a

formally adequate model- theoretic semantics into a

materially adequate truth conditional semantics.

We can do

this if there is at least one model M and interpretation

such that, for each sentence
is true in M on

interpretations

I

.

S,

S

is true if and only if S

Call these intended models and intended

.

In Chapter One,

I

I

introduced a version of possible

worlds semantics, and described the relationship between
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this style of semantics and the language
of extensional

world theories.

The restrictions on the models in the

semantics correspond to non-logical axioms in
the theory
(this may involve the introduction of
restrictions on the

interpretation of the predicate

between worlds.)

Then,

'

Rw

^

1

for accessibility

corresponding to the selection of a

particular interpretation function defining truth in the
model, we provide a rendering function that associates
each

sentence of the object language with a sentence of L
EWT
L ewt is a classical first order language.

interpretation of L EWT

,

.

By an

let us understand simply some method

of segregating the sentences of L EWT into two classes

true sentences and the false sentences.

-

the

A classical

interpretation of that language is the sort of
interpretation familiar from the study of first-order logic.

When

speak of a particular extensional world theory

I

mean only to refer to some set of sentences of L EWT

.

T,

I

Such a

theory may be specified by taking it to be the theorems or
first order consequences of some set of non-logical axioms
in L ewt

,

So,

but it need not be.
the parallel between possible worlds semantics and

EWT works this way: A particular extensional world theory T

corresponds to a class of models in possible worlds
semantics; a rendering function taking sentences of the
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primary modal discourse into

L^

corresponds to an

interpretation function in possible worlds semantics;
and,
the intended models of possible worlds semantics
correspond
to certain classical interpretations of the
first-order

language L EWT

23
.

Let me introduce one further, more informal, notion.

The language L EWT is generally taken to have a particular
sort of intended interpretation.

over worlds, the term

relation expressed by
exists in

'a'

'

The world variables range

refers to the actual world,

Ixw'

the

is the relation x has to w if it

and the individual variables and constants of

w,

the L ewt stand for the same individuals as the variables and

constants they render.

Let's say that an interpretation

that interprets the language in something close to this

intuitive way is a face-value interpretation

.

If Simple

World Actualism is true, then everything exists in the
actual world.

So,

say that an interpretation of

is an

actualistic face-value interpretation just in case it is
face-value interpretation that makes
Now,

I

'

(x)Ixa'

a

come out true.

want to distinguish four different attitudes one

might have toward a proposed rendering of the sentences of

primary modal discourse into L EWT

.

That is,

these are four

different claims that might be made in defense of
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extensional world theories.

In the following,

let

'MD'

stand for the primary language of modal discourse.
The First Claim

One account of the usefulness of extensional world

theory is that it takes logical truths of MD into truths
of
some extensional world theory

T.

So,

there will be an

isomorphism between the relation of logical consequence in

MD and material consequence, relative to
la.

T,

in

there is a theory T such that, for every sentence S and
set of sentences r of MD, S is a logical consequence of r
if and only if t(S) is a material consequence in T of
t

(D

.

To say that t(S)

just to say that,

is a material consequence of t(T)

if every element of

t(D

is in T,

in T is

then

is in T.

t (S)

Since an interpretation of T is just a segregation of T
into two classes of sentences,
ones,

lb.

then

(1)

the true ones and the false

is equivalent to:

there is an interpretation I of Le^ such that, for every
sentence S and set of sentences r of MD, S is a logical
consequence of r if and only if t(S) is an I-consequence
of t

(T)

where to say that t(S) is an I-consequence of t(D is just
to say that if all of the members of

then so is t(S).

t(D are true on

I,

The requirement might be strengthened
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somewhat

One might require the interpretation

I

to be

classical

lc

.

there is a classical interpretation
I of L
or every sentence S and set of sentences EWT such that
r of MD
S is
a logical consequence of r if and
only if t(S) is an
I -consequence of t (r)

The claims in this first group are extremely
trivial,
la and lb are automatically satisfied by
letting T be

determined as the range of any 1-1 rendering function
from
the logical truths of MD into L
EWT

.

lc is slightly less

trivial, but it will be satisfied so long as the range
of

logical truths of MD forms a classically consistent set.
The triviality can be lessened by making a stronger
claim.
fooard,

logical

One might require truth preservation across the
so that all truths of MD,
,

logical as well as non-

go to truths of T:

The Second Claim
2.

there is a theory T such that, for every sentence
S is true if and only if t(S) is true in T.

S

of

MD,

This is equivalent to:

2a.

there is an interpretation I of
such that, for every
sentence S of MD, S is true if and only if t(S) is true
on I
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And,

once again we have the strengthening
to classical

interpretations

2b.

there is a classical interpretation I of
such that
for every sentence S of MD, S is true
if and only if
t S
is true on I
(

This is the usual benefit that is claimed for
extensional

world theories.
SI:

A sentence such as:

It is possible that: there is a philosopher,
is not a philosopher.

but Quine

is rendered as:

S2

:

There is a world w such that: there is an x such that x
is in w and x is a philosopher in w and Quine is not a
philosopher in w.
it is claimed that both SI and S2 are true.

that claim

2

would also be satisfied, vis-a-vis

But,
SI,

notice

if SI

were rendered as

S3:

There is a sequence of numbers S such that: there is an
x such that x is a term in S and x is the fifteenth term
in S and 17 is not a term in S.

This claim is obviously true.

If all that is required of

the renderings is that it takes truths into truths,

does just as well as S2

.

then S3

This suggests that we might be

able to get a truth-preserving rendering by finding set-

theoretic surrogates for the individuals and properties
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referred to in modal discourse.

We let the

predicate

that renders "x is a philosopher" be "x is
the fifteenth

term

m

S"

,

and we let individuals like Quine be denoted
by

natural numbers

And again, on the assumption that the range of the
rendering forms a consistent set, there is bound to be some
interpretation that preserves truth, since every consistent
set has a model.

One may then want to strengthen

2

to:

The Third Claim
3.

there is a face-value interpretation I of
such that,
for every sentence S of MD, S is true if and only if t(S)
is true on I.

This claim is vaguer than the others, but seems more

difficult to fulfill.

Many philosophers seem to believe

something like the third claim.

There is one stronger claim

that might be made

The Fourth Claim
4

.

there is an actualistic face-value interpretation I of
L ewt such that, for every sentence S of MD, S is true if
and only if t(S) is true on I.

2.5.2 A Problem for Extensional World Theories

The claim

I

wish to defend is that the Fourth Claim

above cannot be fulfilled, given the usual sort of rendering
of MD into

Lent.

I

hold:
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There is no actualistic face-value
interpretation I of
such that, on the usual rendering t,
every sentence
of MD is true if and only if t(S) is
true on I

W

In defending this claim,

I

will make one assumption:

There are counterinstances to the Barcan Formula:
"if it
is possible that there is an x such that
Fx, then there
is an x such that it is possible that Fx"

A)

One counterinstance to the Barcan Formula involves
the

assumption that biological organisms are essentially
members
of the species to which they actually belong,

or at least

that it is necessary that they could not be members of
some

other species.

Let

'C'

denote the class of all insects.

I

claim

It is possible that there is an x such that x is a member
of a species of insect that is not in C, but there is no
x such that it is possible that x belong to some species
of insect other than those in C.

B)

Here is the argument against the Fourth Claim.

mean
C

6

'

.

.

'x is a

Assume

03xFx

3w(Raw

&

'

Fx

member of a species of insect that is not in

The EWT rendering of

7.

Let

(6)

is:

3x(Ixw and Fxw)

)
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It is a consequence of this
that:

8.

3x3w(Raw &(lxw and Fxw)),

but,

9

.

on an actualistic face value
interpretation, we have:

Vxlxa

so we get,

10.

from

3x Ixa

and

9:

(3w) (Raw & Fxw)),

&

(

8

which is the rendering of
11.

(3x)0Fx.

So,

by conditional proof it follows that

12.

03xFx

=3

3xOFx.

which is the Barcan formula, which

I

have argued is false in

this instance.
If there can be no adequate face-value rendering of MD

into L ewt

,

then the actualist must settle for something else.

There seem to be three plausible actualist responses here.
1.

The first response, due primarily to Alvin

Plantinga,

involves the use of individual essences: an

individual essence of an individual x is a property
that x is necessarily such that it has
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P,

and P is

P

such

necessarily such that if anything has
An individual essence is a property
essence of some individual.

it,

P that

could be the

The appeal to essences suggests

the following interpretation.

Let the individual variables

°f L ewt range over individual essences.
'Ixw'

that thing is x.

as saying that x exists in w.

Continue to read

But,

read 'Exw'

(the

rendering of 'Ex') as saying that x is exemplified
in w.
Plantinga believes there are unexemplified
essences, so he
can accept both

understand
I

'a'

’

3x(Ixa & ^Exa)

’

and

’

Vxlxa'.

We can still

as standing for the actual world.

will consider Plantinga

's

views on essences in

Chapter Four.
2.

Another approach, which seems to be the approach of

Chris Menzel

,

is to fall back on the Second Claim above.

We can come up with a truth-preserving interpretation of
L ewt

,

and so a materially adequate possible worlds semantics,

by building models of different possible worlds which
include representatives of possible individuals.

We give up

anything close to a face value interpretation.
Menzel regards this as a defense of possible worlds
semantics.

But,

I

think it shows that possible worlds

semantics has only heuristic value for the philosophical

undrstanding of modality.

There is no longer any sense in

which EWT or possible worlds semantics can be taken as
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providing us with some sort of
conceptual or semantic
analysis of modality.
A Third approach, defended by
Kit Fine 25 is to
retranslate
back into modal discourse.
3

.

in effect,

Plantings

’s

approach is a version of this.

But,

what makes

Fine's proposal different is that, in
it, the quantifiers in
world theory do not correspond to the
quantifiers in MD.
Fine begins by treating the world-theory
quantifiers as

"possibilist " quantifiers, intuitively ranging
over all

possible entities.

But,

he then seeks to provide a

translation of sentences containing these
quantifiers that
avoids the commitment to possibilia.

The sentence:

ZxFx
containing the possibilist quantifier

'

^

'

is translated

back into modal discourse as
03xFx.

In effect,

the interpretation of L EWT here is not classical.

A sentence such as '£x£yFxy' will be rendered as
'03x03yFxy', while the sentence 'Xy^xFxy' will be rendered
as

03y03xFxy

'

.

But,

while the first and third sentences

are equivalent on a classical interpretation of the

quantifiers,

the second and fourth are not equivalent.
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Whether or not Fine's proposal works,

I

want to point

out two things: by giving a non-classical
interpretation of
the language of extensional world theory,
it is no longer
ext ensional world theory.

Fine is giving up whatever

benefits might be supposed to accrue from giving
a classical
first order rendering of modal discourse.
be stressed that,

Second,

it should

since modal operators are reintroduced

into the retranslations,

there is again no sense in which

the L ewt sentences can be thought of as providing
an analysis
of modal discourse.

4.

Notes
1. I thus use the expression "Meinongian Possibilism"
to
cover a broad range of theories, not just for the precise
ontological views of Meinong himself.

2.

See,

for example, McTaggart in McTaggart

(1921)

3. Paul McNamara has argued in McNamara (19) that, given a
modalist account of possible worlds as maximal possible
states of affairs, there may be more than one actual world.
If this is true then ACTw should be reformulated by
replacing the expression "the actual world" with the
expression "every actual world".

Plantinga (1974).
5.

See Plantinga (1974),

6.

Plantinga (1979b), pp. 258-59.

7.

These ideas are defended in Plantinga (1979b).

(1976),
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(1985b)

and (1987).

8
The following account of Lewis’s
views is based
primarilly on Lewis (1983) and (1986
-

9

11.

Lycan (1979

)

Lewis (1986), p

10

.

1

Most of them are tangible,
deities etc.

Some are made up of spirits

14.
12

Lewis

13

Lewis himself discusses some of these
problems in Lewis
pp 8-13

(1986)

,

(

1983

)

.

.

A criticism along these lines has been offered
by Martin
Davies in Davies (1981), p. 262. Davies attributes
the
criticism to David Kaplan.
18.
15.

Van Inwagen (1986), pp. 194-99.

16. Lewis discusses the relationship between
modal operators
and quntif icational scope in Lewis (1986),
pp 5-13.
.

17

.

Russell

(

1905

)

Parsons 1980.
19

.

Zalta (1988)

For examples of this approach, see Plantinga 1976,
McMichael (1983) and Menzel (1990a).
20.

21.

As distinct from interogatives

,

imperatives, etc.

In what follows, I will assume that interpretations
presuppose a model, so the "in M" is redundant.
22.

generally, an interpretation will select as true more of
the language than just T; a set that includes T as a subset.

23.

24. Menzel

25

.

(1990a)

Fine (1977)
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CHAPTER

3

DIRECT REFERENCE AND SINGULAR
PROPOSITIONS

According to Buridan's Thesis, it is
necessarily the
case that no proposition is either possible,
or necessary,
or true, unless that proposition also
exists.

And,

Buridan

thought that there are propositions that exist
only

contingently.

Buridan's concept of a proposition, of

course, was very different from most of the
popular views

about the nature of propositions that are held today.

The

question then naturally arises as to whether there remains
any reason today to think that some propositions exist
only

contingently
A number of twentieth century philosophers have thought
that this question should be answered affirmatively,

including

G.

E.

Moore, Arthur Prior and Robert M. Adams 1

.

At the core of this position is the view that some

propositions are, as we would now say, singular

propositions

,

propositions that somehow involve certain

individuals in a very direct way.

The individuals they thus

involve are sometimes said to be their constituents or

components

.

If there are singular propositions,

then it seems

plausible that they depend ontologically on their

87

constituents, that is, that it is
impossible for the
proposition to exist if its constituents

fail to exist.

And,

since many of the constituents of
these propositions

are contingently existing things, it
is plausible that the
propositions that depend on these constituents
are also

contingently existing things
The most prominant contemporary proponent
of singular

propositions is David Kaplan, to whom my use of
the
expression "singular proposition" is due.

Singular

propositions, Kaplan says, are the semantic contents
of

sentences containing directly referential singular
terms.

They are what these sentences say.
I

think there are singular propositions.

My purpose in

this chapter is arrive at a clearer conception of their

nature: to give a reasonably precise account of just what

singular propositions are.

In the next chapter,

I

will set

out the arguments for their existence and attempt to defend
the idea that they are ontologically dependent on their

constituents
There are two routes to an understanding of singular

propositions.

The first is through semantics.

One begins

by explaining what a directly referential singular term

is,

and then takes singular propositions to be the semantic
contents of sentences containing such terms, whatever those
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contents turn out to be.
metaphysics.

The second is through intuitive

One begins with the intuitive pre-theoretic

notion of a singular proposition as an entity with elements
or parts organized into a structure, and then tries to argue

that there are such propositions, and that they are proper

subjects for modal and propositional attitude attributions,

whether or not there are any sentences that actually express
them
In this chapter and the next,

first approach.

the focus will be on the

By taking this route, the argument for the

existence of singular propositions is somewhat easier

-

one

need only argue that there are directly referential singular
terms.

But,

the argument for ontological dependence is

trickier than it would be if one began by assuming that
singular propositions had structure.

3

.

1

The Route toward Singular Propositions

Kaplan gives a preliminary account of directly

referential terms and their relationship to singular

propositions in the introduction to his influential

monograph Demonstratives

.

Directly referential terms are

singular terms that
"...refer directly without the mediation of a
If there are such terms,
Fregean Sinn as meaning.
by sentences
expressed
proposition
the
then
containing such a term would involve individuals
89

irectly rather than by way of the
individual
concepts that I had been taught to
expect.
Let us
call such putative singular terms
(if there are
any) directly referential terms
and such putative
propositions (if there are any) singular
propositions 2
.

Here we see Kaplan's twofold characterization
of singular

propositions:

Semantically, they are those propositions

expressed by sentences containing directly referential
terms;

metaphysically, they are propositions that somehow

involve individuals directly.

Since,

as I have indicated,

plan to take the semantic route toward singular
propositions, it is essential that we understand the notion
of direct reference.

Although

I

will be following the semantic route, the

intuitive notion of a singular proposition will play a

guiding role.

One of my aims in this section is to show

that Kaplan fails to distinguish sharply between two

substantially different conceptionss of a directly
referential term.

Since

I

plan to argue for the existence

of propositions that are the semantic contents of directly

referential singular terms,

I

need to specify to which of

the two concepts the argument applies.

As it happens,

I

think one can successfully argue for both kinds of directly

referential terms, but, since my ultimate end is to argue
for the ontological dependence of singular propositions on
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I

their constituents,

will focus on the notion that seems
to

I

correspond most closely to the intuitive notion
of a
singular proposition as an entity with a structure
of some
sort
In attempting to set out Kaplan's views,

I

am going to

accept, on a provisional basis, Kaplan's judgement that

proper names, pure indexicals and demonstratives are

directly referential singular terms.

This is just so that

Kaplan's various remarks about direct reference and singular

propositions can be more easily interpreted, by relating
those remarks to concrete examples of singular terms that

Kaplan clearly thinks are (or are not) directly referential.
In the next chapter,

I

will attempt to defend Kaplan's

account of the correct semantics for these terms.

3

.

2

Content and Character
Kaplan's ideas about direct reference can be

illustrated by a consideration of some simple sentences
containing proper names, demonstratives and pure indexicals.
Consider the sentence:

(1)

I

am sitting down

Kaplan distinguishes two aspects of the meaning of this
sentence.

One aspect,

its content,

is identified with what

is said by a use of this sentence in a particular context of
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utterance.

The other aspect,

its character

common to the meaning of sentence

which it is used.

(1)

,

is what is

in every context in

3

The content of a sentence is a proposition.

Propositions are taken to be things that are
either true or
false relative to counterf actual circumstances,
or what

Kaplan calls "circumstances of evaluation", or
just
"circumstances".

Circumstances are taken by Kaplan to

include at least a world and a time. 4

Contexts are, in a sense, more specific than
circumstances.

A circumstance generally can be represented

by an ordered pair of a world and time.

Contexts also

determine a world and a time, but they generally involve an
agent,

a location and other things.

embedded in more than one context.

A given circumstance is
But,

every context

determines a unique circumstance.
The character of a sentence is that aspect of the

meaning of the sentence that determines its content,
relative to a given context of use.

Character can thus be

represented as a function from contexts to contents

.

The

character of a sentence can be said to depend entirely on
the rules or conventions of the language.

often depends on features of the context,
be outside the speaker's ken.
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Content, however,

features that may

Consider sentence

(1)

in a particular context of
use

To be precise consider an utterance
of

Kervick, at 12:01 PM,

on January

1,

(1)

by me, Dan

m

1997.

utterance under consideration, the content
of

the context of
(1)

is

the

same as that of

(2)

Dan Kervick is sitting down

but the character is different, since the first
sentence

would express a different proposition,

a

different

sentential content, in contexts of use in which

I

am not the

agent, while the second always expresses the same content. 5

A sentence like

same content,

(2)

whose character always determines the

is said to have stable character.

Not only sentences, but also the meaningful parts of
sentences, have content and character.
the context under consideration,

Kervick'

is the same thing

-

In

(1)

the content of

me.

But,

and
'I'

(2),

in

and 'Dan

the difference in the

characters of the two sentences is due to a difference of

character in
'I'

'I'

and

and 'Dan Kervick'.

The character of

determines a function that takes any context of use to

the speaker or agent of that context.

Kervick'

context.

The character of 'Dan

is a constant function whose value is me in every

It has stable character.
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For a somewhat different exampl
e, compare sentences
and (4) below:

(3)

If Kaplan exists,

then he is Kaplan.

(4)

If Kaplan exists,

then Kaplan is Kaplan.

(

3

)

Let's interpret these sentences relative
to some context in
which I produce a tokens of the sentences,
while pointing
out Kaplan.

in

demonstrative.

(3),

the word 'he'

functions as a

In order for its reference to be fixed
in a

context, an associated demonstration must be
provided.
indeed,

in the context described,

thus providing the demonstration.

by

(3)

am pointing to Kaplan,

I

The proposition expressed

in the described context is a necessary one,

true in every circumstance of evaluation.
the case of

(1)

And

Again,

it is

just as in

and (2), the second sentence in this pair

expresses the same proposition as the first in the context

under consideration.

And once again, the second sentence

has stable character.

In this case,

though,

the second

sentence is true in every context, and is a logical truth.
The first expresses falsehoods in other contexts.
One final example will suffice for now.

discusses the sentence

(5)

I

am here now.

6
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Kaplan

It is a curious feature of

(5)

that, while it expresses
a

contingent truth in every context in
which it is used, it
never fails to express some truth.’
Thus,

(5)

is in some

sense analytic, but

(6)

Necessarily,

I

am here now,

is not true in any context in which it
is used.

that

(5)

it is clear

does not express a necessary truth, given
that no

one is ever necessarily at a particular
spatial location. 8

There is an important feature of Kaplan's views
on

content and character that ought to be noted.
of a complex expression,

like a sentence,

the contents of its component expressions.

The content

is a function of

Similarly,

Kaplan holds, the character of the complex expression is a
function of the characters of the component expressions. 9
So,

we can think of the proposition expressed by the

sentence as determined in two different ways.

The

characters of the components of the sentence determine
contents of the components, and these in turn determine the
content of the sentence.

In addition,

the characters of the

sentence components determine the character of the whole
sentence, and that character determines the sentence

content.

I

will refer to this aspect of Kaplan's semantics

as "polycompositionality "
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believe that there is a certain
ambiguity in Kaplan's
thinking about the contents of the
contentful parts of
I

sentences,

an ambiguity that is partly responsible
for the

difficulty in determining what Kaplan means
by "direct
reference

.

What,

in general,

is content?

One answer is that content is roughly the
same thing as

intension

It is something that,

circumstance of evaluation 10
extension.

,

combined with a

determines an an appropriate

This notion of content may be called the

intensional account of content.

Indeed,

Kaplan's formal

semantics seems to result from refinements of and

modifications to an older "Fregean" semantic scheme,
or 9 an ized around the method of intension and extension.

Another answer to our question is that the content of a
contentful component expression in a sentence is the

contribution that expression makes to determining the
content of the whole sentence.

This in itself is too vague,

since even the character makes some contribution to

determining the sentence's content.

But,

perhaps we can say

it is the context- independent part of that contribution.

It

is that aspect of an expression's contibution that results

"after " 11 contextual factors make their contribution to the

determination of that meaning.

On the second account,

there

need be no requirement that the contents of the component
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expressions be the same sort of thing (such
as an intension)
as the contents of sentences.

For a given expression, there

need not be anything that is evaluated at a
circumstance,
other thatn the content of the entire sentence.

Call this

the denotational account of content

MY point is not that these two notions of content
are

mutually exclusive

-

clearly,

are logically distinct.

And

they are not
I

-

only that they

believe that failure to

distinguish them is responsible for certain confusions
regarding the nature of direct reference, as we shall see.
3

.

3

Direct Reference

3.3.1 Names and Descriptions

A directly referential term is a kind of singular term.
In the next two sections,

I

will attempt to say what Kaplan

thinks a directly referential term is.

I

will assume that

the idea of a singular term is sufficiently clear that it

does not need defining.

For my purposes,

the class of

singular terms should be taken as including (at least) pure
indexicals, such as 'I',

'you',

'she',

'he',

demonstratives

such as 'this' and 'that', proper names and definite

descriptions
As

I

have indicated,

I

believe that Kaplan's account of

direct reference sometimes conflates two different semantic
notions, and it is not easy to determine which, if any, of
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them Kaplan intends as the primary
one.

There are two main

reasons for the difficulty in interpreting
Kaplan.

First,

Kaplan's informal presentation alternates
between two
'pictures" of propositions

-

a particular sort of possible

worlds picture, and a structured
propositions picture.
Kaplan thinks of the notion of direct
reference to be a

purely semantical idea" that presupposses
neither picture
and is "expressible in terms of either ". 16
I believe that
each of these pictures fails to bring out an
important

aspect of direct reference.

The second reason for the

difficulties in interpretation is that Kaplan's own
views
are most often set out as contrasting with a Fregean
account
of singular term reference

17
.

I

believe that this results

in a conflation of alternatives, whereby certain
distinct

kinds of non-Fregean singular terms are assimilated to the
same model
As

I

just noted, Kaplan often appeals to a picture

(which he stresses is "really a picture and not a theory" 18

)

of a proposition as an entity with a structure that mirrors

the structure of the sentence that expresses it.

An

expression's content, the contribution that the expression
makes to the determination of a proposition by sentences in

which it is contained, can then be thought of as a component
of the proposition.

Kaplan's accounts of direct reference
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and its relation to singular propositions
are thus often
couched in the language of propositional
components.
On the
structural picture that Kaplan seems to
have in mind,
the

contents of all of the contentful parts of
a sentence show
up in the determined proposition 19
.

On now to direct reference.

Kaplan

s

I

think that all of

pronouncements concerning directly referential

singular terms can be placed in four main groups.

First,

there is a claim about what the content of such a
term is:
I

a)

the content is the referent

There are a number of statements about what it isn't:
II

b)

the content is not a Fregean Sense

c)

the content is not a property

d)

the content is not a complex

There are claims about how the referent and content are
determined:

III

e)

the content is determined by the referent

f)

the referent is directly associated by the
semantical rules with the term.

Finally,

there are claims about how the referent and the

content are not determined:
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IV

g)

the referent is not determined by
the content,

h)

the referent is not mediated by a
sense,
or a complex

a property,

Before continuing, some preliminary
clarification of these
claims is required:
/

First,

as

I

understand him, the term 'referent' is for

Kaplan an informal notion playing no technical
semantic
role.

The formal system makes use of the technical
term

"denotation" and not "referent".

Nevertheless,

the informal

notion of the referent as the thing the singular term
"stands for" obviously plays an essential role in Kaplan's

many informal accounts of direct reference

20
.

Second, while

it is not crucial for Kaplan's account that we have a
theory

about the precise nature of the senses of those singular
terms that have a sense,
for Kaplan,

concepts

:

it is important to recognize that,

senses are formally represented by individual

functions from circumstances to individuals.

Kaplan believes that pure indexicals, demonstratives and

proper names are devices of direct reference, but that
definite descriptions are not.

So,

in order to understand

direct reference, we ought to compare the semantic role of

descriptions with the semantic role of those other
expressions, at least as this difference is conceived by
Kaplan.

The problem is that there are a number of
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differences, and it is not always clear
which features
Kaplan is focussing on.
Let's look first at names and descriptions.
follows,

I

m

what

will go along with Kaplan in treating
definite

descriptions as Fregean: having both a sense
(intension) and
a denotation

(extension)

Consider the three sentences
(7)

Saul Kripke is a philosopher

(8)

The author of Naming and Necessity is a philosopher

(9)

He {pointing to Kripke} is a philosopher

The singular terms in these sentences all have the same
referent, but that referent is determined in different ways.

Kaplan would typically say that, in
name "Saul Kripke" just is Kripke.

(7)

the content of the

However,

it should be

noted that in the formal system that Kaplan provides, the
content is not Kripke but the constant function that assigns

Kripke to every circumstance.
individual concept.

So the content is one kind of

The demonstrative 'he'

has the same content as "Saul Kripke" has in

indicated context)

.

in sentence
(7)

(in the

It differs from the name "Saul Kripke"

only in character.
What is the function of the definite description in
(8)?

(9)

For ease of explication,

I
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will adopt a slight

modification of the technique Kaplan
employs for
interpreting definite descriptions.
content of the word 'the'

(which

I

I

will assume that the

will denote with the

expression 'THE') is a function that takes
properties to
functions on circumstances 21 For a given
property F, the
.

value of the THE function applied to F is the
function that
takes an arbitrary circumstance to the thing
that is F in
that circumstance

22
.

The meaning of the description,

then,

is also an individual concept.

Now here the formal treatment of contents of names,
indexicals and demonstratives as constant functions causes
some difficulty.

Let us restrict our attention to names,

for the time being.

In the informal account of direct

reference, the difference between names and definite

descriptions is fundamentally a difference in semantic
content.

The content of a name is supposed to be its

referent while the content of a description is a sense:

something that determines a referent relative to a
circumstance.

But,

in Kaplan's formal account, both of

these entities have the same sort of thing as their content:
an individual concept.

In a complete semantic theory,

then,

how would names be distinguished semantically from definite
descriptions?

Kaplan explicitly rejects one account of the

102

distinction.

He insists that there is more
to direct

reference than just rigid designation
What is the difference between a directly
referential
term and a rigid designator?
on what Kaplan,

We need to focus our attention

following Nathan Salmon has called

obstinately rigid designators

Roughly put, an obstinately

rigid designator is a singular term that has the
same
referent in every counterf actual circumstance.
not mean that indexicals like

their referents vary.

'I*

This does

are not rigid because

The idea is this: if some singular

term a is an obstinately rigid designator, then in every

possible context of use, a determines a content that has the
same extension in every possible circumstance.

All directly referential terms are obstinately rigid

designators as well.
does not hold.

But,

the converse of this statement

Consider the difference between the two

singular terms in:

is even,

and

(a)

6

(b)

The smallest perfect number is even

Informally, we can express the difference between these two
in Kaplan's vivid terminology of "proposition loading".

content of
6

'6'

is just the number 6.

At the context of use,

is loaded into the proposition expressed by
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The

(a)

When the

proposition is then evaluated at a
circumstance,
obviously show up at the circumstance.

6

will

The content of 'the

smallest perfect number' is a function
that assigns a
referent at every circumstance.
In this
case,

that the referent assigned is always

seems clear.

number

6,

In the first case,

6.

it so happens

But the difference

the content is just the

in the second it is a function that always
picks

out the number

6

Returning now to our problem, we cannot say that the

mark of a directly referential term is that its content
is
not just any individual concept but a constant function.
the contents of names are constant functions,

if

then there is

no difference in content between obstinately rigid definite

descritions and directly referential singular terms.

One

suggestion might be that the problem lies in the possible
worlds semantics that underlies Kaplan's theory.

The

treatment of contents as intentions, functions on world-time
pairs,

is not sufficiently fine-grained.

23

This seems to be

the primary motivation for Kaplan's occasional appeals to
the stuctured propositions picture.

Here is what he says:

"If I may wax metaphysical in order to fix an
image let us think of the vehicles of evaluation the what-is-said in a given context - as
propositions.
Don't think of propositions as sets
of possible worlds, but rather as structured
entities looking something like the sentences
which express them. For each occurrence of a
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singular term in a sentence there
will be a
corresponding constituent in the
proposition
expressed.
The constituent of the proposition
determines for each possible circumstance
of
evaluation, the ob iect relevant to
evaluating the
proposition
that circumstance.
in general, the
constituent of the proposition will be some
sort
of complex, constructed from various
attributes by
logical composition.
But, in the case of a
singular term that is directly referential,
the
constituent of the proposition is just the
object
itself 1,24

m

.

.

.

So,

we can represent the difference between the
propositions

expressed by the two sentences
and
(8)

as the difference between

10)

<<THE

,

A>

(7)

and (9), on the one hand

'

P>

,

and

11)

<k,

P>

What is the propositional component imported by the

description?

If we appeal to the structure model,

that it is just the complex <THE

component.

,

we see

A> itself that is the

The content here is the complex, not the rigidly

fixed referent.
Now,

since the structure picture is "really a picture,

and not a theory"

,

we cannot appeal to it directly to give a

strict answer to the question about the theoretical

difference between directly referential terms and
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obstinately rigid designators.

But,

one aspect of that

picture does carry over to the formal
account.

Say that an

expression in a language has derived
content if its content
is

(non- trivially)

determined by the semantical rules of
the

language as a function of the contents of
its component

expressions

25
.

Then perhaps we can say that the

distinguishing feature of a directly referential
singular
term is that it is an obstinately rigid
designator with

underived content.
I

do not think that this sufficiently captures
Kaplan's

intentions though.

If we adopt this approach,

and if we

retain the treatment of the senses of singular terms as
individual concepts, we are forced to reject the idea that

directly referential terms do not have a sense as their
content.

And,

the suggestion seems to be incompatible with

some of Kaplan's statements:

"...The directly referential term goes directly
to its referent, directly in the sense that it
does not first pass through the proposition.
Whatever rules, procedures, or mechanisms there
are that govern the search for the referent, they
are irrelevant to the propositional component, to
content.
When the individual is determined (when
the referent is fixed, in the language of Saul
Kripke)
it is loaded into the proposition."
,

Here Kaplan seems to say that it does not matter how, in a

given context, the referent is determined.
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What matters is

that it is the referent itself
that is the content, the
propositional component".

believe that the true source of the
difficulty here
is that Kaplan uses a formal technique
that is incapable of
I

bringing out the intuitive semantic ideas.

it would be

nice to provide a alternate semantic technique
that respects
all of the informal intuitions at once,

that

(i)

content,

so that it turns out

names and indexicals do not have a sense as
their contents are underived and are their

referents, and (ii) definite description do have a
sense as
content, and that content is derived.
It is easy to sketch such an approach.

By modifying

the formal semantics, we can present a framework in which
all of these ideas are combined.

To do this, we relax the

requirement that all contents be functions on circumstances,
that is, we reject the intentional notion of content in

favor of the denotational account.

Specifically, we will

allow names and indexicals to have as their contents just
the individuals to which they refer.

The guiding idea will be Kaplan's proposition loading

metaphor.

After the characters of the sentence's contentful

component expressions determine the contents of those
expressions,

these contents are combined to form a sentence

content, or proposition.

But,

the proposition is the only
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thing that is "taken on a round-the
worlds journey",
is,

That

only propositions are evaluated at
a circumstance
The account

the form

is F]

[s

I

,

give will be restricted to sentences
of

where

s

is a singular term and F a

simple predicate expression.

We make the following

stipulations about content:
i)

ii)

the content of a sentence is a proposition a
function from circumstances to truth values,
the content of a definite description is an
individual concept: a function from circumstances
to
individuals

iii)

the content of a name or indexical is an individual
member of the domain,

iv)

the content of a predicate expression is a function
from circumstances to subsets of the domain.

v)

the content of 'the' is function THE that takes
predicate contents to individual concepts.
Xt obeys
the following rule:
If

is an predicate content, then THE j
is the
individual concept i such that, for any circumstance
c, i c
= the unique member of j (c) that exists in c
If there is no such element, i(c) = 0.
j

(

)

(

vii)

If F is a predicate expression with content j, the
content of the singular term [the F] is THE j
(

viii

)

)

For any predicate expression F with content j, and
singular term a, the content of the sentence S =
[a is F] is given by the following two rules:
If a is a name or indexical, with content a, the
content of S is the proposition p such that for any
circumstance c, p(c) = T iff a is an element of i(c)
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If a is a definite description with
content k, then
the content of S is the proposition
such that for
any circumstance c, p(c) = T iff k(c)p is
a member of
V

C

/

•

Now we have a way of representing the difference

between obstinately rigid definite descriptions and
directly
referential names and indexicals.

The content of a directly

referential term is an individual, its referent, and is
underived; the content of an obstinately rigid description
is an individual concept and is derived.
/

if should be noticed that while these two features

of directly referential singular terms
a sense but the referent,

-

the content is not

and the content is underived

-

go

together in our language fragment, there is no essential

connection between them.

Indeed,

there seems to be no

reason that a language not have non-complex singular terms
that have senses as their contents, nor is there any reason

that a language not have complex singular terms that do not

have senses as their contents, but individuals instead.
This latter possibility plays a role in the discusssion in
the next section.

3.3.2

'

Dthat

The issue of what exactly Kaplan means by "direct

reference" is illuminated to some extent, but not entirely,

by his discussion of his homemade demonstrative 'dthat'.
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Kaplan describes this word and its
intended use in
Demonstratives

"Now why not regard descriptions as
a kind of
emonstration and introduce a special
demonstrative which requires completion by
a
description and which is treated as a directly
referential term whose referent is the
denotation
of the associated description? Why
not? Why not
indeed! I have done so, and I write it
thus:

dthat

[a]

where a is any description, or, more generally,
any singular term.
'Dthat' is simply the
demonstrative that' with the following singular
term functioning as its demonstration ." 26
In Afterthoughts

'dthat'

,

Kaplan notes that his original account of

is ambiguous between two uses.

"...On one interpretation, "dthat" is a directly
referential singular term and the content of the
associated description is no part of the content
of the dthat-term.
On another interpretation,
"dthat" is syntactically an operator that requires
syntactical completion by a description in order
to form a singular term. " 27

Let's call the first use of 'dthat' refered to in the above

passage the demonstrative use and the second the operator
use.

But,

I

want to focus here on the operator use of 'dthat'

first

I

will try to clarify Kaplan's remarks concerning

the demonstrative use.
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Suppose

I

utter the sentence "she is a
philosopher",

while holding up a placard on which an
arrow has been drawn,
and I hold it up in such a way that
the arrow is

unambiguously pointing to a certain woman in
the corner of
the room.

"She"

functions here as a demonstrative and its

content/referent in this context is that woman
herself
toward whom the arrow is pointing.
same effect,

might accomplish the

I

though, by raising a placard on which has
been

inscribed not an arrow, but some token of the English

expression "woman in the corner"

(and perhaps by glancing

pointedly at the inscribed phrase as
sentence

)

.

I

produce the

Here it seems clear that the inscribed

expression is not part of the sentence, but constitutes the

accompanying demonstration needed to complete a
demonstrative
The demonstrative use of

analogous to the use of
for example,

'he'

'

dthat

'

is to be understood as

in this second situation.

employing the demonstrative use,

I

verbally

produce an utterance that can be transcribed as
Dthat woman in the corner is a philosopher,
the utterance should be construed as consisting of two

parts: one is a token of the sentence 'dthat is a

philosopher' and the other as a token of "woman in the
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If,

corner" constituting the accompanying
demonstration.
for convenience sake write this

We may

as

Dthat

.

.

.

{woman in the corner}

is a philosopher

Kaplan regards this use of "dthat" as
directly
/

referential, and if he is right about
demonstratives in
general, there is no reason to doubt
this.
On this
treatment,

the word 'dthat'

singular term.
'dthat'

But,

itself is a directly referential

Kaplan claims that the operator use of

is not directly referential:

"If "dthat" is an operator, and if the
description, which constitutes the operand and
thus syntactically completes the singular term,
induces a complex element into content, then the
correct way to describe "dthat" is as a
rigidifier.
Complete dthat-terms would be rigid,
in fact obstinately rigid.
In this case, the
proposition would not carry the individual itself
into the possible world but rather would carry
instructions to run back home and get the
individual who there satisfies certain
1,28
specifications.
.

Now,

.

it is clear that,

on the operator use,

'dthat'

is

not itself a directly referential singular term, since it is
not itself a singular term.

But the question is whether

singular terms of the form 'dthat

[a]'

are directly

referential, and it is not at all clear to me that they are
not,

even if 'dthat' is a rigidifier..

this question further.
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I

want to explore

First, how do we make sense
formally of

rigidifier?

(for

dthat

There are a couple of options here.

the most obvious one:

m

presented

'

First,

•

as a

Here is

to the language fragment
just

the previous section, we add the
word 'dthato'

'dthat -operator use).
'

Syntactically,

'

dthato

'

is an

operator that attaches to singular terms
to form a singular
term.

For a given context of use

let C u be the

u,

circumstance determined by, that is embedded
let the content of a singular term

be denoted by
C

if

,

to u)

[a]

u

u.

And,

relative to context

say that for any circumstance

is an individual,

then the value of a (relative

u

.

[a]

u

,

and if

[a]

is an individual

u

the value of a (relative to u)in C is the result
of
[c*] u

to C.

Denote both of these by

[o]

u

/C.

The

semantic role of 'dthato' in the singular term 'dthato

may then be construed as involving
[a]

u

for every circumstance

C,

j

(C)

=

[a]

[a]'

function that takes

a

and a context u to the individual concept
u /C u

.

j

such that,

In other words,

to the constant function that takes every circumstance to

the value of a,

relative to

in C u

u,

.

There is a technical problem with this first option,
though.

u,

Finally,

[a]

in C is just

concept,

a,

in,

It conflates character and content,

since it is

sensitive both to the context of utterance and the content
of the singular term a.

But,

we can fit it into Kaplan's
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content/character scheme by prizing apart the
contextsensitivity and content-sensitivity:

Let the semantics of

'dthato' be given by the following two rules:
ix)

The character of 'dthato' is a function DTO
that
takes contexts of use to functions from contents
of
singular terms to contents of singular terms.

Which function on contents is it?

That is given by the

following rule:

x)

The content of dthato relative to a context u,
DTO u is the function that assigns to every
singular term content [a] u the individual concept
such that, for every circumstance C, j (C) =
'

,

[a]

And,

u /C u

j

.

then we add the following obvious rule for complete

dthato -terms
1

'

xi)

The content of [dthato [a]] relative to context u is
DTO u [a] u
(

Now,

here,

)

'dthato'

terms formed from definite descriptions

do turn out to have individual concepts as their contents,

and so are not directly referential, but merely obstinately

rigid

29
.

But,

there is an alternative, and more straightforward,

operator treatment of 'dthato' terms.
'dthato'

We can set up

terms so that their content is always the value of
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the bracketed singular term relative
to the circumstance

embedded in the context of utterance.
x')

Change

(x)

above to

The content of 'dthato' relative to a context
DTO u is the function that assigns, to every
singular term content [a] u [a] u /C u

u,

,

.

,

If we adopt this second option,

’dthato [the x Fx]
in u,

then the content of

relative to a context u is its referent

not a sense or function that happens to pick out that

referent at every circumstance.

Since the content of a term

is the "propositional component" associated with a term,

then it is the referent of 'dthato [the x Fx]

that gets

"loaded into" the proposition at the context of utterance,
as the proposition is "prepared for its round-the worlds
j

ourney "
But it also turns out on this second option that

'dthato'

terms have derived content.

Their contents are a

function of the content of 'dthato' and the content of the

embedded singular term (which, if it is a description, also
has derived content)

.

So,

while they possess one of the two

features we associated with direct reference (content

=

referent), when looking only at names and indexicals, they
do not possess the other (underived content)

operator treatment described by rule

(x)

.

Call the

the rigidifying

operator treatment, and call the treatment given by rule
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(x')

the priorizing operator treatment.

these will be distinguished as 'dthato
r
I

Where necessary,
'

and ’dthato p '.

would like to address one possible objection
to these

two accounts of the operator use of

'

dthat

'

.

One might

believe that, for anything to qualify as an operator,
it
must have stable character.

That is it must be invariably

associated with some one particular content.

This conforms

to the notion of operator that we associate with modal

operators,

lambda operators etc.

Both accounts of

’

dthato

1

,

as either a rigidifying operator or a priorizing operator,

violate this restriction.

On these readings,

'

dtahto

does

1

not have a stable character: it is itself an indexical

.

In

every context of use, its content is some function: a
function that takes the content of a singular term to the

referent of that term in the circumstance determined by that
context.

But, which function it has as content varies from

one context to another.
Now, whether or not this is how we understand

'operator',

the question here is whether Kaplan restricts

the use of the term in this way.

If so,

neither the

rigidifying nor the priorizing operator could be what Kaplan
has in mind for the operator interpretation of 'dthat'.
But,

is impossible to understand Kaplan's own treatment in

the formal system,

the treatment he says is most naturally
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given the operator interpretation

30
,

without assuming that

"dthat " is an indexical.

Kaplan gives the following account of the meaning
of
dthat- terms in his system LD:
|dthat[a]|

in context c, under assignment f, at time
t
|a|
=
in context c, under assignment f, at
the time c(T) of c in the world c (W) of c.

m

world w

Consider a singular term such as

dthat [the x: x is the number of planets]

Clearly,

the whole dthat- term here is an indexical.

is the indexicality coming from?

term,

surely.

Where

Not the embedded singular

That term has a stable character.

must be derived from the word "dthat".

And,

So,

in fact,

it

Kaplan

explicitly rejects the notion that operators must have
stable character.

He describes the 'actually' operator as

an indexical, and seems to regard the syncategorimatic

treatment af the latter as an inessential vestige of the
style of the semantics.
If

"dthat' were treated as an operator with stable

character,

then since definite descriptions also (typically)

have stable character, the content of a dthat- term would not
be sensitive to the context of utterance.
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This brings us to the crux of the issue
about direct

reference.

Why does Kaplan believe that regarding

as an operator means regarding

referential?
rigidifier,
function.
reason,

'

dthat

dthat -terms as not directly
'

'

in the interpretation of

'dthat'

as

dthat -terms have as their content a constant
'

'

But,

we can't say that that alone is sufficient

for Kaplan,

referential.

to regard those terms as not directly

In the formalism,

Kaplan traets all singular

terms this way, but for some of them,

the directly

referential ones, he seems to regard the treatment as an
artifact of the model.

The only thing that makes a

difference here is the syntactic complexity.
to associate this with both having a sense,

Kaplan seems
and having a

complex, rather than an individual, as content.

But,

not

all terms with derived reference need work this way.

what is direct reference?

So,

options.

We seem to have two main

There is what may be called prior reference

a

term has prior reference if and only if its content is its

referent (and so the referent is determined prior to the

evaluation at a circumstance)

reference
question,
as

(a)

:

.

And there is underived prior

prior reference plus underived content.
then,

is this:

prior reference,

The

Is direct reference the same thing
(b)

underived prior reference or

something else?
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(c)

Whatever Kaplan has in mind, his discussion
does not
settle the issue as far as (a) and (b) are
concerned,

because he does not carefully distinguish three
types of
complexity: sytactic complexity, complexity of
content and

complexity of propositional structure.
One might be inclined to argue that Kaplan must
have
the notion of underived prior reference in mind, when
he

uses the term 'direct reference', since he explicity says
that the demonstrative use of

'

dthat

'

is

directly

referential, but that the operator use is not

31
.

are two good reasons for rejecting this reading:

But,

there

First,

as

already noted, Kaplan seems to consider only two alternative
interpretations for 'dthat': the demonstrative use and the
'dthato r

'

use; and it is true that

directly referential term.

But,

'dthato r

'

is not a

Kaplan never seems to

consider the possibility of 'dthato p

'

so we don't know

whether he would regard this is directly referential or not.
Second,

there are many passages in which the stress is

laid on prior reference.

This seems especially to be the

case in the those passages in which he speaks of free

variables as a paradigm of direct reference.

The idea is

that in evaluating an open formula at a circumstance,

relative to an assignment to the free variables in the
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formula,

it does not matter how the
assignment is made,

What is assigned. 32

But,

only

there are other passages that
seem

to stress prior reference:

Thus my vivid talk of loading the
referent into
the proposition comes down to this:
when using a
directly referential term, the mode of
presentation of the referent (if you will allow
a
lapse into the Fregean idiom) is no part
of what
is said.
Only the referent itself figures in
content
Directly referential expressions are
transparent
Though there may be a complex
semantical mechanism that mediates the connection
between linguistic expression and referent, that
mechanism is unseen in what is said." 33
.

I

think that one possible source of the obscurity here

can be identified: the "1-dimensional" nature of the

structure picture obscures important differences among
propositions.

On the one hand,

it sometimes fails to

represent all of the propositions

1

s

propositional

components, and on the other hand, it may represent too
many.

Let me explain.

Kaplan needed to distinguish obstinately rigid

designators from directly referential terms.

To do this, he

brought in the idea of a structured proposition.

A directly

referential term is thus said to load an individual into
such a proposition.

Other singular terms are said to load a

complex structure into the proposition.

But,

it is not just

the case that complex expressions have parts with seperate
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contents; they also have their own
contents.

difference between the contents of

when the

dthat -terms and those
'

'

of definite descriptions are
represented

as the difference between
< DTHAT

<THE

,

,

<THE

F»

,

and

F>

the nature of the contents of the two
terms is not brought

out clearly.

W e are induced into taking the content of
both

of these terms to be some sort of complex
entity,

and

neglect the fact that the content of the first is
an
individual (on the second operator treatment outlined
above), and that of the second is a sense.

There is another, closely related, problem with the

structure picture.

According to that picture, any

propositional components loaded into the proposition at the
context of utterance, that is, any contents of component

expressions that go into determining the proposition, show
up along with the proposition at each circumstance of

svsluat ion

.

But,

if we adopt what

I

called the denotational

notion of content, we ought to allow that some of these
concepts are "absorbed into the proposition" at the context
of utterance,

so that only the proposition,

and not (all of)

the contents that determined it, makes an appearance at the

different circumstances of evaluation.
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The kind of use Kaplan makes of possible
worlds

semantics tends to reinforce the habits of thought
promoted

by the structure picture.

In Kaplan's formal system, no use

is made of propositions at all,

of any kind, not even as

functions from worlds to truth values.

Linguistic

expressions are (apropriately) evaluated at contexts, but
these same linguistic expressions are (misleadingly,
think)

evaluated at circumstances as well.

I

This is no help

in fleshing out the intuitively appealing idea that

sentences determine propositions at contexts, and then these

propositions are evaluated at circumstances.

And like the

structure picture, it encourages the view that all of the
contents of the sentence's components are carried around
from world to world.

In the formalism,

complex expression with derived content

the content of a
is,

in a sense,

recomputed at every world, generating the misleading
impression that the content has not been determined prior to

evaluation

3

.

4

What Are Singular Propositions ?
We are now in a position to say something informative

about singular propositions.

I

will be guided by the idea

that a singular proposition is typically the content of a

sentence containing a directly referential singular term,

and in saying that a term is directly referential,
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I

will

mean that it has what

have called prior reference.

I

I

assume that the intuitive notion of a
singular proposition
is that of a proposition with an
individual
as a

constituent, and that the semantic mechanism
whereby that

individual gets to be a constituent of the
expressed

proposition is irrelevant.
Let us think of propositions or sentential
contents as

being determined by an entity that

determining pair or PDP
The content of

S

.

will call a proposition

Consider an arbitrary sentence

S.

is some function of the contents of the

smallest contentful components of

determined?

I

S.

How is this function

A plausible view, and one that is presupposed

by a good deal of semantic theorizing is that, if the
sentence is not syntactically ambiguous, the function is

determined by the semantic categories of the component
expressions together with their order of appearance in the
sentence.

No doubt contextual factors also often enter into

the determination of this function.

determined,

However the function is

let's call it the content function.

We can then

correlate with the sentence the ordered pair:

<3

where

3

...,cn)

/

(cl

,

c2

,

.

.

.

,

cn)

is the appropriate content function,

and (cl, c2,

is the sequence of contents of the sentence's
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component expressions that serve as
inputs to

3

.

Call this

the input sequence. The proposition
determined by the

sentence is not the above ordered pair,
but the result of
applying the content function to input
sequence,

3(cl,

c2

...,

,

cn)

that is

Call the proposition thus determined by

the PDP its product.

Not just whole sentences, but complex component

expressions with content can be represented by a pair
of
this sort.

In general the pair <3,

consisting of content function
*

•

•

CDP

'

c n)

,

...,cn)>

and input sequence

(c 1(

c2

a PDP is just a CDP whose product is a

proposition
It will be convenient in what follows to have an

alternative way of representing the PDP <3,
cn)>.

I

will use the notation

this purpose.
taken,

'

will be called simply a content determining pair or

So,

.

3

c2

(cl,

[[3,

(cl,

(cl,

c2,

...,

c2

cn)]] for

While both of these expressions will be

in isolation,

to refer to the same entity,

the

square-bracketed version will be used when the product of
the corresponding CDP is to serve as part of the input

sequence of another CDP.

expression

[<3,

the expression

(cl,
[[3,

c2

,

(cl,

the two expressions [<6,

In other words, while the
...,

c2,
(c l7

cn)>] denotes the same CDP as
...,
[3,
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cn)]],
(cl,

and while both of

c2,

...,

cn)]>] and

[<5

(c 1;

;

<3

,

(cl,

c2

cn)»] denote

.. •'

,

a CDP in which the

second term of the input sequence is the
correlated with the
CDP <3, (cl, c2
..., cn) >
the second term in
,

the product of the CDP,
<3

/

(cl,

c2

,

...,

the first is

,

and the second term of the second is

cn) > itself.

Representing the proposition expressed by a sentence
by
the associated PDP will allow us to be neutral regarding
the

exact nature of propositions
of example,

To use the most simple sort

.

consider a sentence of the form

[a

is

Suppose the content of a is a and the content of
Then,

the proposition that is expressed by a is

$"]

$>

0,

is F.

its

content, can be represented as

(i)

<g,

(a,

F

)

where g is a content function, and the proposition expressed
is g(a,

F)

.

Now, which function is g?

The answer one gives

this question will depend on which view of properties one
has,

and how one thinks they combine with individuals in

order to determine propositions.

If properties are

propositional functions, and the proposition expressed is
the result of applying that function to the thing referred
to by the subject term,

the above is just F(a)

.

then the proposition expressed by
This means that g is the function y

defined by:
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(ii)

Y

Y)

(x,

=

Y(x)

Suppose on the other hand, you take the
proposition

expressed by
<a,

F>.

fa

is o] to be a structured entity of the
form

Then g is the function

(

iii

)

6(x,

Y)

5

defined by:

= <a,

Y>

The technique can be extended to represent not just

propositions,

the contents of sentences, but the contents of

any complex expression whose content is a function of the

contents of its parts.

As an example,

"Some animals are mammals".

consider the sentence

One way of analyzing this

sentence understands it as having three elementary

contentful grammatical components
'are mammals'

.

-

'Some',

The content of 'animals'

'animals' and

is the property A of

being an animal, the content of 'are mammals' is the

property M of being a mammal, and the content of 'some' is a
function SOME from properties to functions on properties.
That is, the proposition is determined by first applying
SOME to A, and then taking the resulting function and

applying it to

M.

we can represent the content of the

So,

expression 'some animals' by the ordered pair

(iv)

<y

'

(SOME,
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A)

where Y

'

is the inverse of the function
y in (ii)

above.

We

can then associate with the whole proposition
expressed by
our example sentence the PDP:

(v)

<Y

Y
'

(

,

[

(SOME,

'

A)], M)>.

Here is where the notation introduced a few paragraphs

back makes its appearance.
than the expression

<Y

»

We use
(SOME,

'

[y

A) >

rather than as the simpler

,

A)]'

rather

so as to indicate that

it is the product of this latter CDP,

which is the appropriate input.

(SOME,

'

and not the CDP itself

But writing it this way,

'y' (SOME,

A)

'

enables us to

identify that product as the content of some expression.
We can now put forward a characterization of singular

propositions.

We define the transitive closure of a CDP Q

as the smallest set C such that

sequence in Q is in
CDP that is in
R,

then y is in

C,

C,

and

(a)

every term of the input

for any R and y,

(b)

if R is a

and y is a term in the input sequence of
We denote this entity by C(Q)

C.

A

singular proposition is any proposition that is the product
of some PDP whose transitive closure contains an individual.
I

want to avoid several possible sources of

misunderstanding.

First,

PDP

'

s

are not propositions, not

even structural propositions, nor are CDP
least not typically)

.

'

s

contents (at

The content function in a PDP is
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not itself a "component" of the
proposition determined by
that PDP
The content function is not itself
a content.
.

Second,

I

am not putting forth some semantic
thesis to

the effect that sentences somehow express
their contents by

way of PDP

'

s

.

That is,

I

am not saying that sentences

express propositions by first expessing a PDP which
in turn

determines the proposition, but only that a PDP can
be

associated with every proposition expressing sentence.
Third,

the individuals referred to in the definition

above are to be taken as "ontological" individuals, not
"logical" individuals.

What

I

have in mind is this: there

is no reason why we cannot refer to any kind of entity at

all with a directly referential singular term.

The class of

singular terms contains not only descriptions like "the

computer that beat Kasparov" which refers to a genuine
ontological individual

-

the computer Deep Blue, but also

descriptions such as "the mass of Jupiter"

apparently refers to a property

philosophy professors"

-

-

which

and "the truth about

which apparently refers to a

proposition or set of propositions.
nominalizations such as "pespicacity
place".

-

It also includes
"

and "running in

Only the use of expressions like the first one in

this list will be taken as giving rise to singular

propositions
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Fourth,

there is no implication so far
that there is a

one-to-one correspondence between PDP

'

s

and propositions, or

CDP's and the contents that are their
products.

in fact,

on

most views of the nature of propositions and
propositional
components,

this is not the case.

I

intend the notion of a

PDP to be neutral with respect to the actual
nature of

propositions
Finally

,

note that a content function is always the

first term of a CDP even if, as in example

(i)

above,

one of

the contents is itself a propositional function of some

kind
The concept of singular propositions just outlined is a

very broad one.

It involves few assumptions about what a

proposition is.

A proposition can be a set of worlds, a set

of situations or circumstances,

monad.
I

or a some sort of logical

Propositions might even be structural propositions.

believe that this very broad notion of a singular

proposition is all that is supported by semantic
considerations on direct reference.
At this point, all we have arrived at is an account of

what direct reference is, and a corresponding account of
what singular propositions are, insofar as they are taken to
be the semantic conbtents of sentences containing directly

referential expressions.

In the next chapter,
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I

will look

at arguments that purport to show
that there are directly

referential expressions in natural language,
and hence that
some natural language sentences express
singular
propositions.

I

will then turn to the more complex
issue of

whether or not these propositions are ontologically
/

dependent on their constituents.

Notes
1.

See Moore

(1981)
2.

Prior (1957) and (1967) and Adams

(1966),

.

Kaplan (1989a), p. 483.

3. The following account of the content/character
distinction, is based entirely on Kaplan's discussion of
these issues in (1989a) and Kaplan (1989b)
4.

Kaplan (1989a), pp

.

500-505, and Kaplan (1989b) p.

578.

5. This claim involves an idealization.
Many, perhaps most,
proper names have divided reference they have more than one
bearer.
Certainly, contextual factors play a role in
determining the referent of names with divided reference.
Throughout the following discussion, I will adopt the
simplifying pretense that names have a unique bearer.
6.

Kaplan (1978b), pp

7.

But,

.

67-68.

see footnote 12 in Kaplan (1989a)

8. In Chapter 6, I will argue that Buridanism gives rise to
a modal logic in which there is a failure of the rule of

necessitation
i-O

-

hDo
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The example just discussed illustrates
another reason for
denying that rule.
9.

Kaplan (1989a) pp. 505-507.

On this account, then, propositions are
functions from circumstances to truth values represented by

10.

1. The use of "after" here is
metaphorical.
Kaplan often
employs temporal metaphors in order to render
some of his
ideas more vivid.
As, for instance, when he speaks of
contents as "first" being loaded into the
proposition, and
then" evaluated at a circumstance.
16.
Note, though, that
Kaplan's system is intended primarily as an account
of
semantic meaning, and not an account of some possible
process of interpretation on the part of an ideal
interpreter
19.

Kaplan (1986a), p.493, n.17.
17.

More specifically, a Carnap/Church account.

18.

Kaplan (1986a), p.494.

Making use of this picture, Kaplan often describes the
semantic mechanisms by which the contents of the component
expressions in a sentence determine a proposition, and
ultimately a truth value, metaphorically in terms of a
content being "loaded into the proposition", and the
proposition then being "taken around from circumstance to
circumstance".
But, the use of the word "load" invites
different interpretations. Are semantic contents loaded
20.
into a proposition like input is loaded into a computer
program, or like cargo is loaded onto a ship? In the first
case, the entered content (input) data may not be any part
of the proposition (output)
This might be called content
blending
If the input content is in some sense a genuine
component of the proposition determined, we may speak of
content packaging
The distinction between content blending
and content packaging is related to the distinction between
the intensional and denotational accounts of content.
The
nature of this relation will be clarified in what is to
below.
.

.

.

We can't take the intuitive idea of the referent of a
singular term to be the same as the idea of the term's
extension (although the referent always turns out to be the
extension)
since the extension of any expression is
,
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determined by the evaluation of the
expression's content at
a circumstance.
But, in the case of a directly
21.
referential
term, the referent determines the
content.
In the formal system, Kaplan treats
logical constants
quantifiers, modal and tense operators, the
functor dthat
and the definite description operator 'the'
as
sycategorimatic rules are given for determining
the
contents of complex expressions containing these
simple
expressions, based on the contents of the component
espressions, but the sycategorimatical expressions
themselves are not assigned a content. However,
Kaplan
mentions the possibility of extending the notion of
content
to apply to operators, and says that in that case
"we would
see that all indexicals (including N, A, Y and dthat)
have a
Stable Content in every context" (1986a, p. 548)
Earlier,
he says:
I take content as a notion applying not
just to
sentences taken in a context but to any meaningful part of
speech taken in a context" (1986a, p. 501)
22.
I conclude that Kaplan regards the
syncategorimatical
accounts as inessential artifacts of the particular
technique used in presenting the formal system.
If we
extend the notion of content to the
it seems to me that
the account I give here is the only natural one that is
23.
compatible with Kaplan s overall treatment of descriptions
'

:

'

'

'

This definition involves a slight simplification.
The
treatment of definite descriptions as functions of this sort
requires, to secure a smoothly running semantics, the use of
t
a special entity (denoted with
by Kaplan) for the value
of the function at circumstances in which nothing satisfies
the property F.
'

'

This appears to be Kaplan's own diagnosis of the
problem.
He says that "the possible worlds semantics of the
formal system
obscures the distinction between direct
reference and rigid designation" (1986b, p. 579), and that
the distinction "is dramatized by the structured
propositions picture. That is part of the reason why I like
it" (1986a, p.497)
.

24.

.

.

Kaplan (1989a)

p.

494.

The crucial idea here is that the content is derived
from other contents not just that it is semantically
derived.
The contents of all expressions are derived from
their characters.
25.

,
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26.

Kaplan (1989a), pp

.

521-522.

27.

Kaplan (1989b) p. 579.

28.
30.

Kaplan (1989b), p. 580.

29.

I

am working here with the revised semantic
scheme.

Kaplan (1989b),

p.

31.

Kaplan (1989b), pp

32

citation

.

33.

Kaplan (1989b), pp

581.
.

580-81.

.

572-73.
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CHAPTER

4

SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS AND ONTOLOGICAL
DEPENDENCY

The characteristic results of Buridanism
derive from
the intuition that the proposition expressed
by a sentence

like "Quine does not exist" depends for its
very existence
on the existence of Quine himself.

The basis for that

intuition would seem to be a combination of three
ideas:

(i)

that there are directly referential singular terms,
and this

class includes proper names,

(ii)

that the propositions

expressed by sentences containing such terms are singular
propositions of which the referent of the term is a
constituent, and (iii) that singular propositions depend

ontologically on their constituents.
Together,

these three claims generate the thesis that

have called "N-Dependency"

:

I

that the propositions expressed

by sentences containing proper names depend ontologically on
the referents of those names.
In the previous chapter,

I

formulated an account of the

nature of direct reference, and then used that account as a
basis for an "extrinsic" characterization of singular

propositions.

The characterization was such to guarantee

that there are singular propositions, so long as there are

sentences that contain directly referential singular terms.
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In this chapter,

I

will set out the case for directly

referential singular terms, and argue that
the singular

propositions expressed by sentences containing
these terms
are ontologically dependent on their
constituents.
So,

this

chapter is devoted to a consideration of the
case for N-

Dependency
In section 4.1,

argue that the most reasonable account

of the semantics of names,

demonstrative and indexicals is

that they are directly referential.

referential",

I

prior reference
referents.

By "directly

mean here that they have what

have called

I

their contents are identical to their

In the remainder of my discussion,

I

will

continue to use the expression "direct reference" in this
way.

In section 4.2,

I

describe several strategies of

resistance to direct reference and criticize them.
section 4.3,
Thesis

I

In

formulate and argue for the Dependency

the claim that singular propositions are

ontologically dependent on their constituents.
I

strong.

believe that the case for direct reference is quite
The case for the Dependency Thesis is less

conclusive.

But it should be noted that at least some of

the resistance to the idea that the proposition expressed by

"Quine does not exist" depends ontologically on Quine is
based, not on a rejection of the dependency thesis, but on a
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rejection of the claim that "Quine" is
directly referential.
So, for readers who are skeptical
about the claim that names
are directly referential, but who are not
skeptical about
the Dependency Thesis, the argument in
sections I and XI may

succeed in convincing them of N-dependency
4

.

1

Arguments for Direct Referen cp
The main arguments for direct reference were
given

their first careful formulation in the context of
the

discussions and debates attending the birth of the so-called

New Theory of Reference, in the sixties and early seventies.
Alas,

the theory has passed into the ranks of those things,

like the New Criticism,

Testament that are new

the New Frontier and the New

m

name only.

And,

the New Theory is

not really a theory, but an assortment of theories with

certain common themes.

But,

I

will continue to use the

label "New Theory" when great precision is not required.

Most of the arguments for direct reference are now quite
familiar, and they can therefore be presented rather

briskly, so that more attention can be focussed on the

various attempts to resist them.

But there are a few points

to consider before proceeding.

First,

it is clear that one thing that was new about

the New Theory was not just its account of what the semantic

contents of certain singular terms are, but also its account
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of how these terms come to have
those contents in the first

place.

This latter portion of the theory
is the "causal" or
"historical chain" account of the reference
of proper names.

Part of the appeal of the older view,
at least in its

Fregean form, was its explanation of how
reference was
determined.

Some of the criticisms of the New Theory
have

been directed at this aspect of the theory.

I

will not

address those criticisms here, but will instead
restrict my

attention to criticisms having to do with what
the content
of a singular term is.
In presenting the arguments for direct
reference and

the proposed alternatives to direct reference,

I

will rely

on the content and character framework developed by
Kaplan

and discussed in the previous chapter.

This choice is

required by the practical necessity of having an
organizational framework within which to develop the

alternative views.

Without relying on such a framework, it

would be impossible to consider these views in the scope of
a single chapter.

To some extent,

this will require

presenting the views in a somewhat different form than that
given to them by their original authors.
hope is that

I

Despite this, my

have maintained the spirit of these views,

and have not left out any viable candidate theories.
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Nathan Salmon has classified the
arguments for direct
reference as falling into three categories:
modal arguments,
epistemic arguments and semantic arguments.

This is a

useful classification, and the following
presentation is

heavily dependent on Salmon's presentation in
Reference and
Essence.

But,

I

will also briefly consider a certain

argument based on propositional attitude ascriptions.
I

And,

will consider a more direct argument for singular

propositions

-

Kaplan's "quantifying in" argument.

The first four types of arguments are fundamentally

arguments against something, which is sometimes referred
to
as the orthodox theory or the Frege-Russell theory of

singular reference.

The theories of Frege and Russell were

of course very different.

ground.

Each,

But there is an area of common

as Kaplan puts it,

"held something like a

disguised definite description theory of proper names"
So,

the arguments are directed against descriptional

theories of names.

Salmon has proposed the following

account of what it means for a singular term to be

descriptional

"an expression a, as used in a particular
context, is descriptional if there is a set of
properties semantically associated with a in such
a way as to generate a semantic relation, which
may be called 'denotation' or 'reference', and
which correlates with a (with respect to such
semantic parameters as a possible world w an a
138

2
.

tims t) whoever or whatever
uniquely has all or
at least sufficiently many) of
these properties
(in w at t)
if there is a unique such
(

individual

,

and nothing otherwise

."

3

am not satisfied with this account for
a variety of
reasons, but I think that it will suffice
for our purposes
I

here.

What

I

would stress, though, is that on the
modified

content/character scheme developed in the last chapter,
there are only two possibilities for the content of
a

singular term: either its content is an individual
concept
or it is an individual.

So,

I

will assume that to say that

a singular term is descriptional is to say that
its content

is

(represented by) an individual concept: a function that

takes circumstances of evaluation to an individual.
So,

the arguments are directed against

descriptionalism

.

What do the arguments argue for?

The

semantic and propositional attitudes arguments argue

directly for direct reference.

But,

the modal and epistemic

arguments are fundamentally arguments for what Kripke has

called "rigid designation".

The main idea behind rigid

designation has been presented in the previous chapter.
Here

I

will just describe the criterion of rigid designation

that

I

will employ:

An singular term a will be taken to be

a rigid designator if and only if the sentence:
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exists an x such that necessarily
exists, then a = x]

("there

(C)

is true.

if X

4

Note that it is possible for a singular term to be
both

descriptional (its content is an individual concept) and
a
rigid designator.

And so, a critic of direct reference

might accept the arguments for rigid designation.
then,

How,

do we get from rigid designation to direct reference?

The move beyond rigid designation to direct reference is

usually motivated by an attempt to explain rigid
designation.

Kaplan has written that direct reference was

supposed to "provide the deep structure for rigid
designation, to underlie rigid designation, to explain it". 5
So,

one issue we must consider is whether,

some given rigid singular term,

in the case of

there is any plausible

alternative semantic mechanism that explains why that term
is a rigid designator.

While

I

believe that the sorts of arguments considered

below are applicable to indexicals and demonstrative, only
the arguments for the direct ref erentiality of names will be

presented in detail here.
4.1.1 The Modal Arguments
The modal arguments are due to Kripke, and were

presented both in his paper "Identity and Necessity"
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6
,

and

m

the extremely influential monograph
Naming and

Necessi ty1

.

According to descriptionalism, names are
semantically
associated with some property or properties, and
the
referent of the term in a context is the individual
that has
the property or properties thus associated.

The name,

therefore, has the sort of content possessed by a
definite

description (whether or not the language actually contains
a
definite description with that content)

.

Now people

commonly use and understand proper names in natural
languages; so the corresponding description ought to be one
that could be commonly used and understood.

For example,

one might think that the name "Kasparov" is associated with
the description "the current world chess champion".

But,

it

would be implausible to think that the name is alike in
meaning to:

"the human being whose genetic sequence is,

the first chromosome,

AAGTCCCTGA.

.

.

.

,

on

and on the second

chromosome...., etc", that is, to a complete genetic

description of Kasparov.
Suppose,

then,

that the name Kasparov, as used in some

particular context, is identical in content to "the current

world chess champion".

If that is the case,

proposition expressed by
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then the

1)

Kasparov is the current world chess champion

ought to be necessary, or at least the proposition
expressed

by the following is necessary:

2)

If Kasparov exists, then Kasparov is the current world
chess champion

But then,

it is necessary that if Kasparov exists,

is the current world chess champion.

wrong.

And,

Kasparov

this is certainly

It is certainly possible for Kasparov to exist,

while someone other than Kasparov is the current world chess

champion

8

The argument does not depend upon the particular

description suggested here, but requires only that the

description picks out either
has only contingently, or

(b)

(a)

a property that Kasparov

a property that he has

essentially, but one such that it is a contingent matter
that he has it uniquely (perhaps like the description of

Kasparov's complete genetic makeup discussed above).
4.1.2 The Eoistemic Arguments

The epistemic arguments are similar to the modal

arguments.

If

"Kasparov" means the same thing as "the

current world chess champion", then sentence
analytic.

(2)

above is

It seems then that the proposition it expresses

ought to be knowable a priori, just as it is knowable
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a

prion

that if the current world chess champion
exists,

then

the current world chess champion is the
current world chess

champion

9

certainly it is not knowable a priori that if

But,

Kasparov exists, then Kasparov is the current world
chess
champion.

It is not by the use of my reasoning abilities

alone that

I

learn this proposition; rather,

it is known on

the basis of my a posteriori knowledge of current
affairs.

4.1.3 The Semantic Arguments

This argument is due to Donnellan.

Thales is alleged

to be the Greek philosopher who held that all is water.

Suppose,

then,

that the content of "Thales" is given by the

description "the Greek philosopher who held that all is
water".

Here is Salmon's formulation of the remainder of

the argument

"Suppose now that, owing to some error or fraud,
the man referred to by writers such as Aristotle
and Herodotus, from whom our use of the name
'Thales' derives, never genuinely believed that
all is water.
Suppose further that by a very
strange coincidence there was indeed a Greek
hermit-philosopher who did in fact hold this
bizarre view, though he is unknown to us and bears
no historical connection to us.
To which of these
two philosophers would our name 'Thales' refer?
This is a clear semantic question with a clear
answer: The name would refer to the first of the
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This argument is of a very different
kind than the first
two, and it is essential to understand
the difference.
The modal argument asks us to consider
the proposition
that is actually expressed by our use of
"if Kasparov
exists,

then Kasparov is the current world chess
champion",
/

and then to evaluate that proposition relative
to various

counterf actual circumstances.

It is designed to prompt the

intuition that that proposition is false in some
of those

circumstances and so is contingent.
In the framework of possible worlds semantics,

this is

reflected by the values of the designation function: for
all
w,

D "Kasparov"
(

said,

,

w)

=

Kasparov.

The name "Kasparov",

designates Kasparov in every possible world.

it is

But,

this locution is a piece of semantic jargon; it does not

mean the same thing that we would mean were we say that it
is necessarily the case that

Surely,

"Kasparov" refers to Kasparov.

the name might "Kasparov" might have denoted

something else.
The semantic argument asks us to consider not the

proposition that is actually expressed in the present
context, but the proposition that would be expressed in

certain other contexts.

The contexts in question are very

similar to ones that actually obtain and have certain

historical facts in common.

One of those facts is that the
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man referred to by Aristotle and Herodotus,
and from whom
our use of the name Thales derives, never held
that all is
water.

The claim, then,

is that in such contexts,

on the

descriptional theory, the occurrence of "Thales" in
"Thales

held that all is water", refers to the Greek philosopher
who
did hold that view, and the proposition expressed is one
that is true in the circumstance that is embedded within

that context.

The theory of direct reference, however,

predicts that in those contexts, the occurrence of the name
"Thales" in the given sentence refers to the person "from

whom the use of the name derives", and that the proposition
expressed by the sentence is then true in the circumstance
of evaluation embedded within the context.

4.1.4 Propositional Attitudes Arguments
Some of the same arguments that use modal contexts to

argue against descriptionalism can be turned into arguments
that employ propositional attitude ascriptions for the same

purpose.

So,

for example,

it might be argued that there are

many people who know that there is a current world chess
champion, but who do not know who the current world chess

champion is.

Call one of these people "Lester".

Then the

sentence

3)

Lester does not believe that Kasparov is the current
world chess champion
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is true,

but the sentence that results from
replacing

“Kasparov" with the description that is
supposed to give its

meaning

4)

Lester does not believe that the current world
chess
champion is the current world chess champion

is false.

This argument is related to, but different than, the

epistemic arguments.

In those arguments we are asked to

consider the propositions expressed by the embedded
sentences, and to consider whether those propositions are or

are not knowable a priori

.

Here we look at propositional

attitude ascriptions and are asked to consider whether or
not they are true.

There is a serious problem with propositional attitude

arguments for direct reference.

As is shown by Frege's

puzzle about identity, the arguments can be used against
direct reference as well.

So,

there are people who do not

know that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are two names for the
same heavenly body, although they know these names and do

believe that each of them is a name of some heavenly body.
Call one of these people "Hester".

5)

So we have:

Hester does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus
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IS true,

6

)

but

Hester does not believe
that Hesperus is
Hesperus

is false.

But,

if

"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"
are both
directly referential singular
terms, and if their
contents
are their referent
-.—.j
^
ents,
and if ,_-u
they both refer to the
same
thing, and if the content
of a term is the
contribution it
-p

makes to determining the
proposition expressed by a
sentence
that contains it, then
,5) and
6
must say the same thing.
The problem is that
propositional attitude verbs
seem
be exquisitely sensitive
to the smallest
differences
between the sentences embedded
within their complementary
"that "-clauses, even to those
differences that we would
generally think involve no
differences in meaning.
fact,
I am inclined to think
that for any singular terms
a and 3,
even if they are co-referential,
and as alike in meaning as
one cares to allow, it is
possible to find a context in
which, for some person with name
(

,

m

'S',

S

believes a

is true,

S

a

while

believes a

is false,

=

=

3

so long as a and

3

are different terms
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It is possible to sustain the hypothesis
that names are

directly referential, even when falling within the
scope of
propositional attitudes verbs, in the face of puzzles
like
Frege's puzzle 11

.

But,

because of such puzzles,

I

think

that propositional attitudes arguments for direct reference,
like the one above, are unconvincing.

It seems that,

whatever account the defenders of direct reference give of
the semantics of

and (6), in order to defend the claim

(5)

that "Hesperus" and

"

Phospherus " have the same content, the

opponent of direct reference can always use the tools of
that account to forge an account of the semantics of
(4),

(3)

and

in order to defend the claim that "Kasparov" and "the

current world chess champion" have the same content.
4.1.5 Quantifying in

There is one other argument that, while not an argument
for direct reference per se,

is an argument for the

possibility of direct reference, and thus for singular
propositions, and so should be mentioned here. 12

Consider locutions that involve quantification into
clauses governed by modal operators, such as 'there is an x
such that it is possible that x is a philosopher'.

If we

take these operators as operators on propositions, something
that takes a proposition as a value,

saying this

:

then we seem to be

that there is some thing such that the
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proposition determined by assigning that
thing as the
denotation of the variable x in the open

formula 'x is a

philosopher' is possible.

But,

that seems to mean that all

you need to get a proposition from the formula
is to supply
the variable

with a referent.

'x'

This suggests then that,

whether there actually are any directly referential
terms in
natural languages or not, we could invent some.

replaced the
a

in the open formula

'x'

'x is a

And if we

philosopher' by

directly referential singular term that refers to one of

the things that satisfy the formula 'it is possible that
x
is a philosopher',

then the proposition determined by the

sentence will be a singular proposition, and will be

possible
One can avoid the conclusion of this argument by

insisting on the extensional world theory treatment of modal
discourse.

In EWT

analyzed away.
rendered as

'

,

the apparent propositional operators are

The example in the previous paragraph is

there is an x and there is a world w

(accessible from

philosopher in w"

a)

.

such that x is in w and x is a
This sentence may be regarded as not

involving any reference to propositions.
In Chapter Two,

I

argued that there are problems for

the actualist with the EWT treatment of modal discourse.

Later in this chapter,

I

will strengthen the argument by
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arguing against approaches to EWT that use
individual
essences to avoid these problems.
4

.

2

Resis tance to Direct Reference

Many philosophers, perhaps most philosophers, would
reject N-dependency

:

the view that the proposition expressed

by a sentence containing a proper name is ontologically

dependent on the referent of the name.

But,

sometimes it is

difficult to determine the basis for their resistance.

Are

they best construed as denying that the referent of the name
content of the name (and so denying that the

is the

sentence expresses a singular proposition)

?

Or are they

denying that the singular proposition expressed by the
sentence is ontologically dependent on that content?
example,

For

Plantinga claims that some propositions, including

those containing names and indexicals, are "directly about"

certain individuals, and that those propositions are not

ontologically dependent on those individuals. 13
most plausible construal of Plantinga'

s

But,

the

account is that he

means to deny that names are directly referential, and thus
that propositions directly about an individual are singular

propositions
In this section,

I

want to consider certain views of

singular reference that are in conflict with, or that may

appear to be in conflict with, the theory of direct
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reference.

I

will begin with two for which the conflict
is

only an apparent one
4.2.1 Freqeanism and Modified Fraapanism
Some philosophers have proposed a modification of the

traditional Fregean framework, that would allow that names
and indexicals are rigid designators, while attempting to

preserve the use of senses in propositional attitudes
contexts.

Suppose that natural language expressions have,

in addition to their contents,

some other semantic value,

which we may call its connotation.

Assume that connotations

and contents are semantically independent: neither one plays
any semantic role in determining the other.

And,

just as

there is a component of the expression's meaning, its
character, that determines a function from contexts to

circumstances, so there is some other component of the

meaning of the expression, corresponding to character, that
determines a function from contexts to connotations.
Since connotations are independent of content, they are

truth conditionally inert: they play no role in determining
the proposition that determines whether the sentence is true
or false.

It is still possible that the connotation of a

sentence is a proposition, just not that proposition.

But,

connotations do have this role: the content of an expression
falling within the scope of a propositional attitude verb,
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in a given context,

is the customary connotation of
the

embedded sentence in that context.

Suppose,

finally,

that

the connotation of a singular term is typically
not its

referent
While proposals of this form 14 may be thought of as
an

alternative to direct reference, they really require only
a
limitation on it.

It turns out that certain occurrences of

singular terms, whose contents are usually their referents
are not directly referential.

Only those occurrences within

the scope of a propositional attitude verb will fail to be

directly referential.

But, most occurrences of the term

will be directly referential.
4.2.2 Modified Descriotionalism

Another technique for interpreting singular terms
construes them as synonymous with certain complex

'

dthat

'

h

terms.

So,

for instance, while "Kasparov" may not mean the

same thing as "the current world chess champion", perhaps it

means the same thing as "[dthat: the current world chess
champion]

"

.

For this to be a kind of descriptionalism,

'dthat' must be given an operator interpretation and not a

demonstrative interpretation.

Otherwise,

the embedded

description is not part of the sentence, so there is no
sense in which the singular term is synonymous with some
*

description-like entity.
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Modified Descriptionalism is not refuted by
the modal
and epistemic arguments for direct reference.

it is in

conflict with the semantic arguments, though.

Because,

assuming that "Thales" is synonymous with "[dthat: the
ancient Greek philosopher who held that all is water]

"

,

it

has the result that our uses of the name "Thales" refer to

whoever in fact did hold that all is water, rather than to
the person from whom our use of the name derives.

But,

whatever the merits of Modified Descriptionalism, we have
seen that the operator use of 'dthat' can be interpreted so
as to make

dthat -terms directly referential: they have
'

'

prior reference.

So Modified Descriptionalism is not in

conflict with the notion that the singular terms to which it
applies are directly referential.
We now turn to a view of singular term reference that

really is in conflict with the theory of direct reference.
4.2.3 Freaeanism with Essences

One line of resistance to direct reference involves the

use of individual essences as the contents of singular
terms.

15

An individual essence of an individual is a

property that is essential to that individual and that is
essentially unique to that individual.
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More precisely:

Df:

P is an individual essence
of x =df
exists then x has P, and necessarily, necessarily
for any y
necessarily if y has P, then x =

if x

y.

Then we can say that a property P is an
individual essence
just in case it is possible that there be
something such
that P is an individual essence of that thing.
Part of the appeal of individual essences
is that there

might be individual essences that are not
individual
essences of any actually existing thing.

if there are such

uninstantiated essences, then, they may be able to provide
an actualist substitute for possibilia: rather than
say that

there is a possible individual that is F in some world,
we

could say that there is an individual essence that is co-

instantiated with F in that world.
What

wish to focus on, however, is the use of

I

individual essences as the contents of singular terms.

singular term

3,

individual

has an essence of

i,

If a

that refers in some context u to an
i

as its content in u,

then

the sentence

C')

There is an x such that necessarily, if x exists, then
3

=

x

will be true in u.
designation.

But,

So

3

will satisfy our criterion of rigid

since they would function semantically
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like a definite description, terms
like

3

would not be

directly referential.
The philosopher most responsible for
developing this

treatment of singular terms is Alvin Plantinga 16

.

Plantinga

has described four different types of essences:
qualitative

essences, cx-relational essences, world-indexed
essences, and

thisnesses
case,

I

.

I

will consider each of these in turn.

in each

will argue, either there are good metaphysical

reasons for thinking that there are no such essences, or
there are good semantical reasons for thinking that they
are
not the contents of names,

indexicals and demonstratives.

Before proceeding we must explain what is meant by
"thisness",

and consider the difference between purely

qualitative properties, called "suchnesses" by Robert Adams,
and quiditative properties.

A thisness is the property of

being identical to some particular individual.
precisely,

More

to say that some property P is the thisness of x

is to say that P is the property of being identical to x.

There is nothing within the Buridanian metaphysics

under consideration in this thesis that rules out thisnesses
of actually existing individuals.

But,

later

I

will argue

that those are all of the thisnesses there are: had some of

these individuals failed to exist, so their thisnesses would

have failed to exist; and if had there been individuals
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other than the ones that actually exist,
there would have
been thisnesses of those individuals as well,
thisnesses
that are not identical to the thisness of any
actually

existing individual.
Plantinga is an actualist, but no Buridanian.

He

believes not just that there are thisnesses of actually

existing individuals, but that there are thisnesses of
all
of the things that there could have been as well.

Since

these thisnesses are not actually exemplif ied, we can not
say that,

for a given unexemplified thisness

P,

there is an

x such that P is the property of being identical to x.

But,

we can say that there could have been an x that exemplified
P,

and that it is necessary that, had P been exemplified by

some thing y, P would have been the property of being

identical to y.
To begin, we need a working account of what it means

for a property to be purely qualitative.

Robert Adams

defines purely qualitative properties in terms of a kind of

property he calls a basic suchness

A basic suchness is a

.

property that

(a)

thisness,

is not any property P such that there exists a

(b)

is not a thisness,

relation R and individuals x 2

x2

,

property of bearing R to x 1# x

2

,

...,

,

.

and not equivalent to a

.

.,

xn

x n such that P is the
,

and

(c)

is not the

property of "being identical with or related in one way or
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another to an extensionally defined set
that has an
individual among its members, or among its
members' members,
or among its members' members' members, etc." 17
a purely

qualitative property is one that is a basic suchness
or

constructed out of basic suchnesses by certain logical
operations
us restrict our attention for the time being to

physical objects.

Intuitively,

the class of qualitative

properties of physical objects ought to include intrinsic
physical properties such as shape, mass (perhaps), charge
(perhaps)

etc.

It should also include relational properties

such as being such-and-such distance from a some physical

object x with intrinsic physical properties
But,
G,

F,

G,

H etc.

if q is some physical object with those properties F,

H,

etc.,

then the property of being such-and-such a

distance from q is not a purely qualitative property.
4. 2.

3.1 Qualitative Essences

A qualitative essence is one constructed out of purely

qualitative properties.

Adams argues, convincingly

I

think,

that it is possible for there to be an individual that has
no qualitative essence.

I

think that similar considerations

lead to the conclusion that there could be no physical

object that has a qualitative essence.
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Adams argues for the weaker claim from
the possibility
of I-pairs:

an

I

pair is simply a pair of objects that
share

all of there suchnesses.

Adams points out that there seems

to be a variety of different ways in which
I-pairs could

exist: there is the famous example due to Max Black

involving

"a universe consisting solely of two large solid
globes of iron.
They always have been, are, and
always will be exactly similar in shape (perfectly
spherical), size, chemical composition, color - in
short, in every qualitative respect.
They even
share all their relational suchnesses; for
example, each of them has the property of being
two diameters from another iron globe similar to
itself 1,18
.

There are also more complicated imaginary universes;

universes that are:

"perfectly symmetrical about a central point,
or plane, throughout their history.
Or they
may always repeat themselves to infinity in every
direction, like a monstrous three-dimensional
wallpaper pattern." 19
line,

The symmetric universe examples depend on a

controversial issue about the intrinsic properties of
spatial entities.

The issue is whether the intrinsic purely

geometrical properties of an object are preserved under

mirror reflection.

Consider a solid tetrahedron T with

three edges of lengths

1,

2,

and
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3,

sharing a common vertex

and mutually orthogonal.

Now consider a tetrahedron

T'

that

is geometrically related to T by
reflection through a plane.

Although T and

T'

are isometric (geometrically isomorphic

with respect to the distance relation)
to coincide by a rigid motion

they cannot be made

,

some combination of rotations

about a line and translations (moving it along a
straight
line without rotating it)

Such objects are sometimes

called incongruent counterparts

If some spatial entity

could have an incongruent counterpart, it is an
enant iomorph

.

Since T and

T'

are isometric,

they share all intrinsic

properties that are determined by the distance relations

holding among their parts.

But,

some have argued that there

are two additional global intrinsic geometrical properties,

each possessed by one and not the other
case then,

20
.

If this is the

two objects related by a mirror reflection do not

have all of the same intrinsic properties.

And so the

symmetric universes do not necessarily provide examples of
I-pairs

Notice that a world consisting only of tetrahedron T
and a congruent counterpart to

T,

T'

1

,

would not serve here.

Because there would be differences in the spatial relational

properties of the two. For instance, depending on how they
were placed, one of them might have a property like being
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a

solid tetrahedron x for which there is
another solid
tetrahedron y in the region of space that is

(a)

the plane determined by x's edges of lengths

1

(b)

contains x's edge of length

bounded by

and

2,

and

3.

Black's two spheres case depends on the fact that
the
spheres are self -symmetrical

,

symmetric about their centers,

so that even if they are related to one another by
a mirror

reflection,

they will be perfectly congruent.

And there

will be no qualitative asymmetries within the spheres that

could serve as a basis for distinguishing properties such as
the one discussed in the previous paragraph.

But,

there is

a question as to whether anything made of iron could be

self-symmetrical

.

It seems that certain physical objects,

like iron atoms, are enantiomorphs

,

and that they appear in

nature in only one particular orientation. 21

If this is

somehow part of the nature of iron, then perhaps there could
not be a self -symmetrical iron sphere.
So,

the most compelling examples are those of the

"infinite wallpaper" universes.

Any assymetry in the

relationship between two spatial entities x and y in such a
universe will be matched by a corresponding asymmetry

between y and some other entity
relational property of

x,

z.

So,

for any qualitative

that x has in virtue of its
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relation to

y,

its relation to
Now,

y will have the same property in virtue of
z.

if wallpaper worlds are possible,

then we can

argue that no spatiotemporal entity could have
a purely

qualitative essence.
time

t.

Consider any material thing x at some

It seems possible that x could have existed
all by

itself in an infinite otherwise empty space

S,

in perpetual

possession of the intrinsic properties that it actually has
at

t.

But,

if that is possible,

then it seems equally

possible that x could exist in a world consisting of x and
infinitely many copies of x arranged in an infinite

wallpaper pattern.

We need only consider some cubical

region of the space

S

that contains x, and then "brick up"

our new universe with infinitely many replicas of the
region,

all oriented in the same way.

We can then argue as

follows

1.

Necessarily, for any x, it is possible that there is y
such that x and y both exist and are I-pairs.

2.

Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property Q,
necessarily, if there exists a y such that x and y both
exist and are I pairs, then x has Q only if y has Q.

3

Necessarily, for any x, necessarily, if there is a y such
that x and y both exist and are I-pairs, then x * y.

.

4.

Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property Q, if
Q is an essence of x then necessarily, for any y, if x
and y both exist and x * y, then x has Q and y does not
have Q
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But it then follows that

Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property
Q, if
Q is an essence of x, then it is possible that there is a
y such that y has Q and y does not have Q.

5.

since the consequent is clearly impossible, we have

But,

Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property
Q is not and essence of x.

6.

nothing can have a purely qualitative essence.

So,

4

.

2

Q,

.

3

a-Relational Essences

.

An a-relational essences is a property that consists in

being related in such-and-such a way to such and such actual
individuals.

A standard example is the property of being

the organism that resulted from the fusion of gametes A and
B,

where

'A'

and

'

B'

are names of the gametes whose fusion

produced some particular human being

H.

Some essentialists

have argued that a property such as this one is essential to

whatever has

it,

and is necessarily such that nothing other

than the thing that actually has it could have it.

So,

it

is an individual essence.
I

nor do

do not believe that this property is essential to
I

believe that nothing besides H could have

it.

we need not consider this issue to make the main point

regarding a-relational essences.
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Our question here is

H,

But,

whether we can give a semantic account of names
that avoids
direct reference by the use of essences as semantic
contents.

And the problem with a-relational essences is

that they cannot do this job alone.

Suppose we replace a

name of some entity x by a description of the form "the x
that bears R to

b,

a,

and c" where 'a',

of actual individuals.

and

'b'

c'
'

are

Unless we can replace those

names with descriptions, we have not eliminated direct
reference.

So we seem to be involved in an infinite

sequence of essences, or else we terminate the sequence with
a description that contains only terms whose content is some

other kind of essence.

4

.

2

.

.

3

World-indexed Essences

For a given property

property of being

P in w.

thing that has P in W.

P,

let the w- transform of P be the

Suppose that there is only one

Then,

the w-transform of P would

seem to be an essence of that thing; for, no matter how that
thing might have been different, so long as it existed it

would have the property of being

P in w,

were to have the property of being P in

would have to be

x,

and,
w,

since only one thing,

if anything y

that thing y
x,

has P in w.

w-transform that is an essence is a world indexed essence.
I

will argue later that, typically, w- transforms are

not essences

.

I

will argue that worlds are almost always
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A

contingent beings, and that for
anything x that exists in a
world w, it is almost always the case
that x could exist

without w existing as well, and that if
this were actually
the case, x would not possess any
w-transforms

.

But,

this

argument depends on Buridanism, so it would
be inappropriate
to bring it up here as a criticism of
world-indexed
essences

in the course of the argument for Buridanism.

The most plausible candidates among the
world-indexed

essences to play the role of contents of names would
be a-

indexed essences, where a is the actual world.

The idea

here is that the sense of a name would be something very
close to the sort of sense it has according to traditional

Fregeanism

-

some fairly ordinary property by which speakers

and hearers can identify the referent of the name, the "mode
of presentation" of that referent.

The only twist is that

the identifying property gets tied down to a particular

world

-

the actual one.

Now,

one issue here is that cx-indexed essences seem

just to be a special case of a-relational essences.

So,

have the problem that was discussed in the last section.

we
If

we were to fashion a description to do the job explicitly
that the defender of this approach says is done by names

implicitly, we would use a description like "the F in a" or
"the F in

(where @ is an indexical that denotes the world
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in which it is used)

.

So,

in order to get rid of direct

reference entirely, we would need to come up
with some other
essence for the actual world.
Perhaps this is not a problem: maybe worlds have

qualitative essences.

Also, note if one were to allow this

kind of direct reference only, and attempt to explain all
other singular reference in terms of w-transf orms

and hold

,

that worlds are necessarily existing entities, then although

there would be singular propositions with worlds as

constituents,
things

-

those propositions would not be contingent

thus avoiding the snares of Buridanism.

The approach here is very similar to what

modified descriptionalism above

-

the use of

'

I

called

dthat'-

modified descriptions, to secure direct reference.
indeed,

it suffers from the same problem:

And,

It is ruled out by

the semantical argument for direct reference. Whether the

description is rigidified via a world index or not, we get
the result that "Thales" refers to whoever in fact,

world, held that all is water.

4. 2. 3.

But,

in our

that seems wrong.

Thisnesses

The thisness of a thing x is the property of being

better perhaps, the property

identical to that thing

x,

of being x.

if there are thisnesses,

are essences.

Certainly,

or,

then they

Because, x is surely necessarily such that,
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if it exists,

then it is identical to itself, and
nothing

other than x could be identical to
though,

x.

The question,

is whether the thisness of x is dependent
on x

itself.

One who thinks it is not could argue as follows:

the property P of being Plantinga could exist even
without

inga existing, and it would still be the property
of

being Plantinga.

Of course,

that does not mean that, were

that situation actual, there would be something, namely

Plantinga,

such that P is the property of being that thing.

There seems to me to be only three accounts of what a

thisness might be.

On one account,

the thisness of x is the

complex property constructed somehow out of x and the

relation of identity.
on x.

On this account,

the thisness depends

Or it is constructed out of some essence of x and

identity.

Back to old problems.

Or it is a pure haecceity

something pure and simple and non- individual and non-

-

qualitative, something we know not what that makes a thing

what it is and not something else.

Surely,

this view is

just too obscure to be taken seriously.

4

.

3

The Dependency Thesis
I

have argued that there are singular propositions

because there are sentences containing directly referential
singular terms.

The content of a directly referential

singular term is an individual.
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Every sentence that

expresses a proposition can be thought of as
determining a
PDF in which the content of each of the
sentence's

contentful component expressions is a component.

To say

that an entity x is a constituent of a proposition
P is to

say that there is a PDP with x as a component whose
product
is P.

A singular PDP is one that contains an individual as

a component,

and a singular proposition is one that is the

product of a singular PDP.
Consider now this formulation of the dependency thesis:
DEP: Necessarily,

for any singular proposition P with
constituent c, necessarily, P exists only if c exists.

What reasons are there for thinking that this is true?

One

who accepts this is likely to do so for something like the
following reasons:

DEPa: Necessarily,

for any singular PDP Q that determines
proposition P, necessarily if P exists, then Q exists
and determines P.

DEPb: Necessarily, for any PDP Q with component c,
necessarily, if Q exists, then c exists and is a
component of Q.

DEPa and DEPb together entail DEP; for, if some singular

proposition

P has some

with component

i

constituent

that determines

cannot exist without

i

P.

i,

then there is a PDP Q

According to DEPb, Q

existing as well, and according to
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DEPa,

P

cannot exist without Q existing as well.

impossible for P to exist unless

i

So,

it is

exists.

Notice that there is usually more than one PDP
that

determines a given proposition, sometimes more than one
is

associated with a single sentence.

There is always the PDP

that has as its input sequence the contents of its

elementary contentful components, lined up in the order in

which they appear in the sentence.

But,

there will also be

PDPs in which the proposition is "partially computed"

Up to this point there is nothing to prevent one from

holding the view that, though some entity
constituent of a proposition

determined by a PDP without

i

may be a

it is possible for P to be

P,

as a component.

i

Perhaps there

could be, or there may even actually be, a completely
different PDP that determines P but has radically different
components
If this is the case,

perhaps the proposition P could

exist, not just with additional constituents, but without

constituent

i

existing at all.

However,

argument that says this must be the case.

proposition with

i

as a constituent.

that does not depend on

i.

want to block an

Suppose P is a

For any individual

j,

there must be some propositional

i,

function F such that F(j)

I

=

P,

but which is not defined for

Since it is not defined for
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i,

that function does not

depend on
without
and

i

i,

So,

.

it is possible that F and

could exist

and that there is a PDP that determines P
via F

that does not have

j

j

possible that

P

i

as a component.

exist without

function F is not defined for
i.

it is

i.

This argument is question begging.

could exist without

So,

The fact that the

does not entail that it

i

This is especially easy to see in

the case of set- theoretic functions-in-extension

If a

.

function is a set of ordered pairs, then consider the
function

f

consisting of all ordered pairs <x, y> where x is

a natural number greater than

and y

1

=

x-1.

The function

is not defined for the number 1,

but it contains

range.

f

So,

it seems likely that

on the number

1

1

in its

depends

for its existence.

Even if functions are construed as functions-inintention,

the same principle may apply.

The defender of

DEP may hold that a propositional function F that has the

proposition [Quine is a philosopher] in its range depends
for its existence on Quine,

even if it is not defined for

Quine
Of course,

the term 'PDP'

is my own invention,

so

nobody has defended ontological dependency in just these
terms before.

But,

question this way.

there is a good reason for framing the
First,

it would be implausible to say
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f

that the existence of the proposition depends
on the

existence of some sentence that expresses it.

But, we can't

just assume the existence of structured propositions.

PDP's

give us entities that are independent of the sentences
that

determine them, but which directly correspond to the way
in

which a sentence expresses a proposition, and not to the
expressed proposition itself.
I

think that most defenders of DEP would have no

problem with the defense in terms of PDP's.

For such a

philosopher, all the talk about PDP's comes down to this:
the reason that a singular proposition depends on its

constituents is that, so long as that proposition exists,
the meanings that determined that proposition would continue
to exist,

and the way in which those meanings are combined

to get a proposition would continue to exist.

And that is

why the result of combining those meanings in that way would
exist
To evaluate DEP it is necessary to consider the

different conceptions of the nature of a proposition, and to
see how plausible DEP comes out according to each of those

conceptions.

I

do not believe that any of the main

conceptions of the nature of a proposition provides a reason
against DEP, but some seem to give us some reason for

while others seem neutral.
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it,

So far as

I

can see,

there are three main Actualist

accounts of propositions to consider:
of the structural view,

(i)

different versions

according to which propositions

literally have their constituents as parts or members;

(ii)

accounts of propositions as sets of abstract possible
worlds, circumstances or situations, where these entities

are taken as primitive in some sense, and not defined in

terms of propositions themselves.

According to these

accounts, propositions have subsets and so have parts in

some sense, but they do not have their constituents as
parts; and (iii) views that take propositions to be

structureless simples: a sort of logical monad.

Propositions of this sort have no structure whatsoever.
4.3.1 Structural Accounts of Propositions
The structural view of propositions comes in different

versions.

While each of them supports something like DEP,

only one supports DEP itself.

The others require a

restricted formulation of DEP: a restriction of the class of
propositions to which it applies.
The most straightforward version of the structural view
of propositions takes them to be structured n-tuples in

which the contents of all of the simplest, or elementary,
contentful expressions in the sentence appear as terms, or
terms of terms, or terms of terms of terms etc.
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For example, a sentence such as "The astute
philosopher

who wrote Demonstratives teaches at UCLA" expresses
a

proposition with something like the following structure:
<<THE

9-

<P,

,

<A and <W, d>>>>,

T,

U>>

<a,

sentence like "Kaplan is a philosopher" expresses

the proposition <k,

P>

.

Call these discrete linear

structures
Now,

I

take it as established that sets, and the

sequences constructed from them, depend on their elements,
so it seems plausible to hold that if propositions are

discrete linear structures, then they do depend on those of
their constituents that appear in the structure.

there's the rub.
that

I

But,

On the conception of singular proposition

have developed, not all of the contents of singular

terms are elementary contents.

So,

for example,

the

proposition expressed by the sentence "Dthato astute
philosopher who wrote Demonstratives teaches at UCLA"

turns

out to be a proposition with a form almost identical the

first one:

<<DTO

,

<P,

<A and <W, D>>>>,

Kaplan is the content of the

T,

<a,

U>>

Dthato -clause
'

'

,

so is a

constituent, of the proposition expressed by the sentence.
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But,

Kaplan does not appear anywhere in the linear
structure

above.

So,

we have no basis for affirming that DEP
holds,

unless we take the reference to constituents in DEP
to mean

"elementary constituents".
This view of the nature of propositions leaves no
room
for reflecting the fact that the second sentence contains
an

expression that has Kaplan as a content
for derived contents.

-

it leaves no room

It seems to leave out an important

fact about the proposition.

An alternative would be to use a two dimensional

representation of propositional structure: so a sentence
like

"

Dthato woman is the mother of dthato boy" is the

propositional structure:

<<DTO, W>,

<L,

In this version,

M,

M,

B>>

<DTO,

I>

all of the constituents of a proposition

are represented, and we would have a basis for an

unrestricted acceptance of DEP.

Call these 2D structures.

The discrete linear structure picture does not allow
for the representation of derived content.

At the other

extreme would be the view that, in some sense, only derived
content should be represented.

Let's draw a distinction.

Say that the content of an expression is composite just in
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case it has derived content, but that
derived content

consists simply in a structure built out
of the contents
from which it is derived.
For example, one might hold that
the content of a sentence like "Kaplan is
a philosopher" is

composite in that it consists of the ordered pair
<k, p>
Some expressions, though, like

1

dthato -terms
'

,

have derived

content, but that content is a single individual and
is not

made up of the contents of its parts.
The third version of the structural account takes

propositions to contain as parts only those contents of the
sentence that expresses it that are themselves composite
structures or parts of such composite structures.

Any

contents that are "absorbed into" some other content will
not be represented.

philosopher" and

"

So,

the sentence "Kaplan is a

[Dthato: author who wrote Demonstratives]

is a philosopher" will be taken to express the same

proposition.

Both are the structure <k, P>

composite structures

.

Call these

.

If propositions are composite structures,

would presumably have to be restricted.

then DEP

For example,

the

sentence "[Dthato: son of Dan Kervick] is in 1st grade" and
the sentence "Ian Kervick- Jimenez is in 1st grade" both

express the same proposition, representable by something
like

<1,

i,

f>.
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What is there to be said for the
structural views?
Primarily, they offer some account of the
way in which

propositions correspond to the world of which
they are true
or false.

They correspond to certain entities and

properties in virtue of the fact that they have those
entities and properties as parts.

This is relevant also to

the issue of the relationship of propositions to the

sentences that express them.

In order to explain how it is

that a given proposition P is the content of some sentence
S,

we need to explain the relationship between the content

of S and the content of the component expressions of S.

The

structural view explains this relation also in terms of
parthood.
Finally, another reason for holding the structural view
is that it holds out some promise of showing why certain

modal properties and relations hold.
cases we can explain,

proposition

P is a

It may be that in some

for example, why some particular

necessary consequence of a proposition Q

by appealing to the fact that Q contains
way,

P,

in a particular

as a part.

4.3.2 Propositions as Sets of Worlds

Another group of views of the nature of propositions
takes them to be sets of possible worlds or situations.

these views, worlds are primitive entities; they are not
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On

individual concrete universes.
no structure,

The worlds themselves
have

although they do differ in their
intrinsic

properties.

Propositions do have some structure
in the
sense that they have subsets
A curious feature of this view is
that the more

descriptive a proposition

is,

the more complex seeming the

situation it describes, the less structure
it has.

Some

very simple propositions will be true in many
worlds, but
the only difference between the proposition
that describes a

whole world and the world itself is the difference
between
{w}

and w.

There are certain notorious problems affecting
such
views: one has to do with propositional attitude

ascriptions.

On these views,

since propositions that are

necessarily equivalent are true in exactly the same worlds,
then if someone believes that the cat is on the mat, then

they also believe that either the cat or the dog next door
is on the mat or the car,

is on a motor vehicle,

but no cat and no canine next door

and no dogs are on any cars (and by

the way Fermat's Theorem is true).

The view that a proposition is a set of worlds is often

combined with an extensional world theory account of worlds,
and so inherits the problems that those views have been

shown to have.

And, views of worlds that are not based on
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EWT are typically modalist views,

that build worlds up out

of propositions or states of
affairs to begin with.

since

these entities are suited by themselves
to play the role of
semantic contents for sentences, there
seems no reason to
take the constructed worlds and use them
in turn to build

propositions
Sets of worlds do have some structure, and
give us a
set theoretic account of certain logical
properties.

proposition

P

A

strictly implies another proposition
Q if and

only if P is a subset of

Q.

The course-grained intensional

entities these views generate can then also be used to
build

structured intentions, mitigating somewhat the problems
having to do with the identity of necessarily equivalent

propositions
Thinking of propositions as sets of worlds in itself
seems to yield no reason either for or against DEP
However,

the usual EWT approach quantifies over a "permanent

pool" of worlds, and so seems to require worlds and sets of

worlds to be ontologically independent of the things that
exist in them.

Certain possibilist versions of EWT,

however, allow for the formulation of an extensional world

theory in which some worlds are in or exist in other worlds.
This would allow for the possibility that the existence of a

world may depend on the existence of the things that exist
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in that world,

and so might allow for a defense of
DEP

Without Actualism, though, DEP lacks bite.

And,

if it

should turn out that there is a way for a
proposition to be,

without existing, then the case for Buridan's Thesis
looks
tenuous

4.3.3 Logical Monads

A third view of the nature of propositions takes all

propositions to be like the worlds of the second view.
have no internal structure at all.

They

They do differ in their

intrinsic properties, but those properties have no basis in
the properties and internal organization of their parts.

Logical Monads are mysterious.

They must differ in

their intrinsic properties, or else they would have no

differences in their truth conditions.

And,

there is an

unfathomably large collection of these properties.

The view

offers no non-trivial account of how it is propositions have
the truth conditions they do.

And, unlike the view that

propositions are sets of worlds, they offer no account of

how it is that propositions have the logical properties that
they have.
I

Everything is primitive.

believe that only structured propositions hold out

any promise of being able to explain the connection of

propositions to the things they represent, and that this is
a strong reason for favoring the structural account over the
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other accounts, and for believing
the Dependency Thesis.
But,

a full defense of this claim
would require more space

than

I

can devote to it.
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CHAPTER

BURIDAN

Buridan

1

'

S

5

THESIS AND BUR I DAN ISM

Thesis is the view that no proposition
is

s

true or necessary or possible unless it
exists.
chapter,

I

in this

will consider the argument for Buridan'

and explore the consequences of the thesis.
take up these topics in inverse order.

But,

s

thesis

I

will

In my judgment,

it

is easier to understand the issues involved
in the defense

of Buridan s Thesis by first developing a proper
conception

of where it leads.
In section 5.1,

after first formulating the thesis,

I

will show what metaphysical consequences can be drawn from
it.

In section 5.2,

I

address the issue of the connection

between the immediate metaphysical consequences of Buridan

1

s

Thesis and more remote consequences having to do with

various conceptions of possible worlds.

In section 5.3,

I

consider the main arguments for the three components of
Buridan'

s

Thesis, and evaluate their effectiveness.

next chapter,

I

In the

will take a more detailed look at the impact

of Buridanism on modal logic.
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5

.

Consequences of Buridan

1

'

s

Thesis

5.1.1 Formulation of Burl dan's Thesis
The three components of Buridan'

s

thesis can be

formulated as follows:
BTl

:

BT2

.

BT3

.

Necessarily, for any proposition
is necessary then P exists.

P,

necessarily,

if p

Necessarily, for any proposition
is possible then P exists.

P,

necessarily,

if p

Necessarily, for any proposition
is true then P exists.

P,

necessarily,

if p

The use of the iterated modality in the formulation of BTl,
BT2 and BT3 is essential.

'necessarily'

The first occurrence of

in each of the three indicates that each

holds, not just of actually existing propositions, but of

any propositions that would have existed had things been
different.

The second occurrence of 'necessarily' gives the

thesis its bite.

Consider,

for example, BT2

.

Since every

proposition that is possible satisfies the antecedent of the
conditional following the second occurrence of
'necessarily',

then without this second occurrence, BT2

would just reduce to the more or less trivial actualistic
thesis that it is necessary that every proposition that is

possible exists. 1

And this follows directly from Actualism:

the claim that it is necessary that everything (propositions

that are possible included) exist.
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But,

according to BT2

it is not just the case that the
proposition that Quine is a

philosopher is both possible and existent,
but that no
matter how things were different, if the
proposition were
still possible,
exist,

then it would still exist, and if it
did not

it would not be possible.

^•1*2 Some Elementary Con s equences of Buridan
I

1

s

The.q-i.c;

mentioned some of the consequences of Buridan'

thesis in the Introduction.

In this section

I

want to

further develop these consequeneces
I

will use two devices to refer to propositions:

italicized

that -clauses and square brackets.
'

'

So,

the

proposition that Quine does not exist will also be denoted
by

'

[Quine does not exist]

'

I

will make a few initial

assumptions about the semantics of modal attributions.
First,

I

will assume that all of the following

5.1)

It is necessary that $

5.2)

That

5.3)

Necessarily $

3>

is necessary

are equivalent.

assumption.

This ought not to be a very controversial

The claim that the first two are equivalent

reflects the judgment that 'that' clauses are a kind of

singular term, and that the singular term can be moved to
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subject place" without affecting meaning.

This is a

parallel to the idea that ascriptions of
belief, like:
5.4)

Sam believes that $

can be rephrased both as
5.5)

It is believed by Sam that $

and

5.6)

That $ is believed by Sam.
The claim that the first two are equivalent to the

third is somewhat different.

One might think that claims of

the third form such as "necessarily, Quine is a human being"

are alternate formulations of de re modal claims such as
'Quine is necessarily a human being' and that this latter is

only equivalent to the de dicto claim "it is necessary that,
if Quine exists,

then Quine is a human being".

Perhaps

it is best to regard the inclusion of the third item

then,

on the list as a stipulation.

I

will avoid de re uses of

'necessarily', and will express the just-mentioned de dicto

claim as "Quine is essentially a human being", and

I

will

take the third form to be equivalent to the other two.
I

exist]

will also assume that the proposition [Quine does not
is simply the negation of
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[Quine exists]

.

It is not

the same proposition as

[Quine has non-existence]

According to Serious Actualism,
discussed below,
not exist] is possible, while
[Quine

.

[Quine does

has non-existence]

not.

Similarly,

for any x,

the proposition [x is not

will be taken to be the negation the
proposition

and

is

F]

[x is F]

,

will assume that the former is not
equivalent to the
proposition [x is non-F]
I

Now,

the proposition [Quine does not exist],
certainly

seems to be a proposition that is possible.

existence is a contingent matter.
is not possible,

If

Quine's

[Quine does not exist]

then its negation is necessary.

So

[It is

not the case that Quine does not exist] is
necessary, or it
is necessary that Quine exists.

But,

This seems false.

the proposition [Quine does not exist]

is

expressed by the sentence "Quine does not exist", which
contains the directly referential name 'Quine'.
does not exist]

constituent.

So,

[Quine

is a singular proposition with Quine as a

According to the Dependency Thesis, then, it

is impossible that that proposition exist unless Quine

exists as well.

Now,

[Quine does not exist]

suppose that it is possible that
is

true.

If BT3 is true,

then it is

necessary that, if [Quine does not exist] is true, then
[Quine does not exist] exists.

that if

But,

by DEP, it is necessary

[Quine does not exist] exists,
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then Quine exists.

It follows that it is necessary
that if

[Quine does not

exist]

is true,

false,

because it is obvious that if Quine does
not exist,

then Quine exists.

But this is obviously

then [Quine does not exit] is not true.

supposition,

So,

our

that it is possible for [Quine does
not exist]
/

to be true,

A)

is false.

It is possible that Quine does not exist,
but it is not
possible that [Quine does not exist] is true.

[Quine does not exist]

So,

such that it is true.

^

is possible,

but not possibly

Now A is the negation of

it

possible that Quine does not exist, then it is
possible that [Quine does not exist] is true.

and

SA'

We conclude that:

(A

:

1

)

is an substitution instance of the schema

If it is possible that 0,
is true,

then it is possible that

[0]

so,

we seem to have a counterexample that shows the schema

SA'

is invalid.

2

Similar arguments can be made affecting the schematic
form of the characteristic axioms of

B,

S4 and S5

To

simplify the presentation, let us refer to the proposition
[Quine does not exist] as

'

->Q

'

and [Quine exist] as

While Q is possible, it is also possible that
and if

-<Q

were to fail to exist, then, by BT2
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->q

,

1

Q

'

:

not exist,

it would not

be possible; so it is not
necessary that

“'Q

is possible.

We

have a violation of the schema
S5

:

If it is possible that
is possible that ®.

Now,

then it is necessary that it

consider a necessary proposition such as
[Quine

exists or Quine does not exist]

While it is necessary,

.

is also possible that it fail to exist.

that,

if it did not exist,

necessary.

So,

then,

by BT1

it

And it is necessary
,

it would not be

it not necessary that it be necessary.

Thus, we have a violation of

•

If it is necessary that
is necessary that 0.

<t>,

then it is necessary that it

Finally, Q is true; that is Quine exists. But it is

possible that Quine fail to exist, and in that circumstance
Q would not exist as well.

And, by BT2

then Q would not be possible.
Q is possible.

B:

If 0,

So,

So,

,

if Q did not exist,

it is not necessary that

we have a violation of Brouwer's axiom.

then it is necessary that it is possible that

<t,

and the similar axiom

TB:

If it is true that $ then it is necessary that it is

possible that

$.
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Buridan

Thesis also has some interesting
consequences

related to the supposed duality of
the modal operators
'possibly and necessarily.
standard

m

systems of modal

logic, we have the following theorems:

“

D1:

D2:

it:

is not Possible that

ifc

iS n0t necessar y tha t ® then it is
possible that

Insofar as

I

then it is necessary that

<t»,

can determine, Buridan'

no reason to doubt these rules.

s

Thesis gives us

There is no proposition-

expressing sentence that, when substituted for
either of them come out false.

3

But,

0,

makes

in standard systems of

modal logic, we also have as theorems the necessitations
of
the above

D1
D2

:

:

And,

Necessarily, if it is not possible that
necessary that ->$,

$,

then it is

Necessarily, if it is not necessary that 0 then it is
possible that -><£.

if Buridan' s Thesis is true,

counterexamples to these claims.

there do seem to be

Consider that it is

possible that Quine not exist; and if Quine were to fail to
exist, neither Q nor ^Q would exist.

not be necessary, and, by BT2
So,

,

-iQ

So,

by BT1

Q would

would not be possible.

it is possible that: Q is not necessary and
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,

->Q

is not

possible.

But,

this is equivalent to the denial
of D2

.

a

parallel argument can be given against D1
In standard systems of modal logic, we
also have as an

inference rule the rule of necessitation
NEC:

if 0 is a theorem,

If it is true,

schemas,

then

though,

$

is a theorem.

that D1 and D2 are valid

so that all of their instances are true,

and that

the necessitations of those schemas are not valid, then this

rule must fail as well.

5

.

2

Buridan's Thesis and Possible Worlds

5.2.1 Generic Modal sm
i

Much of the difficulty surrounding Buridanian
metaphysics and logic pertains to the interaction between

Buridanism and various accounts of possible worlds.
section,

I

want to explore those connections.

In this

Some

actualist philosophers, including some who are receptive to
the basic Buridanian outlook, have thought that Buridanism

requires either some modification of the doctrine that a

proposition is possible if and only if it is true relative
to a world,

or a modification of our understanding of the

very notion of a possible world.
In this section

I

will develop an account of possible

worlds, and of the nature of the relationships holding among
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possible worlds and broadly logical
modality.
IS compatible with Buridanism,

The account

and yet allows us to keep
the

traditional conception of possibility
as truth relative to a
world.
I believe that one positive
aspect of the account is
that it preserves a popular "modalist"
treatment of possible
worlds as maximal possible something-or-others
,

simpler,

but is

and more simply stated, than some alternative

modalist accounts that attempt to accommodate
Buridanism.
In the Introduction,

I

set out a theory that

I

called

minimal world theory, and briefly discussed its
modalist
interpretation. According to minimal world theory, the

following are true
MWT1) Necessarily,

and only if
MWT2

)

MWT3

)

for all P, necessarily P is necessary if
true relative to every world.

p is

Necessarily, for all P, necessarily P is possible if
and only if p is true relative to some world.

Necessarily, for all P, necessarily P is true if and
only if P is true relative to the actual world.

Many philosophers believe these three things, although they
may differ about the meanings of "world" and "true relative
to"

.

I

have used the term "relative to a world" in order to

express the three claims in as neutral a manner as possible.

More commonly, one encounters expressions such as "truth at
a world"

or "truth in a world" or "truth according to a

world".

But,

as we shall see,

these terms have now become
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somewhat theory
iaaen.
y laden

lat-or
Later

m
-in

-u
the chapter,

f-v,

i

will assign

a more specific non-neutral
meaning to the locution "true
(or false) relative to W"
but, for the present, the
precise
;

interpretation of the expression should
be left open.
There is a family of accounts of
possible worlds that
are often called "modalist" accounts.
Modalists do not use

possible worlds to explain the modal notions
of broadly
logical possibility and necessity, rather
they typically use

modal notions in giving their account of what
a possible

world is.

I

will begin by presenting a generic version
of

modalism: it is generic in that it makes no claim
about what

worlds are, but only about the relations of truth and
falsity relative to a world.

Generic Modalism, then,

results from adding to the above three claims certain

additional hypotheses
First

,

in some sense worlds are supposed to determine

the truth or falsity of every proposition.

said to be maximal.

They are thus

We may define maximality like this:

Dfl: X is maximal
=df
relative to X, or

for every proposition Q, Q is true
is true relative to X.

-*Q

Then we have

The Maximality Hypothesis
MAX: Necessarily,

for every world W, W is maximal.
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Second, worlds are possible
worlds.

The situation they

represent is supposed to be one that
could obtain, so they
do not determine the truth of two
inconsistent propositions.
Thus

,

we have

The Consistency Hypothesis
CON: Necessarily,

for all W, and for all propositions
P and
then they are not both

it P and Q are inconsistent,
true relative to W.

0,

These two claims generate certain further
consequences.

Suppose we accept the following standard definitions
of

propositional entailment and inconsistency.
Df 2

Necessarily, for all P and for all Q, P entails
Q if
and only if necessarily, if p is true, then
is
true.
Q

Df 3

Necessarily, for all P and for all Q, p and Q are
inconsistent if and only if it is not is not possible
that both P is true and Q is true.

It is an uncontroversial claim that,

it is necessary that if iQ is true,

for any proposition

then Q is not true.

(Even Buridanians have no trouble with this one,

converse that they doubt)
and Df2 that if

P

entails

So,

.

Q,

it is the

it is a consequence of Dfl

then P and

~iQ

We can then conclude from MAX and CON the
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P,

are inconsistent.

Closure Hypothesis
CLO: Necessarily, for any world W, and
any propositions P
and Q, if p entails Q, then if P is
true relative to W,
then Q is true relative to W.

Suppose otherwise: suppose there is a world
W relative to
which some proposition P is true, but relative
to which some

proposition Q entailed by
not true relative to W,

entails

Q,

->Q

P is not true.

By MAX, since Q is

is true relative to w

.

But,

if p

then P and iQ are inconsistent, so by CON,
they

are not both true relative to W.
The consistency of a world is not supposed to be
just a

pairwise consistency of propositions, but is a global
affair

,

so it would seem that Generic Modalism involves the

Joint Possibility Hypothesis
JP: Necessarily,

for any world W, the propositions that are
true relative to W are such that they could all be true
together

This hypothesis seems to be merely a logical

consequence of CON.

The intuitive idea is this: suppose

that for some world W,

the propositions that are true

relative to W are such that they could not all be true
together.

Take any one P and let Q be the conjunction of

all the rest.

Since each of the conjuncts of Q is true

relative to

then Q is true relative to W.

W,
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But,

it would

seem that it is not possible
p and Q are both true
Q are inconsistent, which violates

so P and

CON.

The reasoning here is not airtight.

It involves a

controversial appeal to infinite
conjunctions.

And,

the

formulation of the hypothesis makes use
of plural
quantification.
the claim that,

This is done so as to avoid
commitment to
for any world,

there is a set consisting of

all of the propositions that are true
relative to that

world.

But,

the hypothesis certainly seems to be
in the

spirit of the rest.
One other assumption about the truth-relativeto-a-

world relation is often made.

Whatever that relation

consists in, and whatever worlds are, it holds
necessarily

between a world and a proposition, if it holds at
all.

So,

we include in Generic Modalism the

Necessity of World Relativity Hypothesis
NWR: For every world W and proposition P, P is true
relative
to W if and only if necessarily, P is true relative
to W.

From NWR and JP we can conclude not only that the
propositions that are true relative to a world W are such
that they could all be true, but a stronger result:
JP+: Necessarily,

for any world W, it is possible that:
every proposition that is true relative to W is true.
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Now,

have argued that a consequence
of Buridanism is
that there are propositions that
are possible but not
possibly true. Specifically I argued
that while [Quine does
I

not exist]
true.

But,

is possible,

that proposition is not
possibly

armed with the above hypotheses, the
Generic

Modalist may argue against this claim as
follows:
1'

2.
3.

7.

-*-

s

Possible that Quine does not exist,

[Quine does not exist]

is possible,

(from

(ass.)
1)

There is a world W such that [Quine does
not exist] is
true relative to W. (from 2 and MWT2

4.

There is a world W such that necessarily, if
every
proposition that is true relative to W is true, then
[Quine does not exist] is true, (from 3 and NWR)

5.

For every world W, it is possible that: every
proposition
true relative to W is true. (JP+)

6.

It is possible that

(from 5and

[Quine does not exist]

is true.

6)

If it is possible that Quine does not exist, then it
is
possible that [Quine does not exist] is true, (from 1-6,

by conditional proof)

So,

Generic Modalism seems incompatible with Buridanism.

The Buridanian has two options here: to drop the possible

worlds talk altogether, or to come up with a modification of

Generic Modalism.
There is some appeal to the first option.

We have

already seen, in Chapter Two, that there is a problem
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concerning the compatibility of Actualism
and extensional
world theories. Some have held that,
without the benefits
of the first-order,

extensional, analysis of modality in

terms of EWT, one might as well ignore the talk
of possible

worlds.

don’t believe this is true.

I

attempt to argue for it here,

I

While

I

won’t

believe that there are other

uses for the notion of a possible world even when
it is

limited to the MWT conception.
5.2.2 Adams's World-stories

One philosopher who has taken the second option of

preserving the connection between modality and possible
worlds, but rethinking the nature of that connection, is

Robert M. Adams. 4

While

I

am sympathetic both to Adams's

goal and to the spirit of his overall approach,
that Adams

'

I

believe

account involves an extreme and unnecessary

complication of the modalist account of possible worlds.
But,

a

consideration of Adams's account will help to prepare

the way for the introduction of my own account, because in

many other respects, Adams's views are very similar to mine.
Indeed, my own views were developed largely in response to a

reading of Adams'

"Actualism and Thisness", but with an eye

toward avoiding the complex possible worlds machinery that

Adams seems to believe is required by the Buridanian

principles discussed so far.
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Adams introduces the notion of a
world-story as his
version of a possible world. World-stories
are maximal
consistent sets of actually existing
propositions.
They are
consistent in that they could all be true
together.
Adams
says that while "the intuitive idea behind
calling the

world-stones maximal

is that for every proposition
p,

world-story contains either p or the negation of

p" 5

,

each
this

intuitive idea of maximality, he says, requires
two

modifications.

Before considering these modifications, we

may ask: why is it that they are needed?

Because,

take worlds to be unrestrictedly maximal, then,

world-story
exist]

W,

for every

either [Quine exists] or [Quine does not

is true in W.

be true at all,

if we

But,

as we have seen,

the latter can't

so if it is a member of a set of

propositions, those propositions can't be true together.
So,

it can not be part of any world-story,

given the notion

of consistency of a world-story put forward by Adams.

So,

it would follow that the former proposition is a member of

every world-story.

If we assume that a proposition is

necessary if it is included in every world-story, then
[Quine exists]
I

is necessary.

But,

this is false.

believe that there is a flaw in Adams argument for

restricted maximality here, but the discussion of that can
wait.

We may first consider Adams's two restrictions.
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First,

a world-story should not
include singular

propositions about those individuals that
would exist if the
world were actual, but which do not actually
6
exist

.

There

are world-stones that include the
proposition that there is
a talking dinosaur

(I

assume).

if that

world were actual,

/

that is if all of its members were true,
a

true singular proposition of the form

then there would be
[

.

is a talking

.

dinosaur] and there would be a false singular
proposition of
the form

[

.

individual.

.

is not a talking dinosaur]

both about the same

There would also exist many other propositions

with this same individual as a constituent.

But,

it seems

plausible to assume that there does not actually exist
anything that could be a talking dinosaur, so the singular

proposition with the talking dinosaur as constituent that

would exist if there were such a beast is not any singular
proposition that actually exists.

It is a proposition that

comes into existence along with the talking dinosaur.

And

the same goes for all those other singular propositions that

would have the same entity as a constituent

7
.

This first modification is a natural consequence of

Actualism and the Dependency Thesis: if there are no
possibilia,
them.

then there are no singular propositions about

And if there are no singular propositions about

possibilia,

there are no sets containing such propositions.
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I

will let Adams des cribe the
second modification:

Intuitively, a world-story should
be complete
th respect to singular
propositions about those
actual individuals that would
still be actual if
1
pro P° sltlons in the story were
true, and
l
should
contain no singular propositions at
all
about those actual individuals that
would not
exist
that case.
For the propositions would
not exist and therefore could not
be true, if the
individual did not exist. Let us say,
therefore
that if w is a set of propositions,
and s is the
set of all the actual individuals
that s contains
any proposition about, and
is
a
singular
p
proposition that is exclusively about one or
more
members of s, then w is not a world-story
unless w
includes either p or its negation.
Furthermore,
if a world-story contains any singular
proposition
at all about an individual i, it must
contain the
proposition that i exists ." 8

m

Now,

according to the first modification, a world-story

need not contain singular propositions about
individuals
that could exist, but do not actually exist.
to the second modification,

And according

it also need not contain

singular propositions about actual individuals that would
not exist if all of the members of the world-story were
true

together.

But,

in presenting the second modification, Adams

introduces two further requirements: if W is a world-story,

and W contains any singular proposition about some actual
individual

proposition
And,

i,

then for every actually existing singular

P about i,

S

must contain P or its negation.

if a world-story includes any singular proposition

about an individual

i,

then it is not enough that it include
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either the proposition

[i

exists] or its negation

does

[i

not exist]; it must include the
former proposition.

Adams says a proposition is true
in a world-story if
and only if it is a member of that
story.

accept MWT1, MWT2 and MWT3

,

But,

he does not

if "true relative to W"

interpreted as meaning the same as "true
in W"

.

is

what Adams

does believe is that if a proposition
could be true, then
there is a world-story in which it is
included.
(The

members of a world-story could all be true
together, so it
follows that, for each proposition that is
a member of the
story,

that proposition could be true)

.

But,

since Adams

agrees that there are propositions that are
possible but not

possibly true, he holds that there are propositions
that are
possible but not true in any world-story.

So,

Adams

introduces another relation: the relation of being true
at a
world-story.

Intuitively, a proposition is true at a world

if it is truth about that world from our perspective.

The

relation is defined recursively through a series of clauses.
Let w be a world-story and a an actual individual that would

not exist in w:

(Cl)

All propositions that are included in the world-story
of w are true at w as well as in w.

(C2)

If p is an atomic singular proposition about a,
is true at w.
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then

->p

(

C3

A11 Propositions that follow
truth-functionallv
propositions true at w are true at

)

w.

(C4)

X
Xn) is an atomic propositional
ction Vfrom x 1;
x n to singular propositions
about a, then -«(3x 1
(3x n )0(a,
x) i s
true at w.
.

)

/

.

(

C5

All propositions that follow by a "free"
quantification
logic from propositions true at w are
true at w.

)

If Op and

(C6)

-,

0p and

«

(C7)

then

a,

are true at w.

(3x n )0o(a, x l7
x n and -» (3 Xl
xx
x n are singular propositions about
then they are true at w. 9
)

(dx:)<£(&,
a,

Dp are singular propositions about

-i|I]p

,

)

)

There are perhaps some problems with this as a
complete

account of truth at a world, but the gist of the account
is
clear enough, and that is what

I

want to focus on.

It is

supposed to be a consequence of the definition that worldstories are maximal with respect to the true at relation.

How could one use Adams

’

s

account of worlds to block

the argument against Buridanism that
Well,

I

presented above?

one could say that the notion of truth relative to a

world is ambiguous between truth at a world and truth in a
world.

If we read "true relative to a world" as

world-story", then Adams would take premise

(3)

If we take it to mean "true at a world-story",
(5)

fails,

"true in a
to be false.

then premise

since in many cases not all of the propositions

that are true at a world could be true.
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Adams

treatment of worlds as
world-stories has some
interesting consequences. Not,
only are world-stories
not,
in general, maximal, but they
typically are not even
possibly maximal
If the members of a world-story
w that
includes [there is a talking dinosaur]
were all true, then
.

there would be additional singular
propositions that do not
actually exist.
since these are not members of w,
w would
not be maximal in that circumstance.
And it follows that w
would no longer be a world-story.
In general, what world-stories
there are depends on

what else is the case.

First,

the members of W were true,
exist,

as just described,

if all of

then although W would still

it would not be a world-story.

However,

there would

be some additional world-stories that do not
actually exist:

ones made up of newborn singular propositions.

Among the

new world stories, there would be at least one maximal
one:
the one that contains all of the propositions
that would be

true in that situation.

But,

this world-story does not

actually exist.
Notice,

though,

that for any world-story W,

the

elements of W could all be true together, and Adams believes
like me that if a proposition is true, then it exists.
if the members of W were all true together,

then,

although

some of the world-stories that actually exist would no
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So,

longer exist, W would not be one of
them,
exist,

w would still

though it would no longer, perhaps, be
a world-story.

There are a number of problems that one
might have with
Adams's world-stories.
Some of these have to do with the

assumption of such large sets of propositions.

For example,

for every subset S of propositions in a
world-story w,

there

would be at least one true proposition: the
proposition that
S

is a set of propositions,

for instance.

But,

the set R of

all such propositions is a subset of W and so has

cardinality less than or egual to that of

W.

But,

by

Cantor's theorem, the cardinality of P(W), the set of all
subsets of W has cardinality greater than that of

W,

and we

have assumed that there is an injection from P(W) into

R.

So the cardinality of R is both greater than and less than

or equal to the cardinality of W.
But,

A problem.

even if there is some way around this problem

about cardinality,

I

think that Adams's account is just more

complicated than it needs to be.
5.2.3 A Different Account of Worlds
I

believe that the complications of Adams's account can

be avoided if we switch from sets of propositions to world-

propositions: propositions that describe a whole world, and
use in this account the appropriate notion of entailment.

am not saying that we avoid the appearing and disappearing
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I

worlds,

and recover EWT

Adams's.

But,

Tn
thstln tnat

aspect, my views are like

we can accomodate Buridanism in
a much

simpler way (which is important when
it comes to using
worlds in the analyses of other concepts)
In moving gradually toward the new
account, we can stay
/

with sets of propositions for the time being.

First,

on

Adams account, world-stories are maximal with
respect to the
true at relation,

so why not consider a new kind of set,

a

secondary world-story, which is any set W* consisting
of all
propositions that are true at some given world-story
W. Then
secondary world-stories will be maximal: for each

proposition

P they include either P or

-ip.

For Adams, a proposition P is true in a world-story W
just in case [P is true]
W,

is true at W,

the proposition [P is true]

world-story W*

then,

if p is true in

is a member of the secondary

.

Notice that secondary world stories will contain

propositions such as [Quine does not exist]

,

and,

since this

proposition could not be true, we cannot say that all of the
members of a secondary world-story could be true together.
Still,

there is some sense in which the secondary world-

story is possible.

What is it?

Well,

consider a secondary

world-story W* that includes the proposition [Quine does not
exist]

(refer to it as

-iQ)
,

and suppose there exists such a
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thing as the proposition that is
the conjunction of all of
the propositions that are members
of W*
Then, although we
cannot say that this proposition is
possibly true (if it
.

were true, each of its conjuncts would be
true; but
not be true), we can say that it is
possible.

seems to commit us to the possibility of

possible truth.

proposition

->Q,

-,q

could

This only

not its

Call a proposition such as this a world-

.

So far,

there has been no gain in simplicity,

since

everything depends at bottom on the notion of a world-story.
But,

noting that secondary world stories are unrestrictedly

maximal, we can drop the original world-stories from
the

picture and say that a set of propositions is a secondary

world-story if and only if it is maximal (for all
contains either P or

->P)

,

P,

it

and the conjunction of all its

members is possible.
Finally, we need one last nudge to move us all the way

over to the use of world-propositions, rather than sets of

propositions, and to avoid the commitment to conjunctions of
all true propositions.

To what notion of entailment does

the inclusion of a proposition in a secondary world-story

most naturally correspond?

It ought to be the relation that

holds between a conjunction and its conjuncts.
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5

.

2

.

3

.

1

A Nec essary Digression

We don

t

want to use the notion presented as Df
2

despite the fact that it is commonly accepted.

Consider the

proposition [Quine is not a talking dinosaur]

This is a

.

singular proposition containing Quine as a constituent,

by DEP and BT3

(8)

Now,

(9)

,

so,

we have

it is necessary that if [Quine is not a talking
dinosaur] is true, then Quine exists.

Buridanism rejects the validity of the schema:
necessarily, if

$>,

then

[®]

is true,

but it accepts the validity of:

(10)

necessarily,

if

<D

and

exists,

[$]

then

[<D]

is true.

As a consequence we get:

(11)

So,

(12)

And,

Necessarily, if [Quine is not a talking dinosaur] is
true, then [Quine exists] is true.

according to Df 2

[Quine is not a talking dinosaur] entails [Quine
exists]

since a conjunction entails its conjuncts, an

entailment is transitive,

(12)

leads to the conclusion:
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(

13

)

[Quine is not a talking dinosaur
and Quine does not
exist] entails [Quine exists]

But the proposition [Quine does not
exist and Quine is not a
talking dinosaur] is one that is possible.
Indeed, it seems

necessary that if Quine does not exist, then he
is not a
talking dinosaur. But, again appealing to the
principle
that a conjunction entails its conjuncts, we
have
(14)

[Quine is not a talking dinosaur and Quine
does not
exist] entails [Quine does not exist]

Only impossible propositions entail two contradictory
propositions.

So,

conclusions

(13)

and (14), together with

the claim that the proposition [Quine is not a talking

dinosaur and Quine does not exist] is possible, are

contradictory
I

believe that

(14)

is true and

(13)

is false,

and that

the source of the problem is with the definition of

entailment given in DF2

.

I

do not believe that this is the

correct analysis of the ordinary notion

-

the one involved

in the claim that a conjunction entails its conjuncts.

get a fix on the correct notion, consider the following

propositions

A:

Kasparov is a world chess champion

B:

Kasparov is a world champion
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To

In some sense A obviously entails,

implies

of this relation was given above
in Df 2

B.

One account

to say that A

implies B is to say that it is necessary
that if a is true,
then B is true.
But,

there seems to be another, more direct
account.

Let us introduce the notion of narrow
entailment:
Df4:

P

narrowly entails Q

=df

necessarily,

if p then Q.

This definition requires a higher order formulation.

variables
variables.

P

’

I

and

'

Q
'

The

serve both as terms, and as sentential

think this accounts for the difficulty in

distinguishing it from the other first-order account of
entailment given by Df2

Ordinary English just doesn't use

higher order grammar much, if at all.

Now,

in the example

here, A seems both to entail and narrowly entail

B,

because

both of the following seem true:
(15)

Necessarily, if it is true that Kasparov is a world
chess champion, then it is true that Kasparov is a
world champion.

(16)

Necessarily, if Kasparov is a world chess champion,
then Kasparov is a world champion.

But,

as

I

will argue, Buridanism has the result that there

are cases of two propositions where one entails the other,
in the first sense of "entails", but does not narrowly
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entail it; and cases where one narrowly
entails the other,
but does not entail it.
To get a feel for this, consider
the following family of propositions:
A:

[Quine is not a human being]

B:

[Quine does not exist]

C:

[Nothing is a human being]

Let's use the letters

'A',

B
'

and

'C'

for their corresponding propositions.

as constants standing

And allow them to

function both as terms and sentential constants.

want to

I

compare these three relationships: X narrowly entails
entails
that,

Y,

and X narrowly entails that Y is true.

I

Y,

X

claim

given the Buridanian principles already outlined, and

assuming that being a human being is an essential property
of Quine,

I. a)

I.b)
I. c)

each of the following claims is true:

Necessarily, if A, then B,
Necessarily, if A is true, then B is true (the
antecedent is always vacuously satisfied)
It not necessary that, if A, then B is true,

II. c)

Necessarily, if C, then A
It is not necessary that, if C is true, then A is
true
It is not necessary that, if C, then A is true,

III. a)
Ill.b)
Ill .c)

It is not necessary that, if B, then C
Necessarily, if B is true, then C is true.
It is not necessary that, if B, then C is true.

II. a)
II. b)
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So,

we can say the following: A narrowly
entails B and A

entails

B,

but A does not narrowly entail that B
is true.

C

narrowly entails A but does not entail A and it
does not
narrowly entail that A is true.

And, B entails C but does

not narrowly entail C and does not narrowly entail
that C is
true. This ends the digression.

5. 2. 3.

World- Propositions

We can now formulate a notion of world-proposition that

corresponds to the conjunction of the members of a secondary
world-story.

Let

P

and

Q

range over propositions.

'

We

define

Df 5

P is true

Df 6

P is maximal
=df
for every Q, either Q is true
relative to P or -iQ is true relative to P.

Df 7

P is a

relative to Q

=df

world-proposition

Q narrowly entails P

=df

P is

possible and

maximal

From this point on the phrase "truth relative to W"
will be used exclusively in the sense of Df 5

And,

I

will

use the term "world" as synonymous with "world-proposition"
If a proposition is true relative to a world,
is possible,

but it need not be possibly true.

possible that a proposition
true]

is possible,

then

P is true,

[P is

true]
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,

then it

If it is

that is if

and not just

[P

is

P,

is true

relative to some world
that P is true inside

Df

:

W.

In this situation, we will say

W:

? is true inside Q

=df

[P is

true]

to Q

The expression is somewhat awkward, but

I

is true relative

want to use one

that is different from Adams's "true in a world" to avoid

confusion.

However,

I

do think that the notions are

extentionally equivalent in the sense that
a

world-proposition W if and only if

story

P is true

inside

P is true in a world-

.

One should not think that the notion of truth inside W

corresponds to the result of replacing "narrowly entails" in
Df5 with "entails".

We saw in the previous section that

there is a difference between saying that P narrowly entails
true]

[Q is

and saying that P entails

a world W narrowly entails not just P,

then W will narrowly entail

well,

Note also that if

Q.

[P is

but

[P

exists] as

true]

There are a number of interesting consequences that

follow from Buridanism together with the account just given
of worlds as maximal possible propositions.

Recall that

there are worlds that narrowly entail [Quine does not
exist]

that is there are worlds relative to which [Quine

does not exist] is true.

Now,

it is not in general true

that whenever a proposition P narrowly entails another
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proposition

Q,

then it also entails Q.

But this further

result will often hold in the case when
see this,

The proposition W’

.

Quine is a philosopher] will then be equivalent
to

and will thus be a world as well.
then,

To

consider a world W that narrowly entails
the

proposition [Quine is a philosopher]
[W &

P is a world:

But,

=

W,

if W' were true,

since [Quine is a philosopher] is a conjunct of W'

[Quine is a philosopher] would be true

10
.

The same result will hold for a world V that narrowly

entails [Quine does not exist]

proposition

V'

.

The corresponding

will have the property of being necessarily

such that if it is true, then [Quine does not exist] is
true.

But,

since the latter could not be true,

that V' could not be true as well.

So,

it follows

there are some

entire worlds which, like the proposition [Quine does not
exist], are possible but not possibly true.

I

will accept

as a hypothesis the claim that worlds depend ontologically

on all of the propositions that are true relative to it.

Cosequently, some worlds narrowly entail their own non-

existence: there are worlds W such that necessarily, if
then W does not exist.

W,

If things were as the world

describes them, the world itself would not exist.
Just as with Adams's world-stories, which worlds there
are depends on what else is the case.
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If things were

different, many of the worlds there are
would no longer
exist,

and there would be new worlds that don't
actually

exist

Before concluding this section,

I

want to say something

about how one should diagnose the argument against
Buridanism,

if we take worlds to be world-propositions,

analyze truth relative to a world in the way
suggested.

First, while

I

I

and

have

do not accept the hypothesis

called the "Necessity of World Relativity Hypothesis",

I
I

would accept the weaker:
NWR

'

So,

:

I

NWR'

for any world W and proposition P, if p is true
relative to W, then necessarily, if w exists then P is
true relative to W.

would accept the argument up to premise four, since
is sufficient by itself to derive premise four from

premise three.

But,

I

would reject premise five for the

reasons already discussed: some world-propositions narrowly
entail propositions that, while possible, are not possibly
true

5

.

The Defense of Buridan's Thesis

3

The argument for Buridan's Thesis is,

I

weakest link in the argument for Buridanism.
I

is

don't think the thesis is true
-

it's just that

I

don't think
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believe,

the

It's not that

I'm inclined to think it

-

I

can give a non question-

begging argument for it.

Ultimately,

it seems to come down

to a certain set of intuitions about what
we mean when we

say a proposition is necessary, or true, or
possible.
So my goal here is more modest:

to try to give a more

precise account of the issues that are involved in
Buridan's
Thesis and to try to present the intuitive basis for
the
thesis in the best possible light.

reader to share my intuition.

Perhaps

I

can get the

My faith in Buridanism is

sustained by the feeling that the overall picture of the
modal universe it provides has a sort of harmonious and
lively inner beauty, beside which the more conventional S5ish picture seems dull and flat.

But,

then again, sometimes

the truth is dull, and parents always find their children

beautiful

5.3.1 Serious Actualism

A standard approach to the defense of Buridan's thesis
is through some version of one of a family of doctrines

variously called Serious Actualism, Property Actualism or
Predicate Actualism.

Alvin Plantinga 11

SA:

Necessarily,
necessarily,

Serious Actualism has been defended by

:

for any x and for any property
if x has P then x exists.
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P,

SA can be used to defend Buridan

1

Thesis,

s

if necessity,

possibility and truth are taken to be
properties of the
propositions to which they are attributed.

we have two

So,

main issues: first, whether Serious Actualism
true and,
second, whether it entails Buridan

Thesis

's

(or any

component of it)
Critics of Serious Actualism appeal to certain
alleged

counterexamples.

One such, due to John Pollock 12

,

is

supposed to involve the property of nonexistence

It is

possible that Quine not exist; but, were Quine not to exist,
then he would have the property of nonexistence.
is an x and a property P such that,

have P and yet not exist.

So,

there

it is possible that x

Contra SA.

In addition,

the property of not being a philosopher.

there is

Although this

property may be exemplified by something that also exists,
it is also necessary that,

for any x, necessarily,

not exist then x is not a philosopher.
runs,

if x does

And so, the argument

it is possible that something have the property of not

being a philosopher, and yet not exist.
Plantinga at one time claimed that Serious Actualism
follows from Actualism 13

.

He later retracted that claim 14

(though not Serious Actualism)

reaffirmed it

15
.

;

but,

The reaffirmation,

later yet, he
though,

involved a new

argument from Actualism to Serious Actualism.
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I

want to examine Plantinga 's
arguments.

Ultimately,

I

don't think that either argument is
completely convincing.
But the examination will help in clarifying
the issues
related to the defense of Buridan’s Thesis.

Plantinga has given another formulation of
SA in terms
of worlds 16

:

SAW: Necessarily, for any x and any property
P and any world
W, x has P in W if and only if x exists
in W.

Plantinga holds that x has P in W if and only if it
is

necessary that if W is actual, x has

P;

and he holds that x

exists in W if and only if it is necessary that, if w is
actual,
of

then x exists.

So SAW turns out to be a consequence

:

SAW'

Necessarily, for any x and any property P and world
necessarily, if W is actual then, if x has P, x
exists

Which is (more-or-less
Plantinga,

)

equivalent to SA since,

W,

for

to say that a proposition Q is necessary is to

say that for any world W, necessarily, if W is actual, then
true.

P is

SAW 17

He argues,

in "De Essentia",

for the weaker

:

Assume, contrary to SAW, that there is some object, say

Socrates,

that has some property P in some world W and that

Socrates does not exist there.
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Well, by Actualism we have:

1.

It is true in every world that there
are no nonexistent

objects
from which it follows that:

2.

It is true in every world that there are no
nonexistent

objects that have

P,

which is equivalent to:

3.

It is true in every world that whatever has P exists.

By hypothesis:

4.

It is true in w that Socrates has P,

from which Plantinga says it follows, given premise

5.

3,

that:

It is true in W that Socrates exists,

which contradicts the original assumption that Socrates does
not exist in W.
This argument contains a fallacy, which Plantinga

recognizes in "On Existentialism" 18
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.

Premise

3

says this:

It is true in every world W that:

then x exists.

premise

But,

every world

W,

,

if x has P,

in order to derive premise

we would require the

4,

for all x

claim:

it is true in W that:

5

from

for all x and for

if x has P then x

exists
Serious Actualism seems then to be a separate
thesis
from Actualism.

But,

in his "Reply to Pollock" in Profiles

Plaritinga offers a new argument for Serious Actualism 19

The revised argument is presented in two stages.
first stage,

.

In the

Plantinga argues that the property of

nonexistence is necessarily unexemplified.

Plantinga takes

the property of nonexistence to be the complement of the

property of existence
of P if and only if,

For Plantinga P* is the complement

necessarily,

for any x, x has P or x

has P*, but not both.

But,

entail that for any

necessarily x has

not both.

x,

given Actualism, this does not
P or x has P*

Rather it entails only that for any

necessarily,

if x exists,

,

but

x,

then x has P or x has P*, but not

both
Stage One goes as follows:

1.

For any property P, if P is exemplified, then there is
something that exemplifies P

2.

For every property P, whatever exemplifies P exists,
(from 1, by Actualism)
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3.

If nonexistence is exemplified,

then nonexistence is
(from 2 by UI)

exemplified by something that exists,
4.

nonexistence is not exemplified,

(from

3)

Plantinga claims that the conclusion follows from
premise

3

since it is impossible that something both exemplify
/

nonexistence and also exist, and this claim seems
unobjectionable.

He then says that since each of the

premises is necessarily true, it follows that nonexistence
is necessarily unexemplified.

Now,

technically, we don't get the necessitation of

from the necessitation
is a property P,

nonexistence.

2

3

unless we add: necessarily, there

such that P is the property of

But,

this does not seem to be much of a

problem
If one were an Actualist,

but wanted to deny Serious

Actualism, how might one respond?

One might hold that it is

possible that: Quine does not exist and Quine exemplifies
nonexistence.

By existential generalization,

it follows

from this assertion that

5.

There is an x such that it is possible that: x
exemplifies nonexistence and x does not exist.

And from

5,

and the claim that necessarily there is such a

thing as the property of nonexistence, we get:
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6

.

There is an x such that it is possible
that there is a
property P such that x exemplifies P and
x does not
exist

from which, by Actualism,

7

it follows that:

There is an x such that it is possible that
there is a
property P such that x exemplifies P and there is
nothing
that exemplifies P.

which contradicts premise

1.

So,

it seems that the critic

of Serious Actualism can maintain Actualism, but
deny
8.
premise

1

However,

nonexistence,
existence,

since Plant inga takes E*, the property of
to be the complement of E,

the property of

then, by the definition of a complement of a

property we get:
necessarily, for any
and does not have E.

x,

x has E* if and only if x exists

But that x both exist and have nonexistence is impossible,
so the conclusion of the Stage One argument follows more

directly
Stage Two of the argument for Serious Actualism then

proceeds as follows:

9.

Necessarily, had Socrates exemplified P, then either
Socrates would have exemplified (P & E)
or (P & E*),
,

10.

Necessarily, if Socrates exemplifies
Socrates exemplifies E*,
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(P & E*),

then

11

.

12

.

13

.

14

I

.

Necessarily, nothing exemplifies E*,
Necessarily,
exemplifies

if Socrates exemplifies P
(P & E)

then Socrates

Necessarily, if Socrates exemplifies
Socrates exemplifies existence,

(P & E)

Necessarily, if Socrates exemplifies
exists

E,

think this argument is question-begging.

defines the complement of a property

then

,

then Socrates

Plantinga

P to be one that a

thing x has if and only if x exists and does not have

P.

since the actualistic critic of Serious Actualism

But,

believes that there are properties such that it is possible
that Socrates exemplify p and yet fail to exist,

then it

follows that there are properties P such that it is possible
that Socrates exemplify p and exemplify neither E nor its

complement E*

.

So,

premise

9

appears unwarranted.

What might such a property

P be?

What about the

property of not existing, i.e. being such that it does not
exist.

This property, one might argue,

complement of existence.

is not the

Since it is necessary that,

for

every

x,

then,

unlike E*, not-existing seems to satisfy a stronger

it is necessary that x exists or does not exist,

claim

15.

Necessarily, for any
x has non-existence.

x,

necessarily, x has existence or
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And,

15 contradicts Serious Actualism,

on the assumption

that there is some x that is possibly
such that it does not
exist (and so does not have the property
of existence)
if
.

we run Stage Two of the argument with the
property E** of

not-existing in place of E*, then the revised
premise

9

seems warranted, but now there is a problem with
the revised

premise 11.

That premise is no longer the conclusion of
the

Stage One argument.

And,

a corresponding revision of that

argument will be ineffective, because now the original

criticism of that argument will stick.
Plantinga's immediate response to this is to claim that

not-existing is not a property, but a condition.
are just propositional functions.

condition but not a property.

Something may satisfy a

For example, Quine satisfies

the condition of not being an ostrich,
is not an ostrich,

ostrich.

Conditions

or being such that he

but there is no property of not being an

There is a property of being

a

non-ostrich, and

Quine exemplifies that property.
The distinction between properties and conditions, and

having or exemplifying properties and satisfying conditions
results in a lot of inconclusive skirmishing between

Plantinga on the one side, and Pollock and Fine on the
other.

Plantinga holds that, while there is a distinction

between properties and conditions, an object can neither
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satisfy a condition, nor exemplify a
property without
existing.
Pollock suggests that Plantinga is
merely

defining "property",

"condition" etc. in such a way as to

make these claims true
I

20
.

doubt that the terminology is sufficiently
precise to

enable us to say that the question of the truth or
falsity
of SA has a determinate answer.

accept SA,

In any case,

even if we

in order to evaluate Buridan's Thesis, we
will

still be left with the question of whether truth,
necessity

and possibility are properties or not.
At this point,

then,

it may be best to stipulate

certain interpretations for these imprecise terms.

Take a

condition to be a propositional function, and use the

expression 'C\x\' to denote the proposition that results
from applying condition C to the argument x.
'

C\x\

Grammatically,

may occupy a "propositional place" in a sentence; it

is a kind of propositional variable.

We can then define an

existence-entailing condition:

EE:

And,

C is existence-entailing
=df necessarily, for any
necessarily, if C\x\, then x exists.

from this point forward,

x,

let's just stipulate that a

property is an existence-entailing condition.
that
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Let's say

Sdef: x satisfies C

And,

=df

C\x\

say that x has or exemplified a condition
C if and only

if it satisfies C and C is a property.

The question we now

face is. are the conditions of being necessary,
being

possible and being true existence-entailing or not?

Are

they properties in our defined sense?

Despite the inconclusiveness of the argument for
Serious Actualism,

I

believe that there is an intuitively

plausible distinction here, between existence-entailing
conditions and those that are not existence-entailing.

What

follows is an attempt to give an impressionistic sketch that

brings out the appropriate intuition.

When we describe a universe, our own, or one that doesn't
exist but could, we take certain ingredients and put them

together into propositions.

Now,

some of the propositions

seem to have this property: if the universe we are

attempting to describe really existed, then someone who
existed in that universe could take the same ingredients and
put them together in the same way, and come up with a

proposition that would be true of the universe: the person
could say:

"yes,

this proposition is true".

Other propositions seem different.

While we can

recognize that the proposition somehow accurately describes
the fictive universe from our point of view, we can see that
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if that universe were real,

none of the people there
would

be able to put that proposition together,
not just because
they would have no handle on the ingredients,
but because
the ingredients wouldn't be there to be
put together.
Often,

these propositions seem to involve negation,
and they

represent the fictive universe by contrast with
our own.
can say things like:

"that universe is not like ours:

instance Quine is not there".

But,

We

for

from the standpoint of

the people who would exist if the universe were
actual,

there is no Quine to "not be" there.

From their point of

view nobody is left out, everything that there
In the Buridanian scheme,

is,

is there.

this corresponds to the

difference between propositions that are true inside of a
world,

and those that are merely true relative to a world

but not true inside them.
Of the propositions that we can form,

clear cases of one or the other.

some seem to be

The clear cases of the

internal characterizations are propositions that attribute

certain "positive atomic" properties to some individual or
individuals.

If we can say of the fictive universe that

Mars has mass m there, then the denizens of that universe

would be able to truly characterize it in the same way.
The clearest cases of purely external characterizations

are like my favorite and off-used example: the proposition
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that Quine does not exist.

In this case the proposition,

when used to characterize the other universe,
does not seem
to be an attribution of some feature
to Quine in that
universe,

so much as a kind of contrastive
characterization.

It is a way in which that whole universe
differs from ours:

it lacks Quine.

Other propositions straddle a middle ground: we can
say
of certain universes that Quine is not a philosopher
there.

Sometimes that is because, though Quine would exist if that
u^*-iv€;^£>e

path.

were real

For some,

,

he would have chosen another career

though,

it is true because Quine would not

exist there, and so could not be a philosopher or a

photographer or a cabbage or king.

In the first case,

our

imagined inhabitants would be able to truly characterize
their universe as one in which Quine is not a philosopher.
In the other case,

they could not.

In understanding the straddlers, we might make use of

the other two cases as models.

that Quine is not a philosopher.

Consider the proposition
We seem to be able to

interpret this proposition in two ways: first, as a purely

contrastive negation, in which we describe something that
the whole universe lacks: Quine's being a philosopher; but

also as an attribution of a certain feature to Quine in that
universe, his not being a philosopher.
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It'S as though,

to obtain the condition
of not being a

philosopher, you first take a proposition
of the form x is a
philosopher, then form its negation, and
then abstract an

individual from it.

In using that condition to form
a

proposition, you may mean two different things.

You may

mean: plug an individual back in to the
place from which one

was abstracted, re-forming a proposition like
the original;
or you may mean: to describe the individual
as being

characterized by the condition, in which case you don't
plug
an individual back in, but instead attribute the
abstracted

condition to the individual.
The possibility of an attribution treatment seems to
go

along with the possibility of the proposition serving as an
internal characterization, since it is modeled on the clear
cases of internal characterization.

The possibility of

treating the proposition as a contrastive description goes
along with the clear cases of external characterization,

which seems somehow to essentially involve propositional
negation
So,

there seems to be some intuitive basis for the

notion that there is a difference between the proposition
that it is not the case that Quine is a philosopher, and the

proposition that being such that he is not
truly attributable to Quine.

a

philosopher is

The latter entails Quine's
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existence, while the former
does not.

And,

since the truth

of the former is all that
is required in order
for it to be
the case that Quine satisfies
the condition of being
such
that he is not a philosopher,
then this condition is not

existence entailing.
Let us formulate a hypothesis
about conditions and

positive

properties.

Suppose we take it that we have
some

conception of what a "positive atomic"
property or relation
is.
Then we can say that such a property,
or the

conjunction of such properties, is a basic
condition.

Basic

conditions would seem to be existence-entailing.

the

But,

condition of not having a basic condition,
or of not having
an existence-entailing condition generally,
would seem not
to be existence-entailing.

absences

5

'

3

*

2

Call these latter conditions

.

BT1 and BT2

-

Possi bility and Necessii-y

Can we take either possibility or necessity
as
absences, rather than existence-entailing conditions?
so,

the BT1 and BT3 would fail.

though,

If

it seems reasonable,

to require the defender of the view that possibility

and necessity are absences to come up with some proposal
as
to what they are absences of.

There seem to be two prominent proposals: first, one

might hold that to say that a proposition is possible is
228

just to say that its negation is not necessary;
second; one

might hold that to say a proposition is necessary
is just to
say that its negation is not possible.

These two proposals cannot be taken jointly as
definitions; not without circularity.

But, perhaps one can

defend the notion that they are both true, when interpreted

merely as necessary equivalences.
the first proposal only gives us a basis for

Now,

saying that possibility is an absence if we have some reason
for saying that necessity is a positive property; and,

similarly,

the second proposal only gives us a basis for

saying that necessity is an absence if we have some basis
for saying that possibility is a positive property.

Taken together, the two proposals merely entail that to
say something is possible is to say it is possible, and to
say something is necessary is to say that it is necessary.
And,

obviously, both the view that these two conditions are

absences, and the view that they are properties are

consistent with these claims.
choice.

It seems we must make a

In order to defend the idea that one of the

conditions is merely an absence, we need to assume that the
other is existence entailing.
There are other plausible hypotheses about which modal

conditions are primitive.

For example, we could start with
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impossibility

;

then, we could define a necessary
proposition

as one whose negation is impossible,
as one that is not impossible,

a possible proposition

and a contingent proposition

as one that is neither impossible or necessary.

Or we could

start with contingency; then, we could define a necessary

proposition as one that is true but not contingent, an
impossible proposition as one that is false but not
contingent, and a possible proposition as one that is not

impossible

Whichever of these hypotheses is true, if any, in each
case we begin with one condition that is not defined in
terms of the others, and for which we therefore are given no

justification for viewing it as an absence.
This raises a further question.

If we adopt any one of

these hypotheses, does BML collapse into S5?
in each case the answer is no.

Since,

believe that

at this point,

not discussed the logical system in detail,

attempt to demonstrate this claim.

I

But,

I

I

I

have

will not

will give one

example
Consider,

for example,

is the primitive property,

the hypothesis that possibility

and that a proposition is

necessary just in case its negation is not possible.

If we

add this definition to the axioms of BML, we do get some
changes.

Both

'

iOP o ~'P' and '(-'OP o
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D-iP)

will be

theorems of the modified system, whereas only the
first is a

theorem of BML
don't hold.

But,

.

there are still some S5 theorems that

For instance, D(P

=>

OP)

will still fail.

To

derive this in S5, we need the full rule of necessitation

Adding the suggested definition to the axioms will not allow
us derive this rule.

5.3.3 BT3

Truth

-

believe that a more difficult problem for Buridanism

I

is the defense of BT3

.

There is a very plausible account of

truth that seems to justify the idea that truth is not

existence entailing.

This is the deflationary or reductive

account

DTR

:

T P
(

=df

P.

Deflationary accounts are sometimes given metalinguistic
formulations such as

DTR'

TO

=df

O.

A metalinguistic account states, in effect, that expressions
of the form

with,

1

.

.

is true'

are replaceable by, or synonymous

the corresponding expression

into trouble with claims such as:

night is true'.

DTR'

Such account run
'the thing you said last

gives the incorrect result that this

means the same thing as 'The thing you said last night'.
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This is not the intent of DTR; it is not a
verbal

definition.

Instead it corresponds to the higher order

equivalence
DTR

'
'

(

:

T P
(

)

=

P).

The deflationary account seems to conflict with BT3
It entails that,

exist,

then it is possible that it is true that Quine does

not exist.
exist]

since it is possible that Quine does not

That is,

is true.

it is possible that

But,

[Quine does not

by the dependency thesis, it is

necessary that if Quine does not exist, then [Quine does not
exist] does not exist.

So,

DTR has the result that it is

possible that a proposition be true, yet not exist.
How might Buridanians respond?

First,

that the account is inadequate somehow.

Though there don't

seem to be any obvious counterexamples to it
that Buridan's Thesis is not obvious

-

they might claim

-

I

take it

the Buridanian may

claim it is somehow evident that truth involves more than
what is stated in DTR, but in addition involves some

positive relation of 'correspondence'.
is true,

Whether or not this

it is hard to see how it could be defended without

question begging.
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Another approach would be to follow Kit Fine in
claiming that there are two senses of 'true'

21

One is the

sense given by DTR; the other is:
DTR+: T P
(

=df

)

where

P and

,

is an operator indicating propositional

existence.
second,

On the first reading, BT3 is false.

On the

it is analytically true.

This seems very much like an ad hoc manoeuvre.

Is

there any independent basis for the claim of ambiguity,

other than the desire to defend Buridan's Thesis in the face
of the plausibility of DTR?
And,

Fine does not provide any.

it is hard to believe that the sense given by DTR+ is

what anyone means by 'true'

It would be somewhat more

plausible, perhaps, to combine these two responses, and to

claim that the second sense of 'true' is the one associated

with some intuitive notion of correspondence.

Then,

one

could try to spell out this notion, with the hope of having
BT3 fall out of the correct analysis as a logical

consequence
In any case,

I

believe that it is more reasonable for

the Buridanian is to hold, not that there are two different

senses of 'true', but rather one indeterminate sense, which
is some sort of an amalgam of deflation and correspondence.
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Given that philosophers have been of two
minds about whether
or not BT3 is true, perhaps this is evidence
that the

ordinary notion of truth, the notion associated
with our
prior ordinary uses of 'true', is built up of
these two
aspects.

And,

that it is only in the face of abstruse

Buridanian considerations that these two aspects are
shown
to diverge

Notes
I will often use the somewhat awkward expression
"proposition that is possible" rather than "possible
proposition" since the latter may be taken to mean
"proposition that possibly exists".

1.

2. For the purposes of this chapter, it will not matter
whether we think of the validities of modal logic as
schemas, containing substitutional variables, or as
formulas, containing either proposition constants or
objectual variables which take propositions as values.

Prior believed that there were counterinstances to D1 and
D2
That is because he took "possible" and "necessary" to
be equivalent to "possibly true" and "necessarily true",
respectively.
See Prior (1957), pp. 41-54.
3.

.

4.

The following account of Adams views is based on Adams

(1981)

.

5.

Adams (1981), p. 21.

6

Adams (1981), p. 21.

.

7. It is not clear to me that this first "modification" is
really a modification of the intuitive idea of a worldstory; rather, it seems to be a clarification of what is
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involved in that intuitive notion, given the
truth of
Actualism.
8.

Adams (1981), p. 22.

9.

Adams (1981), pp

.

23-29.

10. I have assumed here the following principle:
for any
proposition P, necessarily, P is true if and only if p and
exists

P

11. Plantinga defends Serious Actualism in Plantinga
(1979)
and (1985b).

'

12.

Pollock (1985), pp. 126-29.

13.

Plantinga (1979).

14.

Plantinga (1983).

15.

Plantinga (1985b).

16.

Plantinga (1979), p. 108.

17.

Plantinga (1979), pp

18.

Plantinga (1983), p. 12.

19.

Plantinga (1985b), pp. 318-19.

20

.

Pollock (1985)

21

.

.

108-109.

Fine (1985)
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CHAPTER

6

THE LOGIC OF CONTINGENT EXISTENCE

Once Buridanism is accepted, there remains the
problem
of determining what effect it ought to have on
modal logic.
In this chapter,

call

I

outline of the system

Buridanian Modal Logic' or

'

BML

'

.

I

propose, which

I

There are a number

of questions here about the connections between metaphysics

and logic, and about the correct analysis of the notions of
logical truth and logical consequence.
these in depth,

I

Without exploring

will try to explain my conception of the

connection between modal logic and modal metaphysics

.

Some

of these questions may have no right answer.

In the first section

I

will present a sketch of BML,

explain its motivation, and point out its most interesting
features.

I

pay special attention to those places in which

it differs from more standard systems of modal logic.

I

will also say something about the intended semantical basis
for the logic, and how it may be provided with something

close to a standard possible worlds semantics.

Although

this latter semantic framework really misrepresents the

intuitive basis for the system, it does have instrumental
value,

and may help to facilitate comparisons between BML

and other systems.
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One benefit of BML, not directly related
to the issues

having to do with Buridanism, is that it
provides a unified
solution to a cluster of problems in modal
logic that
refer to as the problems of contingency.
of the chapter,

I

I

will

in the remainder

compare my approach to these problems with

those of other philosophers who have attempted to
treat some
of the same issues.

I

will begin in section 6.2 with a

discussion of the free logical approach to the problems of
contingency.

In sections 6.3,

Arthur Prior's system

Q,

6.4 and 6.5,

.

will examine

Harry Deutsch's Logic of

Contingency and Christopher Menzel
6

I

'

s

True Modal Logic.

Buridanian Modal Logic

1

6.1.1 The Formal System Described

The language of Propositional Buridanian Modal Logic,
Lbml(p)

/

is the same as that of standard systems of

propositional modal logic, but with one addition: we add the
sentential operator

indicating propositional existence.

The axioms of BML(P) are as follows:

K:

D(PoQ) o (DP o DQ)

T:

DP

o P

D:

OP

=

S5

'

:

OP

-.ChP
=>

B(&p

3 OP)
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T:
or

H(DP

3 g)P)

(Op 3 rp)

:

Schema St): If A and B are any sentences containing the
same
proposition letters, then
(Sa

=

SB)

is an axiom.

Schema

[UPC:

For every valid PC wff A,

A
is an axiom.

and the system contains the following rules of inference:

RSN
US:

:

bA - bD (SA 3 A)

and B is the result of replacing the proposition
letters p x
p n wherever they occur in A by the
sentences S x
..., S n
then bB.
If bA,

,

.

.

.

,

MP

:

If bA and bA3B,

,

,

then bB

Perhaps the first thing that deserves notice is that
the characteristic axiom of S5,

replaced by the restricted version
I

have argued,

in Chapter Five,

the S5 axiom that are false,

OP',

'OP 3
S5

1
'

:

has been

OP 3 H{SP 3 OP)

'

.

that there are instances of

for example "if it is possible

that Quine does not exist, then it is necessary that it is

possible that Quine does not exist".

But,

I

believe that S5

embodies an important insight: that propositions possess
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their modality essentially.

property

P

An object x possesses a

essentially if and only if it is necessary that,

if x exists,

then it has

if one thinks that propositions

P.

exist necessarily, then there is no reason to attend
to the

difference between the claim that a proposition possesses
its modality necessarily,

and the claim that it possesses

its modality essentially.

But,

in a Buridanian setting,

these two claims must be distinguished.

replaced by S5

Thus,

S5 is

In BML, we can deduce restricted versions

.

of the characteristic axioms of S4 and Brouwer's system B as

well

S4
B'

'

:

:

DP

3

(gp 3 DP)

P 3 \3(&p 3 OP)

Another key feature of BML(P) is its restriction on the rule
of necessitation

N:

i-A

-

hQA.

That rule has been replaced by:

RSN:

hA - hD(^A

=>

A)

As an example of the effect of this restriction,

I

while the sentence

its

necessitation

'

D(P

'

P

=3

=>

OP)

OP'
1

is a theorem of BML,

is not.
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note that

We can derive only:

CT’

:

(

(P & ^P)

3 OP)

.

Here is an example illustrating the motivation
for this
restriction:

While it is true that "if Quine is not an

ostrich,

then it is possible that Quine is not an ostrich"

is true,

the sentence "necessarily,

ostrich,

then it is possible that Quine is not an ostrich"

is not.

According to Buridanism, if Quine did not exist, he

if Quine is not an

would be neither an ostrich nor possibly such that he is not
an ostrich.

What is true is the sentence "necessarily, if

Quine exists and Quine is not an ostrich, then it is

possible that Quine is not an ostrich"
This example is as good as any for illustrating a

general feature of BML that distinguishes it from systems
such as Prior's system

Q.

Let me begin by making some

points about the notion of logical validity.

We might say

that there is a weak and a strong sense of that notion.
In the weaker sense,

to say that a sentence is valid is

just to say that there is no interpretation of its non-

logical expressions that makes it false.

propositional logic and a sentence like

In the case of
'

P

=>

OP',

this

means that there is no proposition such that, when that

proposition is assigned as the meaning of
comes out false.
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'

P',

the sentence

In a stronger sense, we would say
that it is not just

that there happens not to be a proposition
that makes
OP'

p o

come out false, but that there could not be
a

proposition that makes it come out false.
careful here.

We have to be

The sentence could of course have meant

something different than it does, but the idea is
that
necessarily, no matter how things might have been different,
the sentence

'P

=>

OP',

given the meaning it actually has,

could not have turned out false on any reinterpretation of
its non-logical constants.

Both the weak and the strong sense must be

distinguished from another claim that might be made on
behalf of a sentence: the claim that every allowable

interpretation of the non-logical constants of the sentence
makes it necessarily true.

Call this

'-validity'.

BML is consonant with both the weak and strong sense of
validity, but not with D-validity.

sentence

'P o OP',

With regard to the

this sentence is both weakly and

strongly valid, intuitively, because both of the following
claims are true:

1.

For every proposition
that P,

P,

if P,
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then it is possible

Necessarily, for every proposition
possible that P.

2.

if p

then it is

given Buridanism, the following is not true:

But,

For every proposition
possible that P.

3.

P,

necessarily,

P,

if p,

then it is

/

the sentence is not D-valid.

So,

Notice that in BML(P), every instance of the schema
'

^A

is a theorem,

'

theorem.
true,

but not every instance of

'

d^A' is a

This is because every instance of the former is

and no matter how things were different, every

instance of it would be true.

Given the truth of Actualism,

necessarily, everything exists.

proposition exists.

So,

So necessarily,

the propositional constant

P
'

'

in

'

necessarily, every

every interpretation of

^P’

is true.

But,

there

are many propositions that do not actually exist, so there
are instances of

1

D&P

that are not true.

The two axioms

r
or

:

:

mnp
(Op

=>

=)

rp)

rp)

and the axiom schema
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^D:

If A and B are an Y sentences
containing the same
.

proposition letters, then
.

(«?A

=

g’B)

is an axiom,

play a crucial role in BML

.

They allow deductions of

restricted versions of standard theorems that
would
otherwise not be deducible in any form.

An illustration of

this point can be made with respect to axiom
axiom.

In BML(P),

Tl.

0-^P 3

T2

.

->DP 3 0-^P

T3

.

T4

.

Chp

the duality

each of the following is a theorem:

-.OP

3 --0P

--Op 3

But,

D,

Chp

their necessitations are not all theorems, only the

necessitations of Tl and T3
T5

.

T8.

(O-'P

3 -iQP)

(nP

3 -,0P)

are theorems.

The other two, T2 and T4 yield,

conjunction with RSN and axioms
T7

( (iDP

.

T10

.

((-nOP

& gp)
& <fP)

o OiP)
o D-iP)

.
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HZ’ and

0%

in

the theorems:

Similarly, even though we cannot deduce
S5,

BML

S4 and B in

we can deduce sentences that are usually
taken to be

/

equivalent to them:
CS5

:

CS4

:

CB:

So,

ODP

o

Dp

OOP

3

OP

ODP

o p

in BML,

these are not equivalent to S5, S4 and B.

The

failure of the necessitations of the duality rules T2 and T4
^ole here, since,

P-^ys

in standard modal logic,

one must

make use of these necessitations in deriving S5, S4 and B
from CS5

CS4 and CB

,

One last point about BML has to do with the schema:

PC:

For every valid PC sentence A,

A
is an axiom.

We could not accomplish the same result by having as axioms

only PC-valid sentences because, using the rule RSN, we get
for each such sentence A only:

(«?A

3 A)

Still,

.

it seems to me that every sentence that is PC-valid

is necessary,

although not necessarily true.
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It is

necessary that Quine exists or Quine does
not exist, but it
is not necessarily true that: Quine
exists or Quine does not

exist
BML(P)

can be extended by adding operators

for truth and falsity of propositions.

and

'F'

The addition of

'T'

1

T'

requires only the addition of the axioms

T&
T=

D(TP
:

P

3 gp)

TP

=

As consequences, we will be able to deduce:
TP/P:

(

TP o

(

P/TP:

and

P)

(P & gp)

3 TP)

We can then introduce the definition for
FDef: FP

=

F:

T->P

allowing us to derive all of the following:
TP,
TP,
iTP s FP,
TiP = FP,
“'FP
F~iP

(

=
h

(--FP &

(F^P
(

(

iTP

(T-iP

Sc

=

I

gp)

=

TP)

,

FP)

,

TP)

=

&P)
FP)

=

.

have not presented an "official" quantified version

of BML in the Appendix.

But,

I
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would like to describe in

outline the form that

I

believe such a system should take.

The quantification theory for BML, BML(Q),
requires nothing
new in itself different from ordinary QT.
It is a classical

and not a free quantification theory.

We may introduce a

predicate 'E!x'\ though, indicating individual
existence,
and then we will need axiom schemae like the following

linking the two concepts of individual and propositional

existence

where
(^Vv$

tx
=

,

.

tn

)

.

,

.

(E!t x &

=

tn

,

... &E t n
are all of the terms in 0
!

)

]

,

(

t lr

.

.

.

,

tn )

|f0)

(«^3v0 = £T$)

The individual constants in BML(Q) all denote things

existing in the actual world, just as the propositional
constants of BML(P) denote propositions the exist in the
actual world.

4

.

5

.

VxFx

=>

So the formulas:

Fa

Fa 3 3xFx

are valid, but not

6

.

7

.

D(VxFx

o Fa)

(Fa 3 3xFx)

.

Instead we have restricted versions:
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(

(

(

CH(

VxFx

(E a 3 Fa)

=>

!

(Fa & E!a)

VxFx

=3

(

)

o 3xFx)

J^Fa 3 Fa))

(Fa & <#Fa)

^ 3xFx)

.

6.1.2 The Semantics for
In the Appendix,

BMT,

lay out a semantic system for BML(P)

I

and prove completeness with respect to the semantics.

would like to point out that
instrumental value only.

I

I

take the semantics to be of

It is somewhat complicated variant

of standard possible worlds semantics for modal logic.

believe that taken literally 2
facts.

But,

semantics,
And,

if BML(P)

,

I

it misrepresents the modal

is to be given a possible-worlds type

it would have to be something like the one here.

think that it does help in both illustrating the

I

intuitions behind BML, and facilitating comparison with

other systems.

The key ideas behind the semantics are

these
1.

Each model contains a distinguished world,

representing the actual world.

Truth in a model is defined

as truth in the actual world of the model.
2

.

Every world in the model is assigned two classes of

propositions: the existents at that world, and the

projections at that world.

The existents are those
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propositions that exist relative to that world,
so those
that are true are true inside of that world,
and those that

are false are false inside that world.

The projections of a

world are those propositions that are either true or
false
relative to the world.
a world,

If a proposition is true relative to

and is one of the existents, then it is also true

the world.

A proposition that is in neither the

class of projections of a world nor the class of existents
of that world receives no valuation at that world.
3

.

All of the propositional constants for BML are

interpreted as standing for propositions that are in the
class of existents for the actual world.

And,

the class of

projections for the actual world is identical to the class
of existents for the actual world.

This has the result

that, while there are gaps in the valuation of propositions

at worlds,

those gaps never affect the evaluation of a

sentence at the actual world, since the propositional

constants all refer to propositions that exist there.

(In

the quantified version of BML, all constants are taken to

refer to individuals in the domain of the actual world.)
4.

There is an accessibility relation between worlds

defined in terms of the projections and existents of worlds.
A world

w'

is accessible from a world w if and only if the

projections of

w'

are identical to the existents of w.
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Intuitively,
if w'

this means that a world w’

is accessible from w

can be described from the standpoint of
w, in terms of

the existents at w.

Defining accessibility in this way also

has the effect that,

if w‘

is accessible from w,

then w'

is

maximal with respect to the propositions that exist
in w.
6-1.3 The Problems of Contingency

3

Modal logic ought to make room for the fact that there
are contingent beings.

But,

in some standard versions of

quantified modal logic, formulas like
Vcili-Ch

6

and

7

above turn out

In addition, we sometimes get as valid the formulas:

PCI: D3x(x = a)

PC2

:

PC3

:

DVxDSyix
OE!a

PC4:

(a = a)

I

and
But,

= y)

7,
I

think the problem with the first three, and with
is obvious.

6

Many would see no problem with the last.

take it that if Quine did not exist,

not be identical to anything.

So,

ought to be regarded as valid.

I

then Quine would

don't believe that PC4

Standard systems also

sometimes declare valid the Barcan Formula and Converse

Barcan Formula, each of which seems subject to

counterexample
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All of these problems are related.

They all seem to

result from a failure to model the fact that
different
things exist in different worlds.
The problem,

then,

is to avoid commitment to the

validity of these problematic formulas, while retaining
commitment to the validity of these:
PC5

:

PC 6

:

PC7

:

VxFx o Fa
Fa o 3xFx

Vx (x

=

x)

and to allow for the consistency of:
PC 8

:

0->3x (x = a)

.

If a = Quine then PC8 is true,

on some models.

so PC8 ought to turn out true

Call the problems related to meeting these

desiderata the problems of contingency
In the logic of BML

,

the problems of contingency are

handled by the restriction on the necessitation rule.

This

restriction corresponds in the semantics to the fact that

validity is evaluated as truth in the actual world of every
model, and by the requirement that all constants denote

things in the actual world.
range,

at each world,

Another key is that quantifiers

over only things that exist in that

world

250

This technique for handling the problems of
contingency
is,

in itself,

independent of Buridanism.

world technique

I

Call it the root

now turn to some other approaches toward

the problems of contingency.

6

•

2

Free Logic and Contingency
The problems of contingency have often been dealt with

by replacing classical quantification theory with some

version of free logic.

Basically, a free logic is one in

which the formulas
VxOx

=>

$(a/x)

$(a/x)
3

3x0x

are invalid.

VxOx

=>

(E!a o $(a/x))

($(a/x)

I

They may be replaced by:

& E x)
!

o 3x$x

eschew the free logical approach in BML.

quantification theory is classical.

The

The restriction on

necessitation has the result that while
VxOx 3 ®(a/x)
0 (a/x)

3

3x$x

are valid,

their necessitations are not.
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Instead we have:

[(Vx<J>x

& gfc(a/x))

[($(a/x)

^ o (a/x)

& <f<5>(a/x))

]

d 3xOx]

Now it seems to me that there are two basic
philosophical
motives that might push one into free logic.
One might seek an interpretation of constants
that more

closely reflects the use of names in natural
languages like
English.

That class of English names might be thought
to

include "Pegasus" "Sherlock Holmes",

"Shangri-la" etc.

There seems little doubt that, on a natural reading,
the

sentence "Pegasus does not exist" is true.

So,

it seems

that whatever the correct treatment of names like "Pegasus"

if we use the constants in the formal language to take

is,

their place,

then we are going to want a free logic.

There is nothing wrong with using "constants" in such a
way.

However,

the logical constants in BML are to be

regarded as genuine designators.

In regimenting natural

language sentences with names in them, they should only be

used for those that actually stand for something.

And,

given Actualism, if it stands for something, then it stands
for something that exists, and there is thus no need for

free logical restrictions on EG and UI

Another motivation for free logic involves possibilist
quantification.

One may regard quantifiers as quantifying

over a domain that includes more than just the things to
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which the predicate

'

E

!

applies.

Alternatively one might

have an inner and outer domain for two different
sorts of
quantifiers, with the ordinary existential quantifier

ranging over the inner domain.

There seems to be little

formal reason for possibilist quantification if Possibilism
is not true.

In quantified BML there is only one sort of

quantifier, and the quantifiers range over the same entities
that satisfy 'E!x'.

6

.

3

Prior's System 0

Much of the discussion of the issues involved in

Buridanism has its historical point of origin in the works
of Arthur Prior

.

A good way to see how the logical system

BML is related to the metaphysics of Buridanism is to

compare BML to an alternative system, Prior's system

Q,

which is based on very similar metaphysical intuitions.

4

Prior's system differs from BML in two ways: first, it's

semantics are very different, being based on the method of
matrices.

And,

its theorems appear quite different.

I

would like to be able to give a simple account of the basis
for the differences between them.

But,

despite the fact

that the systems are based on very similar intuitions,

very difficult to directly compare them, as
below
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I

it is

will explain

Prior's views are similar to mine in
that he accepts
the three components of Buridan

formulating the system

Q,

1

s

thesis.

But,

Prior equates a proposition's

being possible with its being possibly true.
account,

then,

in

a proposition like

On his

[Quine does not exist]

is

/

not even possible.

5

One immediate consequence is that,

while Buridanism finds counterexamples to the schema

'(A

o OA)

Prior does not.

'

For him,

the antecedent of

the embedded conditional is only possible if it is
possibly
since,

’(TA

o OA)

1

as both Buridanians and Prior agree,

is valid 6

,

Prior is able to derive the former

formula
The matrix method for Q associates each sentence with
an infinite sequence of 0’s,

l’s and '2’s.

The ordering of

the values plays the role of correlating the values of

different sentences.

The places in the sequence can be

thought of as playing the role of possible worlds in a

possible worlds scheme: so if x is the value that is the
n th term in the sequence of some sentence A,
'

and y is the

value of the n th term in the sequence for a sentence
'

B,

then x and y should be thought of as corresponding to the

value of those sentences at some one particular possible
world.

Otherwise,

is irrelevant

-

the ordering of the terms in the sequence

the order of terms for a given sentence
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could be permuted, without any real
change in its
interpretation, so long as an identical
permutation were

performed on the sequences of all other sentences.
The assignments can then be pictured as an
infinitary

matrix as follows:
W1

Al
A2
A3

A4

W2

W3

10

0

2

1

2

W4

W5

W6

W7

W8

10
10 12

2

2

etc

.

2
1

111
110
111 11111
0

0

A5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

A6

0

2

0

0

0

2

0

0

A7

2

1112

11

1

etc

This is how Prior interprets this scheme: a value of

2

corresponds to the proposition's not existing at the given
world, a value of

1

corresponds to the proposition's being

true and existent at that world, and a value of

0

corresponds to the proposition's being false and existent at
that world.

Prior then gives rules for the interpretation

of his modal operators,

L and M.

Since

notation, rather than Polish notation,
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I
I

am using standard

will use the

symbols
But,

and

for Priorian necessity and possibility.

it should be noted that Prior discusses
both a strong

and a weak sense of necessity and possibility.

operators will be used for the strong sense

,

The

to be explained

below
The interpretation rules for

strong sense, are as follows 7

and

the value of #A is

:

world W if and only if the value of A is
and the value A at W is not

2,

otherwise.

1

The value of BA is
1

1

2

2

at W if and

and its value at W is

at every world (that's every world,
2)

.

at W if and only if the value of A at W is

its value at W is

0

at a world W if and only

not just the ones in which the value of A is not

value is

at a

1

at some world,

It's value is

2.

only if the value of A at W is

if the value of A is

in the

It's
2,

and

otherwise.

0

Notice that a sentence is true or false at a world if
and only if it is stateable there.

This corresponds roughly

then to my notion of truth and falsity inside of a world,

not to truth and falsity relative to a world.
Let's use

'

\B\

'

and

necessity and possibility.

'

\

\

'

for Prior's weak sense of

'

\

\

P

is true at a world W

just in case there is some world at which it is not false.

Since P is always stateable at least one world, weak

possibility corresponds to being stateable somewhere and not
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false somewhere. This condition
could be satisfied by a

proposition if it is either false or
unstateable everywhere,
and true nowhere.
This is not much of
a sense of

possibility and Prior does not employ it much
or stress
But,

it turns out that

weak necessitation of

'

\4P\

'

is equivalent to

\B\P,

P,

'-.B-.A'.

it.

The

is defined as true at a

world W if and only if p is either true or
unstateable at
every world.

This makes '\B\P' equivalent to

As we can see above,

sequences to consider:
and 2's,

(ii)

•

-«-.?

there are six types of sentence
those with a mixture of 0's,

(I)

those with a mixture of l's and 2's,

those with a mixture of

0

mixture of 0's and l's,

(v)

those with all 0's.

sequence is not

2

.

1

s

and 2's,

(iv)

l's

(iii)

those with a

those with all l's and (vi)

Prior requires that the first term of a
This means that there is at least one

world at which all propositions exist.

This is similar to

the actual world in my scheme, although for Prior this is

just a way of making sure there is at least one world of
this type.

The logical laws for Prior are those that are

not false at any world, that is they are true at every world
in which they are stateable

(and they are always stateable

somewhere)

Prior also introduces the operator 'S', and interprets it
so that

'SA'

is true at a world W if and only if the value
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of A is either

0

or

1

at every world.

in effect,

that 'SA' says that A is necessarily
stateable.
'SA'

this means

Note that

is not automatically true at a world
just because A is

stateable there.

equivalent to BML

So,
1

s

'

'SA'

%A'

should not be interpreted as

.

How does the logic of Q compare to that of
BML?
are different ways in which they may be
compared.

There
First, we

could attempt a direct syntactic comparison, using
Prior's
strong possibility and strong necessity, which are
the

notions he uses in the formulation of the system.
In this case,

we get many superficial similarities and

dissimilarities: for example one similarity is that Prior
does not have as valid the sentence:

(-p

=

B->P)

unlike BML, Q also declares invalid the simpler
sentence

but,

^P
But,

=

B-iP

this sort of direct syntactical comparison is

misleading for two main reasons.

First,

Prior's semantic

framework does not allow for the expression of something

corresponding to truth at or relative to a world, rather
than truth in or inside the world. While truth inside a

world can be defined in terms of existence and truth
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relative to a world, truth relative to
a world cannot be
defined in terms of the others. Consequently,
in some
sense, no Q sentence expresses what
BML expresses by simple

sentences such as

'P' are closer

'

DP

'

or 'OP'.

in meaning to BML's

In addition,

actual world in a Q matrix.

m

'?' and

'DTP' and 'OTP'.

there is no simple way to capture within
Q

the BML notion of validity,

world

Prior's sentences

BML is that,

in it,

since there is no distinguished
The function of the actual

every proposition exists.

And

a sentence is valid just in case it is true at
the actual

world of every model.

Intuitively,

there is no distinction

in BML between truth relative to the actual world and
truth

inside the actual world.

However,

this second feature could

be accommodated within the Q framework by regarding the

first term of the corresponding sequence for a sentence as

representing the actual world.

(Prior also requires that

there be a certain world such that every sentence is

stateable at that world, but does not require that validity
be determined relative to that world)

There are two noteworthy results of these features.
First, while Prior is able to solve some of the problems of

contingency (taking the box in the strong sense)
PCI: D3x(x = a)

PC2

:

nVxn3y(x

= y)
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PC3

:

PC4

:

De

!

a

(a = a)

He is able to do this only at the cost of losing
these

formulas

PC5

:

PC 6

:

PC7

:

VxFx 3 Fa
Fa

Vx

r)

3xFx

(x = x)

and the following turns out to be inconsistent:
PC 8

:

0-3x(x

= a)

However, one might make the following suggestion.
First, BML contains certain sentences that are valid because

they are true at the actual world of every model, but not at

every world of every model.

Q sentences are valid only if

true at every world of every model (matrix)

.

So,

any

sentence in Q that is expressible in BML and is valid ought
to be valid in BML as well.

Second, although not every

sentence expressible in BML is expressible in

Q,

it does

seem that every sentence expressible in Q is expressible in
BML.

So,

there seems some reason to think that, given the

appropriate translation of Q sentences into BML sentences,
the Q validities ought to be a subset of the BML validities.
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Such a scheme might go as follows:

A
t

tA

-

(

~>A

-

-it

B)

-

)

t (A &

tA & tB

tSA

-

T(tA)

tBA

-

DT(tA)

t4A

-

OT(tA)

tA

- TA,

for A atomic.

Note,

that even the sentence

expressible in
BML,

Q.

For Prior,

'

P'

P
'

'

of BML is not

is equivalent to

'TP'

in

hence the first and last rule above.
For the most part, the translation scheme above does

take valid Q sentences into valid BML sentences, although,
as we have seen,

there are a number of BML sentences that

are not the translation of any Q sentence.

exceptions to the parallel, though.
Q sentence
'TP o OTP

'

'P o iP',

for example,

There are a few

The translation of the

turns out to be,

The Q sentence is valid in

Q,

in BML,

but the

corresponding BML sentence is not valid in BML.

6

.

Deutsch's Logic of Contingency

4

Harry Deutsch has developed a system of modal logic,
LCB

,

designed to solve the problems of contingency, among

other things. 8

Since BML accomplishes the same task,
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I

would like to consider in this section the way in
which my
approach differs from that of Deutsch.
In order to prepare the way for a presentation
of

Deutsch’

s

views,

let me review some facts about Kaplan's

treatment of indexicality in his logic of demonstratives
Recall, Kaplan's framework depends on having two levels
of evaluation,
use,

the evaluation of character at a context of

and the evaluation of content at a circumstance of

evaluation.

For directly referential singular terms,

referent is determined in the context of use.

the

That referent

is the singular term's input toward the determination of a

proposition, and that proposition is then evaluated at

different circumstances.

A sentence is true in

a

context

just in case the proposition it determines in that context
is true at the circumstance of evaluation that is embedded

in that context.

While the framework allows a unified treatment of direct

reference and indexicality, there is no essential
theoretical connection between these two concepts.

We can

have indexical terms that are not directly referential, and

directly referential terms that are not indexical.

In fact,

Kaplan's scheme allows for pure constants that may be

treated as non-indexical directly referential terms.

Regarding these constants, Kaplan thinks of them not just as

262

having stable character, but as
being in some sense
"characterless".
in some sense, the context
doesn't fix the
referent of a constant, the interpretation
of the language
9
does that.
Deutsch's system, LCB, exploits two levels
of

evaluation to solve the problems of contingency.

I

will

begin by describing a simplified version
of the system. 10
An LCB-model is a quadruple <K, w*

,

D,

g>,

where K is a

set of worlds, w* is an element of K (the
actual world), D
is a function that assigns a domain to
each world,
a

and g is

valuation function that assigns extensions to
predicate-

world pairs, truth values to sentential constants
(0-place
predicates), and to each ordered pair

(t,

w)

where

,

t

is an

individual constant and w a world, a member of D(w)
Take a context of origin

c

to be some world in K.

An

assignment is a function from variables into the domain, and
a w* -assignment is an assignment

such that

f

element of D(w*) for each variable v.

denotation in w relative to
den

(

t)

den

(

t)

f

cw = f(t),

f

cw = g(t,c),

c

and

f

f (v)

is an

Then we define the

as follows

if t is a variable;

if t is a constant.

Think of the function g as a sort of "reference-fixing’
function, analogous to the character of an indexical term
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(although Deutsch makes it clear that
context of origin is
not the same thing as context of use)
The function den is
.

what is often called a "designation function".

function den assigns to a constant

So,

the

the same entity in

t

every possible world, relative to a given context
of origin
The context of origin fixes the referent, and
then the term
is evaluated at each world

(circumstance of evaluation) as

having that rigidly fixed referent.
We then define the notion of truth at a world in a
model,

relative to a context of origin (and assignment

f)

we define the notion 0 is true at w in M w.r.t. c and f
(M*=0 f cw )

(i)

if 1
F n t lr

as follows:

<
.

.

.

n, t 1# ..,
,t n
then
,

<den(t 1 f cw
den
and only if g(F n

(iv)

f

.

,

=1.

M*=$ f c

w

w

if

is

If $ has the form Vv?, then M*=O f c w if and only if for
each object a e D(w), M>= f (a/v) c<wW where f(a/v) = a, and
if u * v, then f(a/v)(u) = f(u).
If $ has the form t 1 = t 2

If

f
(

<D

x

)

c

w

=

den

'

then

,

f

M>= CiW

0 if and only if

f
(

2

)

c

w

.

has the form Dp,

each world w
(vi)

)

If f is a truth-functional compound, then
defined as usual.

den
(v)

n

w)

,

(iii)

f

f
(

)

(ii)

are terms, and 0 has the form
cw if and only if
n
w)
If n = 0, IM c
cw 6 g(F

tn
M*=<J>

E K,

M>=

If 0 has the form AW,

then
f

cw

.

Mi= f c>w

$ if and only if for

W.

then
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M>=

f

c

w

O if and only if

Then we say that a formula O is true in a model
just in case
it is for each w* -assignment
c* and f,

w*

So,

.

f,

<D

is true at w* in M w.r.t.

where c* is the context of origin such that c*=
a closed formula 0 will be true in M if and
only

on every assignment of actual individuals, O is true
in

if,

M at the actual world of M (taken as circumstance of
t ion

)

,

relative to the actual world of M (taken as

context of origin)

Then we say that 0 is valid if and only

.

if for each model M,

0 is true in M.

The intuitive idea here is just as in LD, Kaplan's
logic of demonstratives.

In LD,

a sentence is true at a

context if and only if the proposition it expresses in that
context is true at the circumstance (world-time) that is
part of that same context.

Deutsch's scheme requires the

evaluation of constants at a context of origin, and the
addition of a distinguished world

-

the actual world.

allows for a definition of truth in a model.

So,

This

being true

in a model turns out to mean the same thing as being true at

the actual world of that model.

There are some significant differences between LCB and
BML

.

In LCB,

the modal logic is a version of quantified S5,

because possibility and necessity are evaluated without the
use of an accessibility relation.

"Necessarily Quine

=

Also,

in LCB the sentence

Quine" comes out valid, because every
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name is assigned a denotation in each
circumstance of

evaluation with respect to each context of origin.

So,

since truth in a model is equivalent to truth at
w*

(taken

as the actual world), with respect to w*
of origin)

,

(taken as context

then the sentence "Necessarily, Quine

=

Quine"

is true in every model.

LCB is able to solve the other problems of contingency,
though, because it uses a variant of the root world

technique.

and BML

There is thus a significant parallel between LCB
In both,

.

truth in a model is determined by a

sentence's being true in the actual world of that model.
BML,

In

all constants are assigned to entities in the domain of

the actual world.

In LCB constants have different referents

in different worlds

(taken as contexts of origin), but the

referent at a world must be in the domain of that world.

And in BML, as in LCB, the quantifiers are taken as ranging,
at a given world,

world.

So,

over only things in the domain of that

it seems that the two logics use a very similar

technique to solve the problems of contingency.
However,

in LCB,

than the actual world.

the contexts of origin include more

The context of origin functions in a

parallel fashion to the context of use for indexicals.

We

are to think of individual constants as having variable

reference.

The function g in effect is the reference-fixing
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function.

With respect to a particular context
of origin, g
determines a denotation, which is defined
so as to be

rigidly fixed to be the same thing in each
world.
Consider three sentences like:
Gl: Gorbachev does not exist.

G2

:

G3

:

Possibly, Gorbachev does not exist.

Gorbachev is a world leader.

The sentence Gl is actually false, because the thing

"Gorbachev" refers to,

from the standpoint of the actual

world taken as context of origin, that is Gorbachev, does
exist at the actual world.

So,

what the sentence means in

the actual context of origin (the actual world)

is a

proposition that is true in the actual circumstance of
evaluation (also the actual world)

.

In LCB

,

Gl will be

false with respect to any context of origin, because

constants always have some referent fixed by that context,
and whatever "Gorbachev" refers to there is something that
exists there.

However, generally, G2 will be true with

respect to a context, because the thing "Gorbachev" refers
to in that context does not exist in some worlds other than

thp one that is the context of origin.
G3 is true in some contexts,

including the actual

context, and false in other contexts.
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But, when we say that

G3 is false

ir^

other contexts, that is not necessarily

because our Gorbachev is not a world leader
there (although
that may be the reason, if the referent
of
"Gorbachev" in

that context is our Gorbachev)

but it may be false because

,

the thing that "Gorbachev" refers to there
is not a world

leader there.
In effect,

it might seem,

Deutsch is giving something

like an indexical theory of names, but in fact that
is not
the case.

Contexts of origin are not contexts of use, they

are a third parameter.

While the scheme here presented does

not involve indexicals, Deutsch 's comments suggest that they

would be incorporated into the system in such a way that
evaluation of the individual constants at a context of
origin happens in between the evaluation of indexicals at a
context of use and the evaluation of content at a

circumstance of evaluation.

Deutsch comments on the

sentence

(9)

Bucephalus does not (now) exist.

He says

"Thinking now of the elements of a model as
moments or intervals of time, and taking the bound
variable tacit in (9) to range over things that
presently exist, (9) will be true if we take the
context of origin for the denotation of
"Bucephalus" to be the ancient time in which
Bucepahlus existed. Thus, context of origin
should not be confused with context of use." 11
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Deutsch is clearly thinking of a reading
of the sentence

(9)

as

(

9

'

)

It:

n

he Case that there is

°^ !r
is Bucephalus

It seems that,

on Deutsch'

indexical 'now'

s

reading,

(now)

an x such that x

the referent of the

is determined first by the context of
use.

Then, with that time fixed,

the sentence is evaluated at

different contexts of origin, at which there are
different
referents for the name "Bucephalus".
What is it though that determines whether a particular

utterance of

(9)

in a context of use is true or false?

I

believe that Deutsch 's intent is that the context of use
assigns to a constant a particular context of origin.

It's

ss though the character of a name is a rule or instruction

like: go to such-and-such context of origin to pick up a

referent for this name.

And then at the context of origin,

there is an instruction of the form: here is a referent for
the name, now evaluate the sentence at such-and-such

circumstances

Deutsch 's system offers an interesting account of the
semantics of reference for names.

However,

I

think that the

issues surrounding the use of names for past existents or

non-existents like "Bucephalus" are irrelevant to the
problems of contingency: those problems are entirely solved
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by the root world technique.

Deutsch's theory seems

designed to handle puzzles having to do
with the variability
of reference of names.
By discussing the problems of
contingency

m

this context, he creates the impression
that

these problems and the aforementioned puzzles
are connected.
But,

it seems to me that those puzzles are
entirely

independent of the problems of contingency.
I

think this can be seen if we consider the case
of

pure constants: a constant whose referent is
determined by
the interpretation of the language, and not by any

contextual factors.

In Demonstratives

,

Kaplan discusses

these as one possible account of the semantics of names.
Names,

on this view,

are in a sense "characterless".

Their

meaning is on a par with the meanings of predicates and
logical connectives.

They are fundamental, and the factors

that determine whether the names have this meaning belong to

metasemantics, and not semantics.
The question is not whether this is the right account
of natural language names.

The point is that,

if a language

contains pure constants, we still have the problems of

contingency with regard to them.

We could design a language

otherwise like English, but containing the pure constant
"Squine".

And we could stipulate that the meaning of

"Squine" is just Quine, and is absolutely independent of
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contextual factors of any kind.

it seem to me that the

sentence "Possibly, Squine does not exist" is
true in this
language, and that "Necessarily,

Squine" is false.

But,

there is an x such that x

=

the context of origin machinery

would be inapplicable to pure constants. 12
6

•

5

Menzel's True Modal

T.oair

Chris Menzel has produced a system of modal logic that
he calls "The True Modal Logic"

(

TML

13
.

Menzel begins with

basically Priorian intuitions, but seeks to preserve a more
standard modal logic.

According to Menzel, the difficulties

that force Prior into system Q reside in Prior's notion of

what it is for a proposition to be possible; and he says
that there is an alternative to that notion that leads to "a

much happier and more standard modal logic that

Q" 14

.

Menzel's proposal is very similar in spirit to my own, but
our logics come out different.

In this section

I

will

examine the reasoning that leads Menzel to TML, compare BML
and TML, and try to account for the differences between
them
I

think that one way of viewing the difference between

BML and TML is that, in TML, Menzel applies certain
"Buridanian" intuitions only to quantified modal logic, and
leaves propositional modal logic untouched.
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There are two main components of Menzel

1

s

account: the

metaphysical component with its alternative to
Prior's
notion of possibility, and the logic Menzel
thinks that

alternative supports.

want to first make some remarks

I

about the metaphysical component
In effect, Menzel offers a variation on the
theme of a

distinction between a proposition's being true
relative
a world.

to,

a world,

Where

I

or

and it's being true in, or inside of,

would say that a proposition P is true

relative to a world
W.

at,

W,

Menzel would say that P characterizes

He then says that a proposition is true in a world if

and only if it characterizes that world and exists in that

world
There are important metaphysical differences between us

with regard to the notion of a world.

Menzel develops his

account as part of an overall effort to defend possible

worlds semantics.

But,

I

don't believe these differences

play an important role in the divergence of BML and TML
Menzel uses this distinction to rebut Prior's argument
that a proposition like [Quine does not exist] is not

possible. He says that, while it is true that the

proposition is not true in any worlds, it does characterize
some worlds, and so is possible.

agreement
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So far we are in

The main difference is this.

I

take it that P is

possibly true if and only if it is possible
that
That means that
And,

[P is

to say that

[P is

true]

true.

is true relative to some world.

true]

equivalent to saying that

P is

[P]

is true relative to a world is
is true inside the world.

Menzel understands possibility in more or less the
same way,
but takes possibility to be equivalent to possible truth.

And since, like me, he does not believe that for any

proposition

P,

it is necessary that:

would then deny BT3

.

if P,

then P exists, he

He likewise seems to reject the other

components of Buridan's Thesis.
This rejection shows up in his discussion of the

duality rule:
D

'

:

<&

=

iOi®

Prior's argument against the validity of this rule depends
on the claim that a proposition like [It is possible that

Quine does not exist] is true if and only if it could be the
case that [Quine does not exist] is true.

Since Prior

believes that it could not be the case that [Quine does not
exist]

is true,

he also holds that [Quine does not exist]

thus not possible.

claims.

So,

Menzel denies both of these Priorian

he thinks that the argument against the

validity of the above fails.
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is

Since Prior believed that

D'

was invalid, he certainly

thought it could not serve as a definition
do

But,

.

after

rebutting Prior's argument for the invalidity
D', Menzel
then goes on to argue that, since the
argument fails, "there
is no apparent reason to abandon the
standard definition"
So,

Def

he incorporates into his system:

:

do =df

Just as in BML, there is a certain restriction on the
rule
of necessitation.

But,

by treating

not just a theorem, Menzel
D'

,

•

s

D'

as a definition,

and

TML yields the necessitation of

and the necessitation of the necessitation etc.
TML also includes the full S5 axiom

the restricted version S5

'

=

1

04>

3

'

DO 5

3

0<D

3 0<D)

'

and not

in BML.

'

Given Defd S5 is once again equivalent to the converse CS5:
'

0d4> 3 d3>

In very many other respects,

especially in its

treatment of quantification theory, TML is like BML.
TML contains no
existence,

'

While

-like operator for propositional

it does contain a predicate

'

E!

for existence of

individuals
Menzel deals with the problems of contingency by

applying the root world technique, but Menzel

'

s

account of

the failure of necessitation has only to do with the
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contingent existence of individuals,
not propositions.
effect,

m

the restriction does not allow
the application of

necessitation to theorems that are derivable
only with the
aid of the theorem 't = f
This has the result that Menzel
is able to give a complete solution to
the problems of
.

contingency.

He includes as an axiom a

"

free-logic " -like

version of UI
VxO 3

but,

t

=

VxO

(

E t 3 $( x
!

t

))

since he includes the axiom:
t,

3 ®

he gets the theorem:
x
(

t

)

,

but not:

VxO

3

(E t
!

x

o $

(

t

)

,

due the restriction on necessitation.
This is very similar in strategy to the one BML applies
to individuals and propositions.

However,

since the

theorems in the propositional portion of TML can be deduced

without use of

't =

t',

propositional TML remains unaffected

by the restriction on necessitation, and is in fact just

propositional

S5

.
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This suggests that the main differences
between TML and

BML should show up in the interaction between
propositional

modal logic and quantified modal logic.

And, here there are

some significant differences.

One example that is representative of the others is
that in TML it is a theorem that:

3x0

(

~>E

!

x & 0E!x)

This says that there is an x such that it is possible that
(x

does not exist and it possibly exists)

.

In other words

it is possible that there be a de re possibility about a

non-existent object.
BML,

This sort of claim is not a theorem of

and it seems not to be in the spirit of the Priorian

intuitions with which Menzel began.

Notes
1.

This is the notation used by Menzel in Menzel (1991)

2. By "taking the semantics literally", I mean taking it to
have an intended model, in which the worlds of the model are
genuine possible worlds, and in which belonging to the
domain of a world is the same as existing in that world.

Many of the problems discussed in this section have been
described by Harry Deutsch, in Deutsch (1990).
3

.

4. Prior's system Q is presented and discussed by Prior in a
number of places.
See Prior (1957), pp. 41-54; Prior
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p.154 60; Prior (1968), pp 148-9 and 155-60
The
system is also presented in Hughes and Cresswell
(1968}''
(1967),

.

pp. 303-5.

5. In a late paper, "The Possibly-True
and the Possible"
reprinted in Prior (1976), pp 202-14, Prior developed
a'
framework closer to my own approach, although, so far
as I
am aware, he did not apply the results to a system of
modal
.

logic

Prior does not have a 'T operator, but it seems certain
he would interpret it so as to make this valid.
1

7. I will be somewhat loose in the next few paragraphs
about
quotes, corner quotes etc.
8.

In Deutsch

9.

Kaplan (1989a), pp

(1990).
.

558-63.

10. Deutsch’ s system involves a complication of the notion
of context of origin, explained below.
In the official
version, a context of origin is a sequence of worlds rather
than a single world.
However, this feature of the system is
designed to handle cases of sentences containing more than
one name. So, for sentences containing only one proper name,
it does no harm to regard the context of origin as a single

world
11.

Deutsch (1990),

p.

99.

12. the machinery would play a residual technical role, just
as in LD, for the sake of uniformity, names are assigned
constant functions as their content.
In LD, that feature
plays no real theoretical role, and Kaplan takes it to

misrepresent what is actually going on. Likewise, a pure
constant may be assigned a constant function from contexts
of origin as its middle-level meaning for the sake of
technical uniformity.
13

.

14

.

Menzel

1991

)

.

Menzel (1991)

,

(

p.

331.
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APPENDIX
FORMAL DEVELOPEMENT OF BURIDANIAN MODAL
LOGIC

BMUP)

A. 1 The System

A -l-l Language and Axiomatic Basis
The language of propositional BML

S£ BML

,

,

is the same as

that of ordinary propositional modal logic, with one

addition.

We add the sentential operator

propositional existence.
that P exists", or just,

Read 'gV' as
"P exists".

:

to indicate

"the proposition

Syntactically,

functions just like the modal operators

and

'

0
'

'g'

The

system BML(P) is the intersection of all sets of sentences
that contain each of the following axioms and that

^bml

are closed under the indicated rules of inference.

Axioms
K:

(PcQ)

T:

DP

3 p

D:

OP

=

S5

'

r

:

:

0^:

o

(DP o DQ)

-illhP

OP 3 [J(gP 3 OP)

chop

3

gp

(OP 3

rP)

)
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Schema ^D: If a and B are any sentences containing
the same
proposition letters, then
(«fA

gB)

=

is an axiom.

Schema DPC

:

For every valid PC wff

A,

A
is an axiom.

Rules of Inference

RSN

bA - vU{g& 3 A)

:

and B is the result of replacing the proposit ion
letters p lr
p n wherever they occur in A by the
sentences S 1# ..., S n then bB.
If bA,

US:

.

.

.

,

,

If bA and bA^B,

MP:

then bB

Some Theorems and Non-Theorems of BML(P)

A. 1.2

The following list of sentences of BML(P) contains both
theorems and non-theorems
They have been interspersed so
that the BML(P) theorems may be contrasted with similar nontheorems.
Theorems are indicated by T' prefix.
.

'

0~>P 3 -iQp
->DP 3 0->P
ChP 3 -.OP

Tl.
T2
T3
T4.
T5
.

.

nOP 3 D-.P
(O-iP 3

.

6

T7
T8
9

(

.

(-'P

.

.

T10

.

11.

T12.
13

iDp)

-.Qp 3 0“>P
(-.DP & &P) 3 0“>P)
3 iOP)
(iOP 3 D-.P)
& ^P) 3 D-.p)
0-i P 3 -OP)
0-i P 3 -.DP))
(£*> 3
(D-iP 3 ^0P)
3 -.OP))
D(^P 3
(

.

.

T14.

((-OP
(

(

(-.?
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15.
16.

T17

.

18.
19

.

(

-dP

3 0 -> P

\D(gp 3
B(gp 3

(-.? d

D((-dp

O-iP)

)

& gp)

r>

0->P)

Dip)
B(gp 3
(-OP 3 D-iP)
(gp 3 n((-.op & gp) 3

n-,p)

(-.OP

)

^

)

T 20

.

T21. DP 3 p
T22
(DP 3 p)
23
(Dp 3 p)
T24 B(gp 3 BiB?
T25. P 3 OP
26
(P 3 OP)
T27
(P & gp) 3
28
(P & gP)
T29. B(gP 3
p
.

.

3 P)

.

.

.

.

(

(

(

(

T30.
T31.

)

OP)
3 OP)
& gp)

3 OP))

OOP 3 OP
OOP 3 OP)
(

Dn(OOP
OP)
T33
D(^P 3
(OOP 3 OP)
34. np 3 DDp
t35. Dp 3 n(^p 3 op)
T36. DP 3
OP 3 DP)
T37 DP 3 D-.0-.P
32.

=3

.

)

(

.

T38.
T39.
40.

B(BP

—0

=>

>

.

.

44.

T45.
46

T47
T48

.

.

P

-.OP ^ D-iOP

(-.OP

^ D-tOP)

T41. (-.OP ^

T42
T43

1

(gp 3 ^OP)

)

OOP
Dp
ODP ^ DP)
=3

(

(OOP
[gp 3

=3

Dp)

(OOP

^ BP))

OP 3 OOP
OP =>
(gp 3 OP)

D(OP d
(gp 3 OP)
49. CD(OP
(gp 3 OP))
T50. D(&P ^
(OP ^
(gp
T51. -dP ^ Q-dP
.

)

i3

52

.

T53.
54.

T55.
T56.
T57.

(->?

^

3 OP)))

D-dP)

-dP

& gP) o Q-dP)
QH((-dP & gP) ^ D-dP)
(-dP Sc gP) ^
(&p 3
(

(

(

((?

(?

3 Q)
^ P)

3

(Dp 3 DQ)

D-dP)
)
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)

T58
T59
T60
T61
T62

.

.

.

.

A. 1 3

DRl

:

DR2

:

DR3

:

(OP
(A

(^p

=3

=3

OP)

id

)

-i-iA)

(^(P V Q)
\3(&P 3
(^P 3

3 ^P)
3
p V Q)
-i[HP 3 0 “> P

(g’Q
(

)

)

)

)

Some Derived Rules of BMT,(P^
For every sentence A,

v-%K.

For every sentence

if hQA,

A,

For any sentences A and

then hA.

B,

if hDa and hCJ(A

B,

if hD(A

hDB.

DR4

:

For any sentences A and
then !- (A 3 C)

=>

B)

=>

B)

,

then

and v-D(B 3

C)

,

.

DR5

:

DR 6

:

DR 7

:

\-{&A 3 gfe)

for any sentences A and B such that every
proposition letter in B is also in A.
,

If i-A, and B results from A by substituting some
sentence D for some or all occurrences of a sentence
and C and D are PC-equivalent, and C and D exactly
the same sentence letters, then hB.

If hA,

and B is a PC-consequence of

hB.
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A,

then

C,

A. 2 Semantics for BML (P)

A BML (P) -frame is an ordered set <W, a, X, P,
A> such
that W is any set, a is a member of W, A is a
two-place
relation on W, and X and P are functions from W into
(?($£)
In addition X, P and A are required to meet the
followinq
conditions:
1.

X

2.

For any sentences A and B of
a

.

1

a.
b. 1

b

.

2

c 1
c 2
d. 1

d

:

:

.

:

.

2

:

:

.

:

f .1

:

f .2

:

g.i

:

g. 2
h. 1
.

2

S£,

££

and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and

(

:

.

=

(

:

:

P (a)

A E X(w) iff -iA E X(w)
A E P (w) iff -iA E P(w)
AVB 6 X w) iff A e X (w)
AVB 6 P w iff A 6 P(w)
A&B 6 X (w) iff A 6 X (w)
A&B € P(w) iff A e P(w)
A=>B 6 X (w) iff A E X (w)
A^B e P(w) iff A 6 P (w)
A=B 6 X (w) iff A e X (w)
A=B 6 P (w) iff A 6 P (w)
DA 6 X (w) iff A 6 X (w)
DA E P w iff A 6 P (w)
OA E X w iff A E X (w)
OA 6 P(w) iff A 6 P (w)
%A E X (w) iff A 6 X (w)
%A E P(w) iff A 6 P (w)

:

.

e 1
e 2

h

=

(a)

(

:

:

E
E
E
E

X (w)
P(W)

X

(w)

P (w)

E X (w)
E P (w)
E X (w)
E P (w)

)

)

(

:

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

A c W X W such that <w, w’>

6

A only if

X

=

P(w'

A BML P) -model is an ordered pair <& V> such that
BML (P) -frame and V is a function V: $£ X W - {0, 1,
that
(

4.

^

is a

-}

such

For any sentences A and B:
a. V A
w) = - iff A £ P (w)
b. V ~iA, w) = 1 iff V A w) = 0
= 1 iff V(A, w) * - and V(B, w) * - and
c. V(AVB, w
either V(A, w) = 1 or V(B, w) = 1
d. V(A&B, w) = 1 iff V A
w) = 1 and V(B, w) = 1
e. V(AbB, w) = 1 iff V(-iAVB, w) = 1
f. V A=B
w) = 1 iff V Ac>B
w) = 1 and V(B=>A, w) = 1
=
V
%A
w)
1
iff
A
E
X(w)
g
h. VIDA, w) = 1 iff, for every world w' such that Aww'
= 1
V (A, w'
i. V(0A, w) = 1 iff, for some world w' such that Aww',
(

,

(

(

,

)

(

(

(

,

.

,

,

,

)

V

(

A,

w'

)

=

1
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For every world w, there is a world w' such
that for
every sentence A, if V(A, w) = 1 and A e X(w) then

5.

V (A,

w'

)

=

1

For all worlds w and w' and each sentence A, if
V(OA, w) = 1, Aww and A e X(w'), the V(Oa/w')

6.

'

=

1.

Some Definitions
Df

:

A is true in a BML(P) -model M

Df: A is valid
in M.

=df

=df

V(A,

aM

)

=

1.

for every BML(P) -model M, A is true

Notes on the Semantics

Condition 5 plays two roles here. First, it guarantees
for each world in the model, there is some world
accessible to that world. Otherwise, all sentences would
turn out to be trivially necessary in certain models and no
diamond-governed sentences would be true in those models. A
sentence such as dp => OP would then turn out to be invalid.
Second, and related to the first role, Condition 5 is
responsible for the soundness of Axiom T.
Note also that, as a result of conditions 1 and 4a,
there are never any truth-value gaps at the actual world of
a model.
So, every sentence is either true or false in
every model
that,

283

A.

3

Completeness and Canonical Mo^pIp:

In this section, I will prove the completeness of
BML(P) relative to the semantic framework presented in the
previous section. To say that BML(P) is complete is to say
that every valid sentence of S£ BML is a theorem of BML(P).
The method of the proof will appeal to a certain class
of BML models called BML(P) canonical models, or BML(P) Cmodels
The basic outline of this completeness proof is
adapted from Hughes and Cresswell’s Companion to Modal Logic
(herafter H&C)
But, BML(P) C-models differ significantly
in structure from the canonical models for the systems of
modal logic treated in H&C. BML(P) is a peculiar modal
logic, and most importantly, it is a non-normal modal logic.
So, the canonical model techniques of H&C cannot be applied
straightforwardly to BML(P). There are two important
differences between BML(P) C-models and the canonical models
for normal modal logics:
First, BML(P) models differ generally from the Scottstyle models that Hughes and Cresswell are concerned with by
having a distinguished actual world. For Hughes and
Cresswell, a normal modal logic such as S5 is related to a
particular Scott-style model - the canonical model for a S5
In this model, for every consistent set of sentences, there
is a world in the model at which the members of that set are
jointly true.
For BML(P), on the other hand, there is a
whole family of BML(P) C-models. And, the most that can be
said is that, for each BML P) -consistent set of sentences,
there is a BML(P) C-model such that the members of that set
are jointly true at the actual world of that model.
Second, due to the failure of the rule of necessitation
in BML(P), there are special conditions on the kinds of
structures that can serve as BML(P) models generally, and
In a normal propositional
BML(P) C-models specifically.
modal logic, every theorem is true at every possible world,
and no inconsistent sentence is true at any world. Things
stand differently with BML models. We can say that every
theorem is true at the actual world of every BML(P) model,
and no inconsistent sentence is true at the actual world of
But, these claims do not hold for every
a BML(P) model.
world of a BML(P) model. Consider sentences such as:
.

.

(

(S)

-.DP o 0-iP,

(S')

-OP

&

and

1 O- P.
1

is a theorem of BML(P), and (S') is BML P) -inconsistent
For every BML(P)
since its negation is equivalent to (S)
(S)

(
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model,

is true at the actual world of that model,
and
is false at the actual world of that model.
But, there
are BML(P) models such that, at some world w in that
model,
(S') is true and (S) is false.
These are worlds at which
is true, and thus 'DP', 'ChP\ 'OP' and '0-.P'
are all
(S

(S)

)

false

Here, then, is an overview of how the canonical model
technique for proving the completeness of BML(P) works: To
say BML P is complete with respect to the class of BML(P)
models is to say that, if a sentence is BML P) -valid, then
it is a theorem of BML(P)
This is equivalent to
(

)

(

.

1)

For every sentence A, if A is true in every BML
then A is a theorem of BML(P)

(1),
2)

in turn,

(

P)

-model

is equivalent to:

For every sentence A, if for every BML (P) -model M A is
true at a M the actual world of M, then A is a theorem of
BML(P)
f

,

Recall that, for any BML P) -model and any sentence A
A is either true at a M or false at a M and that A is
true at a M if and only if iA is false at a M
Also, say that
a sentence A of Sf BML is BML P) -consistent just in case -'A is
not a theorem of BML(P)
Then (2) is equivalent to:
(

°f

,

SPbml/

,

.

(

.

3)

For every sentence A, if A is BML P) -consistent then
there is some BML(P) -model M such that A is true at a M
the actual world of M.
(

,

,

just says that every BML P) -consistent sentence is
true in some BML P) -model
In the remainder, I will first define a class of
structures that are BML(P) canonical models, or C-models.
I
will then show that each BML C-model is indeed a BML -mode 1
It will then be an easy matter to show that each BMLconsistent sentence of S£ BML is true in some BML(P) C-model,
and thus that it is true in some BML(P) model. This will
complete the proof of completeness.
And,

(3)

(

(

Some Initial Definitions
In what follows, I will use the terms 'theorem',
'BML'valid', 'model' etc. in place of BML- theorem
h
used
will
be
'BML-model' etc. The turnstile,
valid'
exclusively to indicate BML theoremhood.
'

'

'

,
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'

,

Dfl: A is a O-theorem

(b 0

)

=df

A is a 1-theorem (bj =df
A is a 2-theorem (b 2 =df
A is a 3-theorem (b 3 =df

i-A

hQA
bD(^A 3 Qa)

)

3 \3(&h 3 Qa)

)

A is an i-theorem (bj =df

hD(^A 3

U{%A

..

)

3 Da)..)

Call sentences of the type following the turnstile on
the right sides of the definitions canonical sentences
More specifically, for a given sentence A, the 0 th canonical
sentence for A is A itself, the 1 st canonical sentence for A
is DA, the 2 nd canonical sentence for A is
(IfA 3 Qa) etc.
In general, the i th canonical sentence for A is
(§?& 3 B)
where B is the (i-l) th canonical sentence for A. Note that
the i
canonical sentence for A contains i occurrences of
the box,
O
and i -1 occurrences of the existence operator
(i- n
addition to any occurrences of these symbols
contained within A itself)
,

,

Df 2

:

A is an N- theorem

for every

=df

(b N A)

i

>

0,

h^A.

Some Initial Theorems

THEOREM

1

For any sentence A,

:

if

b x A,

then bA

PROOF By the definition of a 1 - theorem,
By axiom T, b(QA 3 A)
So, by MP
bA

if

:

.

THEOREM
h i+1 A

2

then bOA.

,

For any sentence A and any

:

b xA

i

>

0,

then

if bjA,

PROOF: Suppose
Then bB where B is the i th canonical
sentence for A, with i occurrences of
and i-1
occurrences of
extraneous to A.
By RSN, then, bD(^B 3
B)
and by DR5 bD(^A 3 ^B)
since B and A contain the same
proposition letters. So, by DR4 we have bD(^A 3 B) This
is the (i+l) st canonical sentence for A, so, A is a i+1
,

,

,

,

.

theorem

COROLLARY

1

:

For any sentence A,

bx

A if and only if

b N A.

It clearly follows from from Theorems 1 and 2 that,
then b A A for every i > 0, so b NA. And by the
if
definition of an N-theorem, if b NA, then b x A.

PROOF:

b-jA,

COROLLARY

2:

bQA,

if and only if
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b NA.

PROOF: This follows easily from Corollary
definition of a 1 -theorem.

1

and the

The following theorem presents some results
that will
be useful for the upcoming completeness proof:

THEOREM 3a: The following sentences are N-theorems:

D(P
Dp 3

1.
2

.

3

.

4

.

.

7

.

=>

DQ)

p

OP 3 (g’p 3 Op)
P 3

-1 -1

r(P V
rp 3
^P 3

5.
6

(DP

Q)

=>

p

3
(g’Q 3
Q)

^p
r(P v

Q)

)

(-iDp 3 0-iP)

PROOF. For each sentence A in the above list,
A appears in
the list of theorems already generated in Section I.
So, by
Corollary 2 each such sentence is an N-theorem.
I

I

,

THEOREM 3b: The following derived rules hold:
If
If

1.
2.
3.

A and

hN
i-

(A 3 B)
then if b N B
and b N (B 3 C)
then b N (A 3 C)
where all the proposition letters in B are

bN

n (A 3 B)

,

4.

n

,

.

,

(^A 3 ^B)
also in A.
If A is a valid PC-wff,
i-

then

bN

A.

PROOF: Each of these can easily be obtained from the derived
rules and theorems of section I, and from Corollary 2.

THEOREM 3c: If kA, and B and C are N-equivalent (i.e. b N (A =
B)
and D is a sentence that results by substituting C for
some or all occurrences of B in A, then kD.
)

,

PROOF:

(proof omitted)

THEOREM
then b-jA

4:

For each sentence A and all

i

>

0,

if

i-

i+ 1 A,

PROOF: By cases:

Case (a)
Suppose i > 2.
Then if A is an i+1 -theorem we
have bB where B is the (i+l) th canonical sentence for A:
)

(

:

(*Ta

with

3

...

i+1

D(gx

3 Da)

occurrences of

...)

and
287

i

occurrences of

'<£'

,

xtraneous to A. Let C be the sentence that
results from B
by deletion of the expression '(«& 3 from
the left side
o
B and deletion of the final right
parenthesis
from
m1
the right side of B
Then C~ is the i th canonical sentence
for A:
_

-

'

(

’

.

(^A 3

.

.Da)

.

.

.

.

)

with i occurrences of
and i -1 occurrences of
extraneous to A.
In other words, B = [D(^a
C)~|.
Let D be
the sentence that follows the initial box in C
So C = IHUdI
and B - \p{gk o Dd)]. And, D contains i-1 occurrences
of
each of
and
Finally, note that D = [ (&A 3 E)l.
As
an instance of T22, we have
,

=>

'

(- (Do 3
And,
i-D

D)

.

.

since B is a theorem, we have

(&A

=>

DD)

so by DR 4

hD(^A 3

we get

,

D)

,

,

and by substitution for
i-D

(&A o

{&A o E)

)

D:

.

This yields, by DR 6

:

(-(«Ta 3 E)

and thus
hOD.

Since CUD =
i- theorem

Case

C,

the

i

th

canonical formula for

Suppose i = 1.
Then, A is an
if it is a 2 -theorem, so we have:

i-D

(b)

:

(&A 3 DA)

.

By DR2 and DRl, respectively, we get:
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(

A,

i-t-1)

then A is an

-theorem only

i-

(<?A

Qa.)

,

and

h^A,

by MP, we have:

so,

hOA.

Thus, A is a 1-theorem,

Case
have

J_c_L:

Suppose

i

=

and thus an i-theorem for
0.

Then if A is an

(

i+1

)

i

=

1.

-theorem we

:

hOA
and by DR2 we have

bA,

so A is a 0-theorem,

and thus an i-theorem for

This completes the proof of Theorem

i

=

0.

4.

Some More Definitions
Df 3

:

Df 4

:

Df 5

:

A is 0-consistent
A is 1-consistent

(hA)
id A)

=df

i/yA

A is i-consistent

(iHA)

=df

^i-A

(

=

=df

i/q-^A

A is N-consistent n hA)
=df
for some i > 0, iHA
A is N-inconsistent =df A is not N-consistent.
(

A finite set of sentences r = {y l7 y 2 ..., y n } is
N-consistent if and only if y & y & ...8c y n is Nconsistent.
Otherwise, it is N-inconsistent
,

x

2

Df6: A set T of sentences is N-consistent if and only if
every finite subset of F is N-consistent.

Note that, if a set of sentences is 0-consistent then
it is N-consistent.
But, the converse of this result does
,

not hold.
Df 7

For any sets of sentences A and r, A is maximal with
respect to r if and only if, for every sentence A in r,
A is in A or ->A is in A. A is maximal if and only if
it is maximal with respect to SP BML
.
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Df 8

For any set of sentences r, r* is the set of
sentences
A such that 2?A e r
[r] is the largest set A such
that
r is maximal with respect to A;
(r) is the set of
sentences A such that Qa e F

:

;

_

Df 9

r is MP-closed
and A^b are in

:

Df 1

=df
for all sentences A and B,
then B is in r.

A is a branch of r

:

N-consistent,
Df 11

if A

r,

(ii)

=df

(i)

t*

=

[A]

,

r is MP-closed and
and (iii) ‘(r) c a.

Say that r is a stem of A just in case A is a branch
Say that n spawns A just in case either (i) n
bears the ancestral of the stem relation to A, or

:

of r.

n = A.

(ii)

Note that condition (ii) must be added to Dfll because not
every set of sentences is a branch of itself.
Df 12

:

For any set r let S(D be the set of sets of
sentences spawned by F, i.e. S(T) contains r, all
branches of r, branches of branches of r etc.
,

Definition of Canonical Models
Let a be any maximal O-consistent set of sentences.
Consider the structure

«S (a)

,

X s(a)

a,

,

P s(a)

,

A S(a) >

V>

,

in which S(a) is once again thee set of sets of sentences
spawned by a, X s(a) is a function from S(a) into
such that,
for all s in S(a), X S(a) (s) = s g P S(a) is the function from
S (a) into SP such that, for all s in S(a), P s(a> (s) = [s]
and
A s(a) is the subset of ordered pairs <s, s > in S(a) X S(a)
such that s' is a branch of s. Finally, V is a function
V: SP X S(a) - {1, 0, -} defined by:
,

,

'

V (A,
V A,
V A,
(

(

s)
s)
s)

= 1
=

0

=

-

Acs

iff
iff A 6 s
iff A ^ s and iA
-i

£

s

Such a structure will be called a canonical model or Cmodel. In a C-model, the term a will be called the actual
worldset of the model, and the members of S(a) will be
called the worldsets of the model.
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Note that every maximal O-consistent set of sentences
a
determines a unique C-model The following important result
w iH ^e crucial for the proof of completeness.
.

THEOREM 5 (The Transmission Theorem): For any C-model M
with actual worldset ex, if k n A and r is a worldset of M and
A 6 P s(a) (D
then ACT.
,

PROOF: By Theorem 3a. 4, we have k n (A => -nA)
so by Theorem
3b. 1, if k nA then b N ^A.
So, since by hypothesis b N A, then
h N -i->A and -iA is therefore N-inconsistent
And, since r is
N-consistent then ->A £ r. But, by hypothesis A e p s(a) (p)
so either A or ->A is in r.
So, A e r.
,

.

,

COROLLARY
i-

n (A

P s(a)

=>

(D

B)
,

3:
For any C-model M with actual worldset
and T is a worldset of M, and A e r and (A
then B e r.

if

a,
B)

=>

e

PROOF: An application of Theorem 5 yields that (A o B) is in
if n (A => B) and r is a worldset of M, (A o B) e P s(a) (r)
And, if A e r, then MP-closure gives the result that B e r.
T,

i-

.

We are now ready to prove the central result of this
section

* *

The Completeness Lemma: Every C-model is a BML-model.

PROOF: Clearly S(a) is a set containing a, by the definition
of S(a), and x S(a) and P S(a) are functions from S(a) into
Also, by the definition of
S(a) X S(a).
P(S£), and A s(a) c
V, V is a function from $£ X S(a) into the set {1, 0, -}.
It needs to be shown that conditions 1 - 6 of the semantics
hold also.

Condition
1(a):

1:

P s(a) (a) = [a], but since a is maximal,
So, P s(a) = S£ bml

=

[a]

Sl?

BML

.

.

1(b):

for every A in SP BML \-%K.
But, by DR1
a*.
^A
is in P s(a) (a) no matter
know
we
above,
From 1(a)
So, by the Transmission Theorem, ^A is
what A is.
Thus, a r = ^ BML
in a, for every A in if BML

X s<a)

(a)

=

,

,

•
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Before proceding to the proof of condition
first to prove condition 3.

2,

we need

C ondition 3: If <s, s’> 6 A s(a)
then s’ is a branch of s.
So, [s'] = s y
By definition of X S(a) X sla) (s) = s^
By the
definition of P S(a) P s(a) (s’
= [s'].
Then X s(a) (s) = P S(a) (s').
,

.

,

,

)

C ondition 2:
The proof goes by induction on the depth of a
world-set:
For a given C-model M, define the depth-0 set to
be {a}, the depth-1 set to be the set of all branches of a,
other than q if ex is a branch of itself, the depth— 2 set to
be the set of all branches of elements of the depth-1 set
that are not themselves in either the depth-1 set or the
depth- 0 set.
In general, the depth- (i+1) set is the set of
all branches of elements of the depth-i set such that those
branches are not themselves in any depth- j set for j < i.
Finally, we say the depth of a world-set s, D(s), is the
natural number i such that s is in the depth-i set.

Base case, D(s) = 0: D(s) = 0 iff s = a.
Since, from the
proof regarding condition 1, we know that P S(a) = X S(a) = &[ BML
then it is trivial that each component of the 'iff'
- 2h.2 holds.
statements in 2a.

,

Inductive case Assume, as the inductive hypothesis, that
each of the statements 2a.
through 2h.2 holds for any
worldset s such that D(s) < n.
It must be shown that they
also hold for any worldset s such that D(s) = n+1.
:

Suppose A 6 X sla) (s) and D(s) = n+1,
Then %A 6 s, by definition of X sla)
So, obviously <%A £
s <a)
s(a)
-i|TA
X
or
£ X
Thus, %A £ P S(0l> (s) by definition
(s)
s
s(a)
of P
Each worldset of depth n+1 for n > 0 has a stem of
depth n, so there is a worldset s' such that D(s') = n and,
by proof of condition 3, X s(a) (s') = P S(a) (s)
So, <?A £
S(a)
By the inductive hypothesis, we now get:
X
(s')
(left to right):

2a. 1

.

(

.

)

.

.

.

A

£

X s(a)

{%K

=>

&-*A)

~
|

(

s

'

)

,

and

x s(a) (s')

e

We know, from DR5 and
and so, {&A o If-iA) £ P s<a) (s)
=>
and so by application of the
that
(^A
&->A)
Corollary 2
N
o
^A) 6 s. By MP-closure, then,
transmission theorem (IfA
S(a)
~
A £ X
(s)
r-^A 6 s, so
.

t-

i

,

.
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2a. 1

(right to left): Suppose -A e X sla) (s) and
D(s) = n +l
6 S
by definition of X S(Q
So, obviously gb A e'
a)
X
6
(s).
Thus, SnA e P s(a >( S by definition
7
Js%]
f
of P
Each worldset of depth n+1 has a stem of depth
n
so there is a worldset s' such that D(s') = n
and,
by
proof
of condition 3, X s(a) (s') = P S(a) (s).
So, IBa e X s(a) is').
By
the inductive hypothesis, we now get:
'

.

Ik

6

>

.

f

°V

X S(a)

(s'

(I^A o %K)

)

,

)

and
X s(a) (s')

e

and so, (IT-iA => &A) E P S(a) (s)
We know, from DR 5 and
Corollary 2 that b N (^f-iA ^ ITA) and so by application of the
transmission theorem (IT-iA o ITA) 6 s. By MP-closure, then
%A e s, so A e x s(a) (s)
.

,

.

(left to right): If A 6 P S(a) (s) and D(s) = n+1, then
there is a worldset s' such that s' is a stem of s and D(s')
= n, and
A E X S(U) (s')
By the inductive hypothesis then, ->A E
X S(a) (s') and so ->A E P S(a) (s).
2a. 2

.

(right to left): If -«A 6 P s(a) (s) and D(s) = n+1, then
there is a worldset s' such that s' is a stem of s and D(s')

2a.

and
X S(a)

= n,
->A E

X

s(a)

(s'

2b. 1

)

By the inductive hypothesis then, A
and so A 6 P s<0() (s).
(

s

'

)

.

(left to right):

Suppose AVB

E

X s(a)

(s) and D(s) = n+1,
Then
^(AVB) e s, by definition of X s(a)
So, obviously I’(AVB) 6
X s(a) (s)
or iIT AVB e X S(a) s
Thus, ^(AVB) e P s(a) (s) by definition
s(a)
of P
Each worldset of depth n+1 has a stem of depth n,
so there is a worldset s' such that D(s') = n and, by proof
of condition 3, X S(a) (s') = P S(a) (s).
So, IT (AVB) e X S(a) (s').
By the inductive hypothesis, we now get:

6

.

(

(

)

)

.

.

X s(a) (s')
X s(a) (s')
=3
(IT AVB)
lA)
(^(AVB) o IB)

A
IB

E
6

IT

(

E
E

X s(a)
X s(a>

(s'

)

(s'

)

and so, (IT (AVB) o lA) E P s<a> (s) and (I(AVB) o IB) 6 P s<a) (s).
We know, from theorem 3a. 5 that h N (IT(AVB) o lA) and
N IT (AVB) => IB), and so by application of the transmission
theorem (IT (AVB) => lA)
i-

(
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and (g’(AVB) z» gB)
so A e X S(a) s

s

6

e s,

(

By MP-closure,
and B 6 X S(a) (s).

e s.
)

then,

gA

e

s

and

2b. 1 (right to left): Suppose A e X S(a) (s), B
e X S(a) (s) and
D(s) - n+1
Then gA 6 s and gB 6 s, by definition of x S(ot)
So, obviously gA e P S( “>(s) and gB e P s '«> (s)
Each worldset
of depth n+1 has a stem of depth n, so there is a
worldset
s
such that D(s'
= n and, by proof of condition 3,
X s(a) (s') = P S(a) (s)
So, gA e X s(a) (s'
and ^B e X s(a) (s')
By
the inductive hypothesis, we now get:
,

.

.

)

^(AVB)
{gA
(gB o

X s(a)
^(AVB)
6

(gA 3

(s'

g

)

x s(a)
aVb)
e

)

(

)

(s'
)

e

)

x S(a)

(s'

)

and so (gB => (gA o ^(AVB)
e P S(a) (s).
We know, from
theorem 3a. 6, that h N (gB => {gA => ^(AVB)
and so by an
application of the transmission theorem {gB o {g’A
g AVB
6 s.
By two applications of MP-closure, then,
^(AVB) e s, so (AVB) 6 X s<0° s
)

)

)

)

=>

(

)

)

)

(

2b.

(left to right):

If

)

.

P s(a) (s)

and D(s) = n+1,
then there is a worldset s such that s' is a stem of s and
D(s') = n, and (AVB) e X s<a) (s').
By the inductive
hypothesis then, A 6 X S(a) (s') and B e X S(a) (s') and so A e
P S(a) (s) and B E P s<a) (s).
2

(AVB)

e

'

(right to left): If A 6 P slQ) (s) and B E P s(a) (s) and D(s)
= n+1, then there is a worldset s' such that s' is a stem of
= n, and A € X S(a) (s') and B e X s(a) (s').
s and D (s
By the
inductive hypothesis then, AVB e X S(a) (s') and so AVB e
2b.

2

'

P s(a) (s)

)

.

The proofs for the remaining clausesin condition 2, 2c
through 2h, are omitted. They continue in a similar
fashion

Condition

4:

The proof of Condition
lemmas

LEMMA

1:

4

requires the use of some important

For any world-set

s,

X s(a)

(s)

c P S(al (s).

PROOF: For any sentence A, if A 6 X s(a) (s), then g’A E s.
But then, by the proof of condition
Then, gA E P s(a) (s).
2h 2 A 6 P s(a) (s)
.

,

.
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LEMMA

For any N-consistent set

2:

"(r)

r,

is N-consistent

PROOF Suppose r is N-consistent, but "(r) is not.
Then
there is a sentence A such that CUA E F and h ->A. We
have
N
from Theorem 3a 2, that h N DA => A, and so, by Theorem
3c,
h N (^A o -iQa)
since the sentences Qa d A and -iA => -.Qa are
PC-equivalent.
By Theorem 3b. 1, then, we have h N ^DA, so Da
is N-inconsistent
But, since Dh E r, then r is Ninconsistent contradicting our initial assumption.
:

.

.

,

.

,

LEMMA 3:. For any set of sentences r and sentence A, if OA
r and F is N-consistent, then "(r) u {A} is also Nconsistent

e

PROOF: By reductio.
Suppose OA e r r is N-consistent and
u {A} is not N-consistent.
Then, some finite subset
A of '(T) u {A} is not N-consistent.
By the previous
theorem, '(D is N-consistent, so A must contain A.
So, A
= { Yi
•••/ Ya* A}, where each Yi C F.
So,
,

"(F)

/

1*

&

^ (Yl

•••

& Yn

A)

Sc

.

By the definition of an N-theorem,
2.

I“2

~
1

(

Y 1 k ••• & Yn & A)

and by the definition of a 2-theorem:
3

h

.

(

&

!

...

Yn

Sc

A)

8c

Ch

=3

&

...

Sc

D((Yi &

•••

& Yn)

(yi

yn

A)

Sc

)

.

First, we show that:
(*)

t-HU-i

From
4.

(\Hy 1

3,

Sc

...

Sc

DYn

Sc

OA)

.

we get:
3

hD(^--(Yi & ••• & Yn & A)

by the rule of PC substitution.

!-((

5.

(y 1

Sc

...

& Yn)

.

i-

(irb

(

yi

Sc

...

Sc

Yn

-1

A)

3

Sc

A)

o

(

CD

which is equivalent to:
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"'A)

)

We also get:

(

and thus,

as an instance of T57,
6

3

3

(

Yi

from
(

Yi &

Sc

...

4,

5

...

Sc

& Yn)

3

"'A))

and DR4 we get
Yn

)

-

)

n A
-1

)

)

7.

hD(

(r-i( Yl

&

...

& Yn & A)

((y

&

...

&

1

& Yn)

3 ChA)

)

.

We have the following:
8.
9

.

hD
i-O

10.

((-.r-i( Yl

(

-i^A ^

!-(-. A

&

...

-iOA)

^

& Yn & A)

(( Yl

&

&

...

& Yn)

3 i^A)

)

,

,

-i<>A)

,

/

(each of these is easily derivable in BML)

From
11.

and 10 we get

7

(-

(

(^-i
(

and from
12.

)-

(

(

8
i^T->

Yi &

and
(

...
9

Yi &

& Yn & A)

&

(D(Yi &

...

& Yn)

3 -’OA)

)

we get:
...

& Yn & A)

(IU(Yi &

&

...

& Yn)

)

3 ->0A)

.

11 and 12 together give us:
13.

(-((Yl

Sc

...

Sc

3

Yn)

-,

0A).

We have as a theorem of BML:
14.

Sc

...

Sc

3 D(Yi &

IH Yn )

...

&

yJ),

and 13 and 14 together give us:
15.

i-O

(0/1

Sc

...

Sc

0/ n

16.

h[Zb(0/i

Sc

...

Sc

DYn

(

which is the sentence
17.

H 1 -i(DYi

Sc

...

Sc

3 -'OA)

)

Sc

(*)

0/ n

Sc

which gives, by Corollary
18.

t-

N ->

(OYi

Sc

...

Sc

OYn

Sc

,

which is equivalent to:

OA)

above.

16

may be read as saying:

OA
1:

0A

)

.

But, each of the Oyi is in r and so is OA, so 18 says that
contrary to the hypothesis.
F is not N-consistent
,

LEMMA 4: For any sets of sentences r and A, if F is Nconsistent, and [F] is a subset of A, then there is an N= A.
consistent extention of r, T’, such that F
[
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'

]

The sentences of 9? can be effectively enumerated,
so
there is an effective enumeration of A, since A is a
subset
of
Let Ai = <X 1 \ 2
..> be such an enumeration.
Define
=
Ai
<5i> to be <X lt ->X x< X 2
->X 2
...>.
That is 5i = X 2i
if
i is odd, and 5i = “'Si, if i is even.
.

,

,

.

,

,

_ 1

Define the following sequence of sets
r0 = r
ri = ro u

if r 0 u (Si)

(5i)/

is

by

rt

N-consistent

otherwise
r i = r i-i u

if r i_i u (Si)

(Si),

,

rx = r0

is N-consistent,

=

ft

otherwise
Let T + = u{Ti|i

>

0}

It can be shown that r + is N-consistent.
If r + were Ninconsistent then there would be a sentence A such that
But, then A E one of the 1^.
Each
is obviously NN ->A
consistent, though.
So, none may contain A.
It is also
easy to see that [T + = A. Clearly, for any set S of Nconsistent sentences, and any sentence A, either S u {A} or
S u {-A} is N-consistent.
So, for any element of A, either
A or -iA is in F +
,

t-

.

]

.

LEMMA
A and

5:
->A

For any worlset
are in s

there is no sentence A such that

s,

PROOF: Worldsets are, by definition, N-consistent, and so
contain no N-inconsistent sentences.
Suppose, for the
purpose of reductio that for some worldset s and sentence
A, both A and ->A are in s.
Then, by a few applications of
S(0,)
the proof of condition 2, A => (iA
(A & iA)
E P
(s)
By
the Transmission Theorem then, (->A => A & -»A
E s.
By two
,

.

)

(

applications of MP-closure (A &
N-inconsistent. Contradiction.

->A)

E

)

)

But,

s.

(A &

->A)

is

With these lemmas in hand, we now return to the proof of
condition 4:

V s(a>

4a
4b:

(A,

V S(a)

s)

(nA,

=
s)

-

iff A

= 1

iff

£
-iA

s

and
E s

->A

£

s

iff V s(a)

iff A
(A,

s)

£

P

!

=0.

V s(a) (AVB, s) = 1, then AVB e s and AVB
Suppose neither A nor B is in s. We know from
(s)
e P
Ma)
(s).
the proof of condition 2b. 2 that A E P s(a) (s) and B E P
4c left to right):
(

If

s(a)

.
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if neither A nor B is in s,

So,

then

->A

have
hN

->A

6^

3

(

o

A

(

Sc

~'B

3

(

in P
3

“'A

(

(s)

But,

4.

So,

.

-.A)

We

)

)

And, both are in P S(a) (s) since A and B are
by the Transmission Theorem we have:

((AVB)

3

-«B

3

(A

Sc

->A)

)

)

6

s

6S.

->A)

Sc

(A &

are in S

by three applications of MP we have:

Then,
(A

3

->B

3A )

by Theorem 3b.
S(u)

(AVB)

and

s

is N-consistent

,

so we have a contradiction.

4c (right to left): If neither Vs(a) (A, s) nor V(B, s) = -,
and if V s(a) (A, s) = 1 or V S(Q) (B, s) = 1, then both A and B
are in P s(a) (s) and either A 6 s or B 6 s
So, by the proof
of condition 2, AVB 6 P s(a) (s) and both A 3 (AVB) and B 3
(AVB) are in P S(a) (s).
We have by 3b. 4:
.

6N

A 3 (AVB)

hN

B 3

so,

(AVB)

by the transmission theorem,

A 3 (AVB)
B 3

(AVB)

6
6

s
s.

Then, since either A or B is in
is in s.
So, V s(a> (AVB, s) =1.

s,

then by MP closure (AVB)

The proofs of conditions 4d through 4f are omitted.
continue in a similar fashion. We turn next to 4g.
4g

:

V S(a)

(^A,

s)

=

1

iff &A

6

s

iff A

6

s* iff

A

6

X S(a)

They

(s)

.

So, A 6
4h (left to right): If V s(a) (QA, s) = 1 then DA 6 s.
So, A 6 s'
~(s), and thus A 6 s', for each branch s of s
So, V sla) (A, s') =1 for
for each s' such that <s, s'> 6 A s(a)
each s' such that <s, s’> 6 A s(a)
'

.

.

.

4h (right to left): If V s<0,) (A, s') =1 for each s' such that
then A 6 s' for each s' such that <s, s’> 6
<s, s > 6 A s(a)
S(a)
Then A 6 P s(a) (s') for each such s', so A 6 X s(a) (s)
A
By Lemma 1,
since <s, s’> 6 A s(a) and therefore %A 6 s.
'

,

.

,
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since A e XS'«(S)
then A 6 P s -'(s), and so, by the proof of
condition 2, ->A 0~>A, OA, %A, ->dA and %A 2 (-iQA 3
0->A) are
in P S(a)
Suppose, for purposes of reductio, that Da
is
not in s
We have by 3 a 7
t

.

,

2

i~n

(

I Da 2

o^a

so by the transmission theorem <oA 2 (iQa 2 OvA) e s
By
two applications of MP-closure, then, O-iA e s.
And by the
proof of the left to right version of 4i, ~iA is in some s'
such that <s, s'> E A S(j>
But, by Lemma 5, no sentence and
its negation are both in some worldset.
Contradiction.
So,
.

.

A

e

4i

(left to right): V s(a) (OA,

s

and V s(0 (QA,
‘

>

=1.

s)

worldset is N-consistent
consistent, and

[

(s)

(s)

u

c sy

u A]

,

s)

so,

= 1, then OA E s
Each
by Lemma 3, '(s) u A is N-

"

Let s' be an N-consistent extention of
A such that [s'
= s^.
Such a set is guaranteed by
Lemma 4.
In order to prove that <s, s'> E A s{a)
we only
need to show that “(s) c s'
This is obvious since s' 2
(s) u A.
And, equally obvious is that A 6 s'.
So, there is
a worldset s' such that <s, s’> E A S(a) and V(A, s') = 1.
.

]

'

,

4i

(right to left):

If V(A, s')
is a branch of s.

=1

and <s, s'> e A S(a) then
Since A e s' then A e
P s<0,) (s'), so A e X S(a) s
and %A E s
By Lemma 1, A 6 P S(a) (s)
and OA, ->A -<0A, %A, and <%A 3 (- OA o ->A) are in P s(a) (s)
Suppose OA is not in s, then, since OA 6 P s(a) (s), ^OA is in
s
We have

Acs'

and

s'

(

.

)

1

,

t-

N

%A

o

(->0A 3

,

.

ChA)

by Theorem 3a. 7, and since %A 2 1 OA 2 CbA) is in P sla) (s),
then, by the transmission theorem, <%A 2 (- OA 2 D-iA) e s.
By two applications of MP-closure, we get that ChA E s.
Then, by the left to right version of 4h, we get ->A E s'
But, no sentence and its negation are in the same Nconsistent worldset. Contradiction.
So, OA E s and V(OA,
(

1

.

s)

=

1.

Condition

5.:

Clearly, if A
define s' to be s ? n s
For any s E S(a)
s<a)
(s)
then Acs'. We just need to show that
and A 6 X
is a worldset:
.

,

,
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E

s'

s

N consistency: s' is a subset of s. Since, by
hypothesis, s e S(a), then s is a worldset and is Nconsistent.
But, s is N-consistent only if every finite
subset of s is N-consistent. And, every finite subset of
s
is a finite subset of s, since s' c s.
So, every finite
subset of s is N-consistent. Thus, s' is N-consistent.
(i)

MP-closure:
Suppose A e s' and A=>B e s'.
Since s' c
then A and A=>B are in s.
But, by hypothesis, s is a
worlset and so is MP-closed. So, B e s.
Since A=>B e s'
then g (A=>B) 6 s.
By the proof of condition 2, then,
e
and so B 6 s g
So, B 6
s n sg
i.e. B e s'
(ii)

s,

.

(

iii

,

= [s']: If A e s g
then
e s
[s'], then A e s' or ->A s s'; if A € s

)

s

.

.

,

If A e
then
if ->A e s'
then <T->A e s, and by proof of cons it ion 2,
s.
So, in either case <?A E s and A e s g

e

'

,

,

%A

s;
6

.

'

(iv) EJ-(s) c s':
If A e
then Qa e s
So,
s
P s(a) (s) and by the proof of condition 2, (Qa => A)
and (QA => <?A) 6 P Sla, (s)
We know, by axiom T:
(

)

,

.

Da e
e P s(a) (s)

.

b(OA ^

A)

an application of Corollary
also know, by axiom «?, that:
So,

h(QA

=5

3

gives us that A

e

We

s.

gh)

another application of Corollary 3 gives us that &A
Since s' = s n s g Acs'.

So,

so A e s g

.

e

s,

,

Suppose V(OA, s) = 1, and <s, s’> 6 A s(a> and A
6 x
(s'
Then OA 6 s and therefore OA 6 P s(a) (s)
By the
proof of condition 2, then, OA => 0(^A
OA)
P S(a) (s)
e
We
know, by axiom S5
that:

Condition

6.:

s(a)

)

.

.

.

'

hOA ^

Q (g’A

^ OA)

,

an application of Corollary 3 gives us that Q(^A => OA)
So, («Ta
Since <s, s’> are in A s(a) then Q"(s) c s'
e s.
So, by
But, since A 6 X s<0,) (s'), then ITa 6 s'.
OA) 6 s'.
=
1.
and
thus
V(OA,
s')
OA
s',
Mpclosure,
6
so,

,

.

This completes the proof of the Completeness Lemma. We
conclude this section with a proof of the completeness of
BML
We need just one additional lemma:
.
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LEMMA 6: Every O-consistent sentence is a member
of some
maximal O-consistent set.
PROOF: Only a sketch of the proof need be provided.
Via a
construction similar to that used in the proof of Lemma
4,
we enumerate
and then add into our "root" set, at each'
stage of the construction, the next sentence in the
enumeration, so long as the result is O-consistent.
The
resulting infinite union will be both O-consistent itself
and maximal

THE COMPLETENESS THEOREM: For any sentence
only if A is a theorem of BML.

A,

A is BML- valid

PROOF: This statement is equivalent ot the statement that if
A is not a theorem of BML then it is not BML-valid.
Suppose
A is not a theorem, then ->A is O-consistent. By Lemma 6,
every O-consistent sentence is a member of some maximal 0consistent set a. Consider the C-model generated by a.
Since ->A is in a, V(^A, a) = 1.
So, V(A, a) = 0.
So, since
every C-model is a BML model, there is a BML-model in which
A is not true. Thus, A is not BML-valid.
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A

Soundness of BML(P)

.

BML,

I present here only a sketch of the soundness
proof for
relative to the semantics.

Axiom

K. Assume, for the purposes of a reductio
that K is
not true in every model.
Then there is some model M such
that D(P ^ Q) and DP are true at a M and DQ is false at a
M
But, then Q is not true at some world w accessible from a
M
and since the projections of w are identical to the
existents of a M and Q is among the existents of w, then Q
is false at w. But, (P 3 Q) and P are true at each world
accessible from a M and so at w.
So, Q is true at w.
Contradiction
,

.

,

,

,

Axiom T

Suppose that T is not true in every model.
Then it
is not true at some cx M in some model M.
So, since every
sentence is either true or false at the actual world of each
model, then T is false at a M
So, DP is true at a M
and P
is false at a M
Since dP is true at a M P is true at every
world accessible from a M
According to semantic condition
one of these accessible worlds is a world w in which each
5
sentence among the existents of a M and thus each sentence,
has the same truth value that it has at a M
But, then P is
.

.

,

.

,

.

,

,

.

false at w.

Contradiction.

Axiom D (Right to left) Assume OP is true at a M for some
arbitrary model M. Then P is true at some world w
accessible from a M
So, ->P is not true at w, and then CbP
is not true at a M
Since every sentence is either true or
false at a M then Cbp is false at a M
So, ->[Ibp is true at
(Left to right direction recapitualtes this reasoning in
aM
.

,

.

.

.

,

.

reverse)
Suppose, for reductio, that OP 3 (^’P 3 OP) is
Then, since every
not true at some a M for some model M.
sentence is true or false at a M OP is true at a M and D(^P
3 OP) is false at a M
So, there is a world w, accessible
from a M such that P is true at w and (^P 3 OP) is not true
Since every sentence is in the projections of all
at w.
worlds accessible from the actual world, then (^P 3 OP) is
So, ^P is true at w and OP is false at w.
false at w.
since OP is true at a M and w is
But, by condition 6
accessible from a M then OP is true at w. Contradiction.

Axiom

S5

'

.

,

,

,

.

,

,

,

,

Suppose the schema is false for some sentences A
Schema
and B containing the same proposition letters. Then there
is a model M and world w in M, accessible from a M such that
.

,
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is not true at w.
Since, every sentence is in the
projections of any world accessible from a
then
M
is
false at w.
Assume £a is true and
is false at w.
Then
A is in the existents of w, and by condition 2 all of the
letters in A are in the existents of w, and since these are
the same letters as in B, B is in the existents of w and
is true at w.
Contradiction.
Parallel reasoning applies to
the assumption that
is false and
is true.

t?A

'

,

,

Schema DPC
Condition 4 has the result that every PC wff A
is true at every world in which it is among the projections.
Since, for every model M, all sentences are in the
projections of any world accessible from o M then A is true
at each such world.
Hence, by condition 4 h, QA is true at
a M in every model.
.

,

RSN.
Suppose A is true at a M for each model M. And
suppose, for reductio, that D[^A 3 A) is not true at a M in
every model M. Then there is a model M, such that
(g’A 3
A) is false at a M in M.
Then (&K 3 A) is not true at some
world w accessible from a M
Since every sentence is in the
projections of any world accessible from a M then (&A 3 A)
is false at w.
So, %A is true at w and A is false at w.
.

,

303

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackermann, Diana
(1985) " Plantinga s Theory of Proper Names", in Alvin
Pl3.nt.ing3., Tomberlin and van Inwagen eds
Reidel
'

.

Adams

,

R M
(1979) "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity",
Journal of
Philosophy vol 76, no. 1, pp 5-26.
,

.

.

(1981)

.

"Actualism and Thisness", Synthese 49, pp

.

3-42.

Almog, Joseph
(1986) "Naming without Necessity", Journal of Philosophy
83, pp. 210-42.
"Logic and the World",
Wettstein, pp. 43-66.
(1989)

in Almog,

Perry and

Almog, J., J. Perry and H. Wettstein, eds.
(1989) Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University
Press

Anderson, C. Anthony
(1984) "General Intentional Logic",
Guenthner, Vol. II, pp 355-85.

in Gabbay and

.

(1989) "Russelian Intentional Logic", in Almog, Perry and
Wettstein, pp. 67-103.

Armstrong, David
(1989) A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge
University Press.

Austin David (ed.
(1988) Philosophical Analysis
Kluwer Academic Publishers.

:

A Defense by Example,

Austin, David
(1990) What is the Meaning of This? A Puzzle about
Demonstrative Belief, Cornell University Press.
Bacon, John,
(1988) "Four Modal Modelings", Journal of Philosophical
Logic 17, pp. 91-114.

304

Bauerle, Rainer and Cresswell, M. J.
(1988) "Propositional Attitudes", Gabbay and Guenthner
Vol.IV, pp. 491-512.

Bene i venga Ermanno
(1986) "Free Logics",
pp. 373-426.
,

in Gabbay and Guenthner, Vol.

Bigelow, John C.
(1988) "Real Possibilities",
pp. 37-64.

Ill

Philosophical Studies 53,

Phillip
"Reducing Possible Worlds to Language",
PhilosophicalStudies 52, pp 331-55.

Bricker,

(1987)

,

.

(1989) "Quantified Modal Logic and the Plural De Re",
Midwest Journal of Philosophy, 14, pp 372-94.
.

Broadie, Alexander
(1987) Introduction to Medieval Logic, Oxford Clarendon
:

Robert
(1984) "Basic Modal Logic",

Bull,

Vol.

II,

pp.

in Gabbay and Guenthner,

1-88.

Buridan, John
(1966) Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, trans
introduction by T.K. Scott, New York.

.

and with an

Carnap, Rudolf
(1958) Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and
Modal Logic, University of Chicago Press.

Cartwright, Richard
(1987) Philosophical Essays, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, 1987.
Chellas, Brian
(1980) Modal Logic, Cambridge University Press.

Chierchia, Gennaro and Turner, Raymond
(1988) "Semantics and Property Theory", Linguistics and
Philosophy 11, 1988, pp. 261-302.
Chierchia, Gennaro, Partee, Barbara H.and Turner, Raymond
(1989a) Properties, Types and Meaning, Volume I:
Foundational Issues, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
305

Properties Types and Meaning, Volume II: Semantic
Kluwer Academic Publishers.

(1989b)

,

Issues

Chisholm, Roderick
(1981) The First Person, University of Minnesota Press.

"Possibility Without Haecceity" Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, Vol XI, 1986, pp 157-64.

(1986)

,

.

.

"Why Singular Propositions", in Almog, Perry and
Wettstein, pp. 145-150.

(1989)

Church, Alonzo
(1951) "A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and
Denotation", in Structure, Method and Meaning: Essays in
Honor of Henry M. Sheffer, ed. by Paul Henle, H. M. Kallen
and S. K. Langer, pp 3-24. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
.

An Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton
University Press.
(1956)

Cresswell, Max
(1973) Logics and Languages, Metheuen and Co. LTD,
(1985) Structured Meanings
Technology Press.

1973.

Massachusetts Institute of

(1988)

Semantical Essays, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

(1990)

Entities and Indices, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Davies, Martin

Meaning Quantification, Necessity Themes in
Philosophical Logic, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
(1981)

:

Davies, Martin and Humbertstone Lloyd
(1980) "Two Notions of Necessity", Philosophical Studies
1-30.
38, pp
,

.

Deutsch, Harry
(1989) "On Direct Reference" in Almog,
Wettstein, pp. 167-96.
(1990)

Perry and

"Contingency and Modal Logic", Philosophical

Studies 60, pp. 89-102.

306

Dowdy,

R., Robert Wall and Stanley Peters
Introduction to Montague Semantics
Publishing Company.
D.

(1981)

D.

Reidel

Earman, John
(1991a) "Kant, Incongruous Counterparts and the Nature
of
Space and Space— time"
in Van Cleve and Frederick
pp. 131-49.
,

(1991b) "On the Other Hand ...: A Reconsideration of Kant,
Incongrous Counterparts and Absolute Space", in Van
Cleve and Frederick, pp 235-55.
.

Etchemendy, John
(1990) The Concept of Logical Consequence, Harvard
University Press.
Evans, Gareth
(1982) The Varieties of Reference, Oxford Clarendon Press.
:

The Collected Papers, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

(1985)

:

Kit

Fine,

"Postscript" in Prior and Fine (1977)

(1977)

(1885) "Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist
Discourse", Alvin Plantinga, Tomberlin and van Inwagen
eds
Reidel
.

,

Fitch, G. W.
(1988) "The Nature of Singular Propositions" in Austin
(1988)
pp. 281-98
,

Forbes, Graham
(1985) The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford Clarendon
Press
:

(1989)

Languages of Possibility, Basil Blackwell Inc.

Gabbay, D. and Guenthner, F. (eds.)
(1984) Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol II,
Publishing
(1986) Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol III,
Publishing
(1989) Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol
Publishing

307

IV,

D.

D.

D.

Reidel

Reidel

Reidel

Geach,

Peter and Max Black (eds.)
(1952) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of
Gottlob Frege, Basil Blackwell Inc.

Hazen, Allen
(1976) "Expressive Completeness in Modal Language",
Journal of Philosophical Logic 5, pp 25-46.
.

(1979a) "One of the Truths about Actuality", Analysis
1-3
9.1, pp

3

.

.

"Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic",
Journal of Philosophy 76, pp 319-38.
(1979b)

.

Hegstrom, Roger A. and Dilip K. Kondepudi
(1990) "The Handedness of the Universe",
American, January 1990, pp. 108-15.

Scientific

Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J.
(1968) An Introduction to Modal Logic, Methuen.
(1984)

A Companion to Modal Logic, Methuen.

Kaplan, David
(1969) "Quantifying In", Donald Davidson and Jaacko
Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work
of W. V. Quine, Reidel, pp 178-214.
.

(1978) "Dthat", in Peter Cole (ed.
Vol
9: Pragmatics, Academic Press,

)

.

"Transworld Heir Lines",
88-109.

(1979a)

pp

.

Syntax and Semantics,
pp 221-43.
.

in Loux

(1979),

"How to Russell a Frege-Church" in Loux (1979),
210-24.

(1979b)

pp

.

(1989a)

"Demonstratives",

(1989b)

"Afterthoughts",

in Almog et al
in Almog et al

.

.

,

,

pp
pp.

.

481-563.
565-614.

"Opacity", in L. A. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.),
The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Open Court, 1986, pp. 229(1986)

89

.

308

Konyndyk
(1986)

Press

,

Kenneth
Introductory Modal Logic, University of Notre Dame

Kripke,

Saul
(1971) "Identity and Necessity", in Milton Munitz (ed.)
Identity and Individuation New York University Press,
pp. 135-64.
(1979) "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference", in
Peter A. French, Theodore H. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K.
Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the
Philosophy of Language, University of Minnesota Press,

pp.

3-27.

(1980)

Lewis,

Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press.

David
"Possible Worlds", Loux (1979), pp. 110-28.

(1979)

(1983) "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic",
Philosophical Papers, vol 1, Oxford University Press.
.

(1986)

Lewy,

The Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell Inc.

Casimir
Meaning and Modality, Cambridge University Press.

(1976)

Loux, Michael J. (ed.
(1979) The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the
Metaphysics of Modality, Cornell University Press.

Lycan, William
(1979) "The Trouble with Possible Worlds", Loux (1979),
pp. 274-316.

Lycan, William and Shapiro, Stewart
(1986) "Actuality and Essence", Midwest Studies in
Philosophy XI, University of Minnesota Press, pp 343-77.
.

McKay, Thomas J.
(1991) "Representing De Re Belief" Linguistics and
Philosophy 14, pp. 711-39.

McMichael, Alan
(1983a) "A Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds",
The Philosophical Review XC II no.l, pp 49-66.

309

(1983b)

"A New Actualist Modal Semantics",

Philosophical Logic

12,

pp

.

Journal of

73-99.

(1986) "Actualism: Still Problematic", Philosophical
Studies50 1986.

McTaggart, John McT. E.
(1927) The Nature of Existence (in two volumes),
Cambridge University Press.
Menzel, Chris
(1990) "Actualism, Ontological Commitment and Possible
Worlds Semantics", Synthese 85, pp 355-89.
.

"The True Modal Logic",
Logic 20, pp. 331-74.
(1991)

Journal of Philosophical

Moore, G. E.
(1966) Lectures on Philosophy, Casimir Lewy (ed.
Allen and Unwin Ltd.

)

,

George,

Stephen
(1990) Descriptions, MIT Press.

Neale,

Nerlich, Graham
(1991a)

"Hands,

Frederick, pp

.

Knees and Absolute Space" in Van Cleve and
151-72.

(1991b) "Replies to Sklar and Earman" in Van Cleve and
Frederick, pp 257-62.
.

Parsons, Terry
(1980)

Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press.

Pendlebury, Michael
(1987) " Stalnaker on Inquiry", Journal of Philosophical
Logicl6 pp 229-72.
.

Perry,

John

(1977) "Frege on Demonstratives",
pp. 474-97.

Philosophical Review

86,

Plant inga, Alvin
(1974) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford University Press.
(1979a) "Actualism and Possible Worlds",
pp. 253-73.
310

in Loux

(1979),

(1979b) "Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals’"
in Loux (1979), pp 146-65.
.

(1979c) "De Essentia", Grazer Philosophische Studien 7/8:
Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Ernest
Sosa (ed.
pp 101-21
)

,

(1983) "On Existentialism",
pp 1-20.

Philosophical Studies 44,

.

(1985a) "Self-Prof ile"
pp. 3-97.
(1985b)

,

Tomberlin and Van Inwagen,

"Replies", Tomberlin and van Inwagen, pp

.

313-96.

(1987) "Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal
Reductionism"
Philosophical Perspectives 1, Metaphysics,
189-231.
pp.
,

Pollock, John
(1985) "Plantinga on Possible Worlds", Tomberlin and Van
Inwagen, pp. 121-44.
(1984) The Foundations of Philosophical Semantics
Princeton University Press.

Prior, Arthur
(1957) Time and Modality, Oxford University Press.

Present, and Future, Oxford University Press.

(1967)

Past,

(1968)

Papers on Time and Tense, Oxford University Press.

(1971)

Objects of Thought, Oxford University Press.

Papers in Logic and Ethics, University of
Massachusetts Press.
(1976)

Prior, A. N. and Kit Fine
(1977) Worlds, Times, and Selves, University of
Massachusetts Press.

Proust, Joelle

Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic
Proposition from Kant to Carnap, trans by Anastasios
Albert Brenner, University of Minnesota Press.
(1989)

.

311

Recanati, Francois
(1988) "Rigidity and Direct Reference",
Studies 53, pp. 103-17.

Philosophical

Richard, Mark
(1983) "Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief",
Journal of Philosophical Logic 12, pp. 425-52.
(1987) "Quantification and Leibniz's Law", The
Philosophical Review 96, pp558-78.

(1990) Propositional Attitudes An Essay on Thoughts and
How we Ascribe Them, Cambridge University Press.
:

Russell, Bertrand
(1956) "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in Logic and
Knowledge, R.C.
Marsh ed. George, Allen, and Unwin.
,

Salmon, Nathan
(1981)

Reference and Essence, Princeton University Press.

(1986)

Frege's Puzzle, MIT/Bradford, 1986.

"Reference and Information Content: Names and
Descriptions", in Gabbay and Guenther, Vol. IV.
(1989)

Salmon, Nathan and Scott Soames (eds.)
(1988) Propositions and Attitudes Oxford University
Press

Lawrence
(1991) "Incongruous Counterparts, Intrinsic Features and
the Substantivality of Space", in Van Cleve and Frederick,

Sklar,

pp.

173-86.

Scott
"Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and
Semantic Content", in Salmon and Soames, pp. 197-239.

Soames,

(1988)

Stalnaker, Robert
(1979) "Possible Worlds", Loux, pp
(1984)

.

225-34.

Inquiry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Press
Thomason, Richmond
(1989) "Motivating Ramified Type Theory",
Turner, Vol. I, pp 47-62.
.

312

in Chierchia and

Tomberlin, James E. and Peter Van Inwagen (eds.)
(1985) Profiles, Vol
5: Alvin Plantiga, Reidel
.

Van Bentham, Johan
(1986) Essays in Logical Semantics,
Co

D.

Reidel Publishina
y

.

A Manual of Intentional Logic, (2nd ed. ) Center
for the Study of Language and Information, Leland Stanford
Junior University.
(1988)

Van Cleve

James and Robert E. Frederick (eds.
(1991) The Philosophy of Right and Left, Kluwer Academic
Publishers
,

Van Inwagen, Peter;
(1985)
Plantinga on Trans-World Identity", in Tomberlin
and Van Inwagen, pp. 101-20.
"

(1986) "Two Concepts of Possible Worlds", Midwest Studies
in Philosophy XI, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 185-

214

.

Edward N.
Intentional Logic and the Metaphysics of
Intentionality, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press

Zalta,

(1988)

313

